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* LOS OLV~DADOS, THE FORGOZTEN, is the title of a 1950 film by Spanish 
filmmaker Luis ,Bbiiuel about impoverished children living on the streets of Mexico 
City. See VIRG~IA HIGGINBOTHAM, LUIS B ~ E L  77-82 (1979) (describing film's 
plot). The beginning of the film features a panorama of famous cities as the 
narrator states that "this film, based on real life, is not optimistic . . .  but leaves 
the solution to this problem in the hands of the progressive forces of our time." 
GWYNNE DWARDS, THE DISCREET ART OF LUIS B U ~ E L  92 (1982). I feel the same 
way about this Article's approach to the issues discussed. 
** Professor of Law, University of California at  Davis. A.B. 1980, University 
of California at  Berkeley; J.D. 1983, Harvard University. Arturo Ghdara  and 
Virginia Salazar offered helpful comments on the prefatory story. Chris Cameron, 
Richard Delgado, Sergio Ghcia-Rodriguez, Peter Margulies, Hiroshi Motomura, 
Michael Olivas, Steve Roscow, Robert Rubin, and Jim Smith provided constructive 
feedback on a draft of this Article and helped correct a multitude of errors and 
sharpen the analysis immeasurably. My colleague John Oakley provided me with 
useful materials on the question whether lawful permanent residents are 
constitutionally entitled to the franchise and engaged in helpful discussions with 
me on the subject. Ming-Yuen Fong and Saul Garcia conducted the labor-intensive 
review of Supreme Court decisions and legislative histories of immigration 
legislation. Despite the long hours and tedium of the task as well as my 
unrealistic demands, they did an excellent job in good humor. Kerry Bader, 
Kathryn Gimple, and Nipa Rahim also provided helpful research assistance. I 
appreciate the help, support, and encouragement of all these people and am 
confident that they cannot imagine how much they influenced this Article. Finally, 
generous financial assistance from the UC Davis School of Law and the UC Davis 
Academic Senate is deeply appreciated. 
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"I had never heard of New Haven, Connecticut. But that 
is where we ended up after leaving Peru. I also never had a 
lawyer as a boss. But Lillian and I got work with two lawyers. 
Let me tell you what happened . . . . 
The 'Senate investigators' called me at  work. They said 
that they wanted to talk to me about my old boss. They said 
that they had nothing to do with 'La Migra.' I wondered. 
My friend Pablo had been picked up by La Migra. He 
had been here for ten years and didn't want to be sent back to 
Mexico. He was jailed in bad conditions. They kept telling 
him that he would be sent back because there were too many 
'wetbacks' in this country. 
Other fkiends told me stories like Pablo's. We knew that 
La Migra would do whatever it took. It reminded me of the 
police in Peru. 
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I was worried that these 'investigators' would tell La 
Migra about me. Didn't they all work together anyway? But I 
was afraid not to talk to them. 
I told them about the trip to the United States from 
Peru. We were lucky and quickly got work in the home of the 
rich lawyers. They paid us well. They gave us room and board 
in a big house. Lillian watched their baby boy and I drove 
them around town and did odd jobs. 
Life had been hard in Peru. Work was hard to find. 
Wages were low. We worked long hours. El Sendero Luminoso 
[the Shining Path] made life dangerous. The government 
wasn't any better. Even so, the decision to leave family and 
friends was not an easy one. 
Coming to the United States was hard. The trip was 
dangerous and expensive. We paid all the money we had to 
fly to the United States as  tourists. Friends had told us that 
along the border there were many Migra officers with guns 
and jeeps and helicopters and bright lights. 'If you try to go i t  
alone, they will kill you,' we were told. 
I told the 'Senate investigators' all that I knew. They 
kept saying that the lawyers, our old bosses, broke the law. I 
told them that the couple had been good to us. I explained 
that I had moved out because I was arguing too much with 
Lillian. 
After my talk with the 'investigators,' newspaper 
reporters came looking for me. They asked a lot of questions 
about one of my old bosses, the woman. 
Then La Migra found me. I received a letter addressed to 
me (Victor Cordero) in an official-looking envelope. After 
reading it a few times, a friend and I figured it out. They 
wanted me to turn myself in! 
I should have known better than to have believed the 
'Senate investigators.' They all work together, just like in 
Peru. 
I didn't want to be jailed. I didn't want to go home. I 
didn't want to leave Lillian. But there was no choice. These 
words rang in my ears: 'they will kill you.' The guns, jeeps, 
helicopters, and bright lights and the stories of Pablo and the 
others kept coming back to me. 
I wrote a note to Lillian. The next day, I got on a plane 
for the long trip home to Peru." 
The prefatory story might sound vaguely familiar. 
President Clinton's first Attorney General nominee, Zoe Baird, 
employed the two undocumented persons (Victor and Lillian 
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Cordero) on which the story is loosely based.' The nomination 
of Baird, who had employed the Corderos in violation of federal 
law: sparked a national furor? The controversy refused to die 
quickly. A second Attorney General candidate, a respected 
federal district court judge, who employed an undocumented 
worker from Trinidad in her home when i t  was lawful, was 
pressured by the Clinton administration to withdraw from 
consideration: 
Heated debates (particularly in law school faculty lounges, 
I assume) took place in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the 
two Attorney General candidates. Among the frequently 
discussed issues were the propriety of the developing litmus 
test for a high level appointment in the Clinton administration 
(i.e., a nominee could never have employed undocumented 
workers, even if entirely legal a t  the time, or failed to pay 
social security taxes): the alleged double standard used in 
applying the test to f i l l  Cabinet  position^,^ and the manner in 
1. This story is not all factual. Indeed, I made parts of it up out of whole 
cloth. Based on my experience representing and working with undocumented 
persons, I filled in the gaps in the publicly available information about Victor and 
Lillian Cordero with details about what might have been. Because i t  in no way 
purports to represent the "truth," use of the story might be subject to criticism. 
See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on 
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 832-35 (1993). 
Nothing in the story is meant to suggest that, assuming these facts to be true, 
the Corderos might or might not have been eligible for asylum in this country, or 
any other type of relief from deportation. See Huaman-Cornelio v. Board of 
Immigration Appeals, 979 F.2d 995 (4th Cir. 1992) (denying asylum to Peruvian 
national claiming fear of political persecution by the Shining Path). Political 
persecution by guerrillas and security forces in Peru, however, has been well- 
documented. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT 1993, at 236-39 (1992). 
2. In employing the Corderos, Baird violated provisions of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603 § 101(a), 100 Stat. 
3359, 3360-74 (codified as amended at  8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1988)), barring 
employment of undocumented persons, as  well as other laws. 
3. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus & Michael Isikoff, Clinton Withdraws Baird's 
Justice Nomination, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1993, a t  Al. 
4. See Ruth Marcus, Babysitter Problems Sink Second Clinton Prospect; Wood 
Withdraws from Consideration as  Attorney General, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1993, a t  
A1 (reporting that Judge Kimba Wood employed an undocumented person before 
IRCA's passage in 1986). 
5. See Martin Fletcher, Washington Team Suffers Ordeal of Aliens Witch 
Hunt', THE TIMES (London), Feb. 10, 1993. One Washington lawyer reportedly was 
removed from the "short list" of Attorney General candidates for failing to pay 
social security taxes for a domestic employee. See Karen Tumulty & John Broder, 
Ron Brown Failed to Pay Employer Tax, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1993, a t  Al. 
6. See, e-g., Michael Kranish, Woes Over Workers: Clinton Denies a Double 
Standard, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 1993, at 1; Catherine S. Manegold, Looking for 
an  Attorney General: The Reaction; Women are Frustrated by Failed Nominations, 
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which the debacle highlighted the national childcare problem 
with its disparate impact on career women.7 
However, a pressing issue to an isolated segment of society 
implicated by the Attorney General nominating process went 
largely unnoticed. The national dialogue had a very real impact 
on the lives of undocumented persons in this country. As a 
result of the new public awareness, undocumented domestic 
workers feared the loss of their jobs and worse? Furthermore, 
the publicity intensified already simmering anti-immigrant 
sentiment in a nation reeling from an economic reces~ion.~ 
This national discussion, however, was oblivious to its impact 
on one of the most vulnerable groups in American society. 
The human toll on the lives of two fairly ordinary 
undocumented persons is telling. Contacted by the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) after his identity came to 
light in Baird's nomination process, Victor Cordero returned to 
Peru rather than face likely deportation proceedings.'' His 
estranged wife, Lillian Cordero, who had cared for Zoe Baird's 
child, was fired immediately by a successor employer when her 
immigration status became public and soon thereafter returned 
to Peru." Despite a willingness to work a t  jobs that citizens 
apparently did not desire12 and despite the fact that they in 
no way contributed to any of the social ills often attributed to 
"illegal aliens,"13 the plight of the Corderos was buried in the 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, 5 1, at 22; Tumulty & Broder, supra note 5. This issue 
was raised after the previously confirmed Commerce Secretary admitted that he 
failed to pay social security taxes in c o ~ e c t i o n  with the employment of a part- 
time cleaning person. 
7. See, e.g., Erica Jong, The Mother of All Debates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 
1993, at  A23; Anthony Lewis, Abroad a t  Home; It's Gender, Stupid, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 8, 1993, at A17. 
8. See Douglas Martin, After Wood and Baird, Illegal-Nanny Anxiety Creeps 
Across Many Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1993, at  A13. 
9. See Sergio Gdrcia-Rodriguez, Burdening the Care Giver, RECORDER (San 
Francisco), Feb. 24, 1993, at 9. See generally infra text accompanying notes 82-129 
(analyzing "new" nativism). 
10. See Illegal Worhr Disappears, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, at  8; see also 
Linda Himelstein, INS Summons Peruvian Couple, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993, a t  
1 (explaining circumstances concerning INS attempt to contact Corderos). 
11. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Inside the Whirlwind, AM. LAW., Mar. 1993, at  64, 
69; Baird's Former Nanny Agrees to Leave the Country, INS Says, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
29, 1993, at  A24. 
12. See Nomination of Za? E. Baird as Attormy General, Hearing of the 
Senate Judiciary Comm., FED. NEWS SERV., Jan. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, Fednew File (testimony of Baird describing efforts to obtain 
childcare). 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 89-92 (discussing scapegoating of 
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discussion of the events. Their story went virtually untold. Its 
absence from the public discussion lends credence t o  the claims 
of critical race theorists, as well as critics of other stripes, who 
contend that the dominant in society often are ignorant of the 
travails of the subordinated.14 The episode also offers some 
revealing insights into immigration law and enforcement. 
Why was the human tragedy of the Corderos and 
undocumented workers for the most part ignored in the 
Attorney General uproar? This Article attempts to shed some 
light on this question as well as to sketch an explanation for a 
broader phenomenon with ramfications for the interpretation 
and enforcement of the immigration laws. The political 
insularity of non~itizens,'~ particularly those who come to the 
United States outside the avenues provided by the immigration 
laws, has consequences on the enforcement of the laws and the 
ability to change them. Many undocumented persons, marginal- 
ized through use of the label "illegal aliens,"16 live and work 
immigrants). 
14. A representative sample of some of my favorites in this genre includes 
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 
(1987); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND R I G ~ S  (1991); Richard 
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. 
L. REV. 2411 (1989); see also Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche 
Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians 
and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call 
of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991). For a look at a few immigration law 
landmarks through a storytelling lens, see Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My 
Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial 
History, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425 (1990). 
As is expected in the wake of a critical movement, the use of narrative in legal 
scholarship has provoked debate. Compare Farber & Sherry, supra note 1 (critically 
analyzing narrative in scholarship) with Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in 
School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993) (responding to 
criticism). 
15. The term "noncitizens" as used in this Article refers to two distinct 
groups, persons in the country who are undocumented and persons who are lawful 
permanent residents (LPR). An undocumented person is in the country in violation 
of the immigration laws. Undocumented persons for purposes of this Article include 
those who entered surreptitiously, see Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) 
$0 241(aXlXB), 275(a) (codified as amended a t  8 U.S.C. $8 1251(a)(l)(B), 1325(a) 
(1988)), as  well as persons who entered lawfully but remain here without proper 
documentation, for example, persons who overstayed their nonimmigrant visas, see 
INA 8 241(a)(lXCXi), 8 U.S.C. 8 125l(aXlXCXi); see also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF 
& DAVID A. MMtTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 215-58 (2d ed. 1991) 
(discussing nonimmigrant visas). In contrast, an immigrant lawfully admitted to 
this country is an LPR. See INA 8 101(aX20), 8 U.S.C. $ llOl(aX20) (1988). After 
five or more years of continuous residence in the United States, a LPR may be 
eligible to become a naturalized citizen. See INA 8 316(a), 8 U.S.C. 8 1427(a). 
16. See Kevin R. Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the Executive Branch's Asylum 
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in this country for lengthy periods without ever becoming 
lawful permanent residents or naturalized citizens. A large 
population of lawful permanent residents who never become 
naturalized also remain indefinitely in this country. As 
noncitizens, undocumented and lawful permanent residents 
lack the right to vote." Though advocacy groups are able t o  
exert some political pressure on their behalf, noncitizens cannot 
directly participate in the electoral process. Indeed, if they 
enter the political fray, noncitizens risk deportation by a 
government that they fear. Government therefore proceeds 
without direct input from a virtually invisible group of people 
whose daily lives are most vitally affected by its workings. 
Another factor minimizes the influence of noncitizens in 
the political process. Many of today's "legal" and "illegal" 
immigrants are people of color, especially from Mexico.18 As 
has been the case with past immigrant generations, they have 
been subject to  dis~rimination.'~ Unlike their European 
predecessors, however, the animus directed at the new 
immigrants may enjoy greater resilience. The color of their skin 
indefinitely ensures their weakness in the political process, 
even for those "illegals" who navigate the arduous process to 
become 
It would be extraordinary if the political insularity of the 
noncitizen population, which is most directly affected by the 
immigration laws and their enforcement, had no consequences. 
Though at times enjoying the support of diverse coalitions,2l 
Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 279, 281 n.5; see also Ibrahim J .  Wani, Truth, 
Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in Immigration Law, 
11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 53 (1989) (arguing that legal fictions in immigration law 
often are "distortions and misrepresentations" that are "used to achieve ends that 
would be unthinkable in other areas of American law and popular belief"). 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 41-42, 318-41. 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 43-48. 
19. See infia text accompanying notes 82-129. 
20. See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE B ~ O M  OF THE WELL: THE 
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) (arguing that racism is a permanent part of United 
States society). 
21. See infia text accompanying notes 55-60. Such coalitions sometimes have 
resulted in immigration laws notable for their compromises. See, e.g., IRCA 
$5 lOl(a), 201, 302, 8 U.S.C. $5 1324% 1255a, 1159-60 (1988) (providing for 
imposition of sanctions on employers who employ undocumented labor as well as 
amnesty and special agricultural worker programs); CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY 
MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE: SPECIAL ALERT, M MIGRATION ACT OF 
1990 8 1.02 (1991) (observing that Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 
104 Stat. 4978 (1990), has both "humanitarian" and "excessively severe" 
components and that "[mlany practitioners and scholars will regard the statute as 
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noncitizens lack the hard cash of electoral politics- 
votes-essential to protect their intereskz2 One therefore 
might expect that noncitizens generally would find i t  
particularly difficult to persuade Congress to "override" harsh 
interpretations of the immigration laws by the judiciary, a 
difficult endeavor even for well-organized interest groups 
composed of voting citizenry. This is true even when the 
interpretation is inconsistent with majoritarian will.23 
Moreover, without an electoral (or any other) check by the 
group most deeply affected by enforcement of the immigration 
laws, the bureaucracy hardly could be expected to correct 
unlawful, or lawful but heavy-handed, conduct in the ordinary 
course. Limited political power makes i t  inherently difficult to 
curb the misconduct of immigration agencies, especially in their 
everyday business which is effectively invisible to the average 
Evidence supports the legitimacy of these concerns. 
Congress has rarely overridden Supreme Court decisions 
adverse to immigrants, particularly those of far-reaching 
significance to the noncitizen community, and has failed to 
even scrutinize some of the most egregi~us.'~ Administrative 
agencies charged with enforcing the immigration laws, such as 
the INS and its enforcement arm, the Border Patrol, have been 
subject to persistent, credible, and deeply disturbing charges of 
unlawful, overreaching, and abusive condu~t. '~ Significant 
changes have been slow in coming or have not come at  all. 
Under these circumstances, neither the legislative nor 
a mixed bag of beneficial and punitive provisions"); see also Peter H .  Schuck, The 
Politics of Rapid Legal Change: Immigration Policy in the 1980s, 6 STUD. AM. POL. 
DEV. 37, 60-80 (1992) (analyzing circumstances surrounding the odd coalition 
supporting passage of IRCA and the Immigration Act of 1990). 
22. See infia text accompanying notes 49-81; see also Stephen H .  Legomsky, 
Political Asylum and the Theory of Judicial Review, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1205, 1208 
(1989) ("[L]ike other classes of aliens, asylum applicants are politically powerless. 
Unable to vote or to hold office, aliens lack the tools available to other 
constituencies for influencing legislative and executive policy.") (footnote omitted); 
Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 
MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1136 (1977) ("Aliens are unable to participate in the political 
process-forming alliances, trading support, and acquiescing in certain losses in 
order to make possible later gains-that permits other groups to promote their own 
interests in the legislative forum."). 
23. See infra text accompanying notes 181-278. 
24. See infia text accompanying notes 262-317. 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 181-261. 
26. See injkt text accompanying notes 262-78. 
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executive branches appear particularly accountable to the 
people most directly impacted by immigration law and 
enforcement. Judicial intervention that remedies this 
deficiency, as we shall see, also is a rarity. 
One initially might not be troubled by this scenario. 
Although lawful permanent residents stand on different legal 
footing:' undocumented noncitizens by definition are in the 
United States without legal authority. Consequently, some 
might argue that neither Congress nor the executive branch is 
obligated to consider the interests of the undocumented. 
Rather, the argument goes, the federal government should be 
able to treat the undocumented in the manner demanded by a 
majority of the electorate. This is true in some respects. The 
argument misses the mark, however, because of what I believe 
are mistaken assumptions about majoritarian desires. With 
respect to abuses by the immigration bureaucracy, 
Congress-representing the people-has passed immigration 
laws that are designed at least in part to protect noncitizens. 
Under the law, the immigration bureaucracy is obligated to 
serve the noncitizen community as well as enforce the integrity 
of the borders. With respect to  overriding Supreme Court 
decisions, it is entirely possible that a majority of the 
citizens-call it the Silent Majority-may oppose the 
interpretation of the laws and that, for reasons of practical 
politics, Congress fails to  act. The point that this Article seeks 
to emphasize is that, even when the interests of noncitizens are 
supported by a majority of the electorate, they may well lose in 
the political process. In other words, a dysfunctional political 
system molds immigration law and enforcement. 
Some may quarrel with the implicit assumption about 
majoritarian desires on the ground that public opinion polls 
suggest that a majority of the public consistently has desired 
limits on immigrati~n.~~ Even assuming that these surveys 
27. With respect to LPRs, the argument might be that, in order to participate 
in the political process, LPRs need only satisfy minimum requirements to become 
naturalized citizens. See infm note 50 (discussing some of requirements). I t  is 
uncertain how this justifies limiting their ability to obtain protection of laws 
passed by Congress for their benefit before they become citizens. In any event, the 
naturalization process may be significantly more difficult to navigate for noncitizens 
than widely perceived. See generally DAVID S. NOWTH, THE LONG GRAY WELCOME: 
A STUDY OF THE AMERICAN ATURALIZATION PROGRAM (1985). 
28. See Rita J. Simon, Immigration and American Attitudes, PUB. OPINION, 
JulyIAug. 1987, at  47; see also Dianne Klein, Majority in State Are Fed Up with 
IllegaZ Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1993, at A1 (reporting results of poll 
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accurately gauge public opinion on the question of reducing the 
flow of immigrants to this country, it is not necessarily true 
that  a majority of citizens agree that unlawful and unfair 
treatment of noncitizens by the immigration bureaucracy 
should be the rule or that inflexible and unjust interpretations 
of the immigration laws should remain intact.29 Admittedly, 
nativism and restrictionism periodically command the views of 
a maj~rity.~'  However, in light of deeply ingrained images in 
the national consciousness about the virtues of immigrants~' 
these times are not enduring, but rather are fleeting, though 
recurring, chapters in this country's history. Rigid restrictionist 
policies are in tension with democratic ideals.32 Consequently, 
they are not likely to sustain majority support for an extended 
period absent extraordinary circumstances. In any event, the 
critical point for the purposes of this Article is that, even when 
a majority of citizens side with noncitizens, such an alliance 
may not prevail. 
showing that 86% of those polled in California characterized immigration as a 
moderate or major problem); Rich Thomas & Andrew Murr, The Economic Cost of 
Immigration, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9, 1993, at  18-19 (reporting results of poll showing 
that 60% of persons surveyed currently believed that immigration "is a bad thing 
for this country today"); Americans Want to Reduce Immigration, Poll Shows, 
REUTER NEWS REP., July 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File 
(reporting that CNNlUSA TodayIGallup poll showed that 65% of adults "wanted 
immigration levels decreased," a significant increase from a poll taken only a few 
weeks before, and that 60% believed that too many immigrants were coming from 
Latin American, Asian, and Arab countries). See generally RITA J. SIMON & SUSAN 
H. ALEXANDER, THE AMBIVALENT WELCOME: PRINT MEDIA, PUBLIC OPINION AND 
IMMIGRATION (1993) (longer-term study of public opinion on immigration). 
Surveys suggest that any proposal to open the borders would face s i ~ i c a n t  
hostility. See generally OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES? THE ETHICAL AND 
POLITICAL ISSUES (Mark Gibney ed., 1988); Symposium on Duties Beyond Borders, 
98 ETHICS 647 (1988); cf. James A.R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens 
Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (1983) (analyzing obligations 
under international law to admit immigrants). 
29. See Vlae Kershner, Support for Wilson on Immigration, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 
19, 1993, at A1 (reporting results of Field Poll showing that those surveyed did 
not fully support some of the harshest proposals for dealing with immigration). 
30. The same has been said about the popularity of constitutional rights. For 
that reason, constitutional rights, generally speaking, trump majoritarian desires. 
The Constitution, at  least as interpreted by the Supreme Court, however, seldom 
offers protections to noncitizens. See infia text accompanying notes 172-80 
(discussing the plenary power doctrine). 
31. See infra text accompanying note 61. 
32. See JOHN HIGHAM, SEND THESE TO ME: JEWS AND OTHER IMMIGRANTS I  
URBAN AMERICA 30 (1975) ("Any restrictive policy . . . inevitably entails 
discriminations; and a system of discrimination that does not offend the democratic 
conscience has proved as yet unattainable."). 
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Part I1 of this Article describes today's new immigrants, 
analyzes the recent increase in anti-immigrant sentiment in 
the United States as two factors relevant to their political 
power, and considers a tragic example of the electoral 
powerlessness of noncitizens. Part I11 analyzes the evidence 
that the noncitizen population lacks the requisite power to 
respond effectively to adverse judicial interpretations of the 
immigration laws or to monitor meaningfully t h e  
administrative agencies administering those laws. This 
analysis is based on a review of Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting the comprehensive immigration statute, the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as 
through June 1993, and available evidence of the enforcement 
record of the INS, the agency primarily responsible for 
immigration enforcement. Finally, Part IV sketches some 
thoughts about strategies that might facilitate significant 
change in the current situation of noncitizens. It argues that  
images of the immigrant in the nation's consciousness must 
change for the better before immigration law and policy will. 
11. POLITICAL POWER OF THE "NEW" IMMIGRANTS 
A brief review of the dynamics of immigration politics in 
the United States offers considerable insight into the political 
influence of immigrants. A popular refrain in present-day 
political discourse about immigration is that increased 
imniigration enforcement is necessary and that, because abuse 
of the system is commonplace, tougher laws and policies are 
required. Locked out of the political process, noncitizens face 
formidable difficulties in challenging these restrictionist pleas 
and stemming the growth of anti-immigrant sentiment in 
difficult times. It seems doubtful that a majority of the 
electorate, for any sustained period of time, supports closing 
the door to all immigration and halting "abuse of the system" 
whatever the cost. However, because the average citizen does 
not perceive any direct impact from over-enforcement of the 
immigration laws, she is unlikely to act at all in response to 
such proposals. This is true even if immigration law and policy 
in the aggregate has significant effects on the domestic 
economy. More palpable bread-and-butter issues (eg. ,  the 
33. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. 1992)). 
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economy, unemployment, inflation, taxes, etc.) animate the 
political actions of much of the electorate in the United States. 
Thus, even if a majority disagrees with the interpretation of an 
immigration law or the manner in which it is enforced, 
corrective action through the political process often is unlikely. 
A. Immigrants Past and Present 
Before the late 1800s, the United States imposed relatively 
few restrictions on i m m i g r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Although often greeted with 
suspicion and hostility,a5 European immigrant groups eventu- 
ally managed to assimilate for the most part into American 
society? Assimilation was facilitated by the fact that immi- 
grants of this era typically became naturalized citizens. Local 
political machines courted the new citizens, thereby ensuring 
their integration into the political processs7 and assimilation 
into society as a whole.38 
The "new" immigrants differ in salient respects from their 
European predecessors. Perhaps most importantly, the number 
of persons who have entered or remain in the United States in 
contravention of the immigration laws, often referred to as 
"illegal aliens," grew dramatically by some accounts in the 
34. See generally SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION A D REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: STAFF REPORT 161-216 (1981) 
[hereinafter SCIRP REPORT] (describing briefly the history of immigration to the 
United States). 
35. See generally NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE 
MELTING POT (2d ed. 1970) (analyzing hostility faced by new immigrants to the 
United States). 
36. See generally K e ~ e t h  L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and 
Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986) (analyzing immigrants' historical 
tendency toward assimilation and group solidarity). 
37. See ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN 
AMERICAN CITY 32-51 (1961); Oscar Handlin, Why the Immigrant Supported the 
Machine, in THE CITY BOSS IN AMERICA 98 (Alexander B. Callow, Jr. ed., 1976); 
see also THOMAS P. OWEILL, MAN OF THE HOUSE 9 (1987) (telling story of Irish 
politician in Massachusetts who "would meet the new immigrants at the boat and 
take them straight over to register to vote" and then help them fmd a job and 
place to live); MALDWYN A. JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 121-25 (2d ed. 1992) 
(noting the significant political activity of immigrants in the 1800s). 
At various times in United States history, the impact of new immigrant citi- 
zens on the political process resulted in the growth of anti-immigrant sentiment. 
See SCIRP REPORT, supra note 34, at 167-76 (discussing political genesis of "alien" 
acts of late 1700s and rise of Know-Nothing Party in the 1800s); see also SAMUEL 
C. BUSEY, IMMIGRATION: ITS EVILS AND CONSEQUENCES 138-51 (photo reprint 1969) 
(1856) (condemning "political power of foreign votes"). 
38. See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL C~IZENSHIP AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 95-96 (1989). 
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1980~.~' The Justice Department estimated that, by 1987, be- 
tween four and five million "illegal aliens" lived in the United 
 state^.^' Undocumented persons in this country cannot vote or 
possess other benefits of citizenship. Although the Constitution 
does not compel the result, the states have unanimously disen- 
franchised all noncitizens, lawful permanent residents (i.e., 
immigrants who by definition are here lawfully and permanent- 
ly, but who have not been naturalized) as well as the undocu- 
mentede4' All noncitizens are lawfully excluded from the elec- 
toral process. Moreover, many lawful permanent residents 
decline to  take the steps necessary to become citizens and thus 
are indefinitely excluded from the e le~torate .~~ 
Besides the fact that a signifkant number are in the Unit- 
ed States unlawfully$3 another characteristic of the "new" im- 
migrants limits their political power. Many are people of color 
from Mexico, Central America, Viet Nam, and other developing 
nations.44 For a variety of reasons, such as their color and lan- 
39. See, e.g., RICHARD D. LAMM & GARY IMHOFF, THE IMMIGRATION TIME 
BOMB 1-26 (1985). 
40. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
1991 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALEXTION SERVICE 
169 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 INS STATISTICS]. This estimate, which showed a signif- 
icant increase in the undocumented population from previous estimates, may not 
accurately reflect the current state of affairs, particularly in light of the many peo- 
ple legalized under IRCA's amnesty provisions. See Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Undoc- 
umented Immigration Since IRCA: An Overall Assessment, in UNDOCUMENTED MI-
GRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 257 (Frank D. Bean et al. eds., 1990) (summariz- 
ing findings of several studies and concluding that "there has been a clear reduc- 
tion in the flow of undocumented immigrants across the U.S.-Mexico border ip the 
post-IRCA period") (emphasis deleted). 
41. See Gerald L. Neuman, 'We Are the People": Alien Sumage in German 
and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INVL L. 259, 291-310 (1992); Jamin B. 
Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical 
Meanings of Alien Sumage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1393-94 (1993); Rosberg, su- 
pra note 22. 
42. See 1991 INS STATISTICS, supra note 40, at 142 (showing that only about 
37% of LPRs who immigrated here in 1977 became naturalized through f ~ c a l  year 
1990). 
43. See Simon, supm note 28, at 49 (reviewing public opinion polls on immi- 
gration and concluding that people "hold more negative attitudes toward the un- 
documented immigrants than they do toward refugees and immigrants generally"); 
see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Good Aliens, Bad Aliens and the Supreme Court, 
in 9 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 46 (1987) (arguing that Supreme Court was influ- 
enced in immigration cases by whether noncitizen was lawfully in country ("good 
alien") or not ("bad alien")). 
44. See 1991 INS STATI~ICS, supra note 40, at 20 (presenting data of immi- 
grants granted lawful permanent residence in the United States in fiscal year 1991 
showing that 14 of the top 15 nations that sent 77.5% of new immigrants (with 
nearly 52% from Mexico) to United States were developing nations populated by 
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guage  difference^:^ these immigrants may not assimilate as 
easily into dominant American society as their European prede- 
c e s s o r ~ . ~ ~  Nativism reinforced by racism toward the new im- 
migrants therefore may enjoy greater staying power than that 
directed a t  past immigrant generations. The nagging persis- 
tence of discrimination against Asian-Americans, many of 
whose families immigrated here generations ago, lends support 
to the concern.47 This presence of racism also is consistent 
with the resurgence in hate crimes against immigrants of 
people of color); see also Peter H .  Schuck & Theodore Hsien Wang, Continuity and 
Change: Patterns of Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 115, 133 (1992) (finding that in 1989-90 about 70% of the judicial immigra- 
tion caseload came from countries populated predominantly by people of color: 
CaribbeanKentral America, Mexico, East Asia, Middle East, and South Pacific). 
45. See LAMM & IMHOFF, supra note 39, at  99-124 (emphasizing that, because 
English is the "tie that binds" American society, increasing immigration of non- 
English speakers threatens domestic tranquility); Michael S. Teitelbaum, Right 
Versus Right: Immigration and Refugee Policy in the United States, 59 FOREIGN AF- 
FAIRS 21, 43 (1980) (noting growing numbers of Spanish speakers immigrating to 
United States and the fear of linguistic divisions similar to those that exist in 
Canada); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 109 
(1992) ("[A] common language is a necessary bond of national cohesion in so heter- 
ogeneous a nation as America."). 
The push for "English only" laws may be one reaction to the language differ- 
ences of many of today's immigrants. See, e.g., Juan F .  Perea, Demography and 
Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official Eng- 
lish, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 340-50 (1992). Not coincidentally, John Tanton, who 
helped found the restrictionist Federation for American Immigration Reform, see 
infra text accompanying notes 94-95 & note 95, established US.  English, an orga- 
nization advocating a constitutional amendment designating English as the official 
language in the United States. See id. at  341 & n.401. 
46. See US. COMM'N ON CML RIGHTS, CML RIGHTS ISSUES FACING ASIAN 
AMERICANS IN THE 1990s 23 (1992) [hereinafter CML RIGHTS COMM'N] ("Not only 
do most [Asian] immigrants have limited English proficiency . . . but they bring 
with them cultures and religions that are unfamiliar to the American public. These 
differences often generate misunderstandings that contribute to antiAsian senti- 
ments."). But see infra text accompanying note 107 (observing indicators that at  
least some immigrants in f ad  are assimilating). 
47. See, e.g., CML RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 46, a t  22-48 (documenting 
hate crimes against Asians, including numerous murders). 
48. See, e.g., Michael J. Nuiiez, Note, Violence at Our Border: Rights and Sta- 
tus of Immigrant Victims of Hate Crimes and Violence dong  the Border Between 
the United States and Mexico, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1573 (1992) (discussing violence 
against Mexican citizens seeking entry to  United States); Deborah Sontag, Across 
the U.S., Immigrants Find the Land of Resentment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1992, at  
A1 (reporting hate crimes against various immigrant groups, primarily people of 
color). Hate crimes often go unreported, or are reported without mention of any 
racial component. See, e.g., CML RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 46, a t  30-31 (noting 
that intense media average of massacre of minority schoolchildren in Stockton, 
California failed to mention the possibility that the killings were racially motivated, 
which the California Attorney General ultimately concluded was the case); see also 
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1.  Limitations on noncitizen influence 
Noncitizens lack access to the political process. Because 
noncitizens cannot vote, politicians and administrators have 
limited incentive to respond to noncitizen demands, legitimate 
or not, particularly when facing resistance from a voting con- 
stituency. Perhaps more importantly, many undocumented per- 
sons fear apprehension by the INS and deportation. In other 
words, they risk removal from the country if they become politi- 
cally visible.49 Lawful permanent residents fear jeopardizing 
their legal status and possible deportation as well as undermin- 
ing their eligibility for nat~ralization.~' No other group faces 
such dire consequences from political action. Especially when 
combined with disenfranchisement, fear of retaliation might 
naturally be expected to chill noncitizens from engaging in 
political activity to challenge the status quo.51 It therefore 
should not be surprising that noncitizens in the United States 
generally tend to shy away from politics. 
Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2327 (1989) (observing that the racist nature of certain 
crimes is often ignored by media). 
49. See JOHN C. HARLEs, POLITICS IN THE LIFEBOAT: IMMIGRANTS AND THE 
AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC ORDER 6-7 (1993). 
50. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 US. 580 (1952) (upholding con- 
stitutionality of deporting LPR for past membership in communist party); Philip 
Monrad, Comment, Ideological Exclusion, Plenary Power, and the PLO, 77 CAL. L. 
REV. 831, 835 11.21 (1989) (describing case in which INS sought to deport Palestine 
Liberation Organization members who were LPRs on account of political activities); 
see also Katherine L. Pringle, Note, Silencing the Speech of Strangers: Constitu- 
tional Values and the First Amendment Rights of Resident Aliens, 81 GEO. L.J. 
2073 (1993) (noting various restrictions on First Amendment rights of LPRs). 
Naturalization requires, among other things, that a LPR establish "good moral 
character" and "attachment to constitutional principles." INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. 
8 1427(a) (1988). These requirements might tend to make any LPR considering 
naturalization cautious of acting politically. Certain political actions may indeed 
undermine eligibility for naturalization. See INA 8 313, 8 U.S.C 8 1424 (1988) 
(listing political organizations, including Communist Party, in which membership 
bars naturalization); see, e.g., Price v. INS, 962 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de- 
nied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3451 (1994) (denying petition for naturalization because LPR re- 
fused to specifically list every political organization with which he had been al& 
ated); see also Petition of Williams, 474 F. Supp. 384 (D. Ariz. 1979) (denying 
naturalization petition on ground that LPR who stated that religious beliefs pre- 
vented her from voting, being active in politics, serving on juries, and bearing 
arms and who refused to perform any obligations of citizenship that conflicted with 
religious beliefs, was not "attached" to constitutional principles). 
51. Even without the chilling effect of possible deportation, other factors, such 
as difficulties with English, lack of familiarity with political institutions in the 
United States, and cultural differences may make political participation difficult for 
some noncitizens. See HARLES, supra note 49, at 111-12. 
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Because undocumented noncitizens by definition remain in 
this country unlawfully, they might arguably be deserving of 
similar treatment (at least in terms of voting rights) as con- 
victed felons who in many states lose voting rights for violating 
the social contract. (The same argument obviously cannot force- 
fully be made with respect to lawful permanent residents.) 
Imprisoned felons therefore cannot use the vote to "check" 
prison administrators. Still, consistent with the terms of their 
incarceration, they in theory may attempt political activity 
such as writing their legislators without risk of officially sanc- 
tioned, or a t  least lawful, r e t r i b ~ t i o n . ~ ~  Convicted felons re- 
leased from prison, even if prohibited from voting, may engage 
in other political activities without qualification. Undocument- 
ed noncitizens, in contrast, run the daily risk that, if they en- 
gage in political activities of any sort, they will come to the 
attention of the INS and be deported. By necessity, they place a 
premium on low visibility and avoid the community prominence 
that  political activity might bring. 
Put simply, the persons most directly and detrimentally 
affected by INS enforcement excesses and deficiencies in pro- 
viding services lack both formal and informal standing in the 
political system. To exacerbate the difficulties of political mobi- 
lization, undocumented noncitizens who may be adversely af- 
fected by overzealous INS enforcement tomorrow often are not 
in the United States to complain today. The transient nature of 
part of the undocumented population therefore is a critical 
piece of the puzzle. Although not easy to organize other 
disempowered (and sometimes transient) groups such as  the 
homeless" or welfare recipients," it is inherently more diffi- 
cult to mobilize people not physically present in the jurisdiction 
who may be affected by government conduct within the juris- 
diction in the future. 
52. Although prison oficials may limit the activities of prison unions orga- 
nized to improve prison conditions, the mere existence of such organizations illus- 
trates that some political activities by this disenfranchised group-even when incar- 
cerated-are tolerated. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 
U.S. 119 (1977). 
53. See Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making 
Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 557-63 (1987- 
88) (discussing novel strategies to empower homeless). 
54. See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 
(1970) (describing efforts to organize welfare recipients). 
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To avoid exaggerating the one-sidedness of the political 
dynamic, we must acknowledge that noncitizens in fact have 
some input into the political process. Immigrant and refugee 
rights groups lobby the legislatures and agencies and advocate 
in the courts to protect noncitizens. These groups, with the 
assistance of others, have enjoyed some success in convincing 
Congress to enact laws, such as the Refugee Act of 1 9 8 0 , ~ ~  
and a t  times to override Supreme Court decisions.56 Perhaps 
more importantly, immigrant advocates have served as a mod- 
erating influence on immigration legislation. As certain provi- 
sions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986~' 
and the Immigration Act of 1990 attest:8 the "immigrant lob- 
by," including influential organizations such as  the American 
Immigration Lawyers Association and the Mexican American 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, have significantly influ- 
enced immigration legislation by ameliorating some harsh 
provisions and including some favorable to noncitizens, as  well 
as delaying so-called reform bills for lengthy periods." At var- 
ious times, business interests (particularly agricultural ones) 
desirous of cheap labor have joined coalitions with immigrant 
rights organizations in supporting the easing of restrictionist 
policies.60 
55. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
56. See infia text accompanying notes 181-261. 
57. See, e.g., IRCA 8 274B, 8 U.S.C. 8 132433 (1988) (barring discrimination 
based on national origin or citizenship status in hope of limiting negative impact of 
IRCA's provisions prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented labor); infia text 
accompanying note 238 (describing IRCA's amnesty provisions). 
58. See infia note 134 (citing to 1990 Act's new "temporary protected status" 
provisions). 
59. See infia note 238 and accompanying text (discussing lengthy debate over 
IRCA and resulting compromises). 
60. See KITm CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF LABOR: 
1820-1924, at 151-57 (Z. Bankowski et al. eds., 1984) (documenting efforts of busi- 
ness to loosen immigration restrictions during "labor shortage" in 1920s); John A. 
Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36 U.  MIMI L. 
REV. 819, 836 (1982) (recognizing goal of business to ease restrictive immigration 
policies); see also JULIAN SAMORA, LoS MOJADOS: THE WETBACK STORY 33-57 (1971) 
(arguing that Border Patrol's enforcement efforts were closely related to labor 
needs of agribusiness); Carl Hampe, Intent of Congress Behind Certain Provisions of 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 499, 502 (1988) 
(statement of minority counsel for Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refu- 
gee Affairs, Committee on the Judiciary, stating that IRCA's special agricultural 
workers program "was put in place only to provide labor for U.S. agricultural em- 
ployers"); Legomsky, supra note 22, at 1208 (noting that "aliens sometimes benefit 
from the lobbying activities of groups with whom they share common interests" 
and giving example of grower support for agricultural provisions of IRCA that 
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Moreover, immigrant advocacy groups periodically have 
tapped into a sympathetic public sentiment. Citizens, through 
their elected representatives, a t  times have been willing to 
protect noncitizens and would-be immigrants. In particular, 
refugees fleeing political, religious, and other sorts of perse- 
cution traditionally have held a special place in a national 
psyche molded by the proverbial notion that the United States 
is a "nation of immigrants," as exemplified by the Statue of 
Liberty's imagery." Despite embracing these lofty ideals, citi- 
zens generally are not keenly aware of the intricacy of immi- 
gration issues and lack the personal interest that might moti- 
vate them to mobilize politically around them. The daily lives 
of the vast majority of the American public have little to do 
with the INS, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
which adjudicates certain immigration claims,62 or the Immi- 
gration and Nationality A d 3  Moreover, the dealings that the 
ordinary citizen might have with the immigration bureaucracy 
generally are not extended, frightening, or particularly memo- 
rable.64 Indeed, the average citizen's only exposure to the sub- 
ject of immigration may be hearing immigrants blamed in 
times of societal stress for the social ills of the day.65 On the 
other hand, noncitizen encounters with immigration laws and 
benefited noncitizens). 
61. See David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the 
Coast of Bohemia, 138 U .  PA. L. REV. 1247, 1266 (1990). This is illustrated by the 
emergence in the 1980s of the Sanctuary Movement designed to protect refugees 
fleeing violent tumult in Central America. See generally ANN C R ~ E N D E N ,  SANCTU- 
ARY: A STORY OF AMERICAN CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW IN COUISION (1988); 
IGNATIUS BAU, THIS GROUND IS HOLY-CHURCH SANCTUARY AND CENTRAL AMERI- 
CAN REFUGEES (1985). Maw churches and cities, as well as two states, declared 
themselves to be places of relbge for Central Americans. See Todd Howland et al., 
Safe Haven for Salvadorans in the Context of Contemporary International Law-A 
Case Study in Equivocation, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 671, 680 (1992). At various 
times in this nation's history, immigrants generally have been much revered. See, 
e.g., JOHN F .  KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMJGRANTS (Sam Holmes & Charles 
Reynolds eds., rev. ed. 1964). 
62. See 8 C.F.R. 8 3.0 (1993); see also infba text accompanying notes 286-91 
(discussing Executive Office for Immigration Review). 
63. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C. (1988)). 
64. But see, e.g., Murrillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487, 490-97 (W.D. Tex. 
1992) (enjoining verbal harassment and physical abuse by Border Patrol of Chicano 
high school students and employees, all citizens, because of skin color and appear- 
ance). 
65. See infia text accompanying notes 82-129. 
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enforcement, and their views about immigrants generally, are 
distinctly different in kind and quality. 
As is true of other interest groups, the political power of 
noncitizens ebbs and flows with political and economic tides. 
Economic concerns in particular deeply affect the electorate's 
views on immigration and immigrants. Consequently, similar 
t o  United States economic history, anti-immigrant sentiment 
has had a cyclical character to it? Noncitizens and their ad- 
vocates therefore have been weaker in the political marketplace 
at some times than at other times. This is an important part of 
the dynamic concerning the influence of noncitizens. 
In the end, it is important to remember that noncitizens in 
good times and bad have lacked the political power necessary 
t o  most effectively protect their  interest^.^^ Even if adequately 
represented in the political process, noncitizens as a distinct 
numerical minority composed of a large number of people of 
color necessarily would encounter severe disadvantages." For 
this reason, they constitute the quintessential discrete and 
insular minority deserving of judicial protection in the Carolene 
Products sense.69 Surprisingly enough, immigration laws af- 
66. See WAYNE A. CORNELIUS, AMERICA IN THE ERA OF LIMITS: NATMST RE- 
ACTIONS TO THE 'NEW' IMMIGRATION 5-9 (1982) (briefly summarizing causes of anti- 
immigrant feeling in United States). For a fascinating historical analysis of the 
politics behind the rise and fall of various restrictionist immigration policies in the 
United States, see HIGHAM, supra note 32, at 29-66. 
67. But cf. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23 (1984) (stating that in some states, ethnic groups, including 
disenfranchised "aliens," exert considerable political power); Michael S. Teitelbaum, 
Advocacy, Ambiualence, Ambiguity: Immigration Policies and Prospects in the United 
States, 136 PROCEEDINGS AM. PHIL. SOCV 208, 218-21 (1992) (contending that in- 
terest groups, including growers and "Mexican-American political activists," are able 
to  forestall desire of public to restrict immigration). Congress, at times, has been 
protective of certain groups of immigrants, such as the Irish and the Cubans, with 
significant constituencies in the United States. See, e-g., Immigration Act of 1990 
9 132, 104 Stat. 4978, 5000 (codified at  8 U.S.C. $ 1153 (Supp. 1992)) (providing in 
carefully crafted language that Irish receive 4m of visas for three-year period); 
Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (providing that 
Cubans paroled into country may be eligible to become lawful permanent residents 
in shorter period of time than persons of other nationalities). 
68. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 161-62 (1980) (advocating judicial review to facilitate representation of 
"discrete and insular" minorities in political process and arguing that "aliens" de- 
serve such protection because of lack of right to vote, the American tradition of 
hostility toward "foreigners," the fact that legislatures are almost entirely composed 
of citizens who have spent their entire life in United States, and the stereotyping 
of recent immigrants). 
69. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) 
("[Plrejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition . . . 
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fecting the noncitizen minority generally receive a minimum of 
judicial scrutiny.70 
2. The vocal, sometimes successful, minority 
In light of the political impotence of noncitizens, one might 
expect a vocal minority of citizens, particularly well-funded or- 
ganizations, to successfully pressure the executive branch to 
pursue anti-immigrant agendas.?' This in fact does occur a t  
times. Some might not be concerned if a majority of the voting 
public desired the pursuit of restrictionist policies and such pol- 
icies were enacted through the appropriate processes into law. 
However, the making and pursuit of policy by a well-organized 
minority contrary to majoritarian desires, even if weakly held 
ones, raises a number of serious concerns. 
A brief, though perhaps superficial, look at  the commit- 
ment of major interest groups to immigration issues helps 
illustrate how in certain circumstances minority sentiment 
might prevail over majority will. First, the Vocal Minority is 
composed of people committed to restricting immigration and 
increasing enforcement and willing to devote the time and 
resources to further that end. Second, the Silent Majority be- 
lieves that the immigration laws, including its service provi- 
sions, should be fairly and uniformly administered and that 
enforcement is one element of an overall immigration policy.72 
curtail[ing] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judi- 
cial inquiry."). But cf.  Martin, supra note 61, at  1364-65, 1368 (advocating limited 
judicial review of asylum decisions because applicants see asylum as a "loophole" 
on which they might as well "try their luck"); Katherine L. Vaughns, Taming the 
Asylum Adjudication Process: An Agenda for the Twenty-First Century, 30 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1993) (arguing that, because courts lack competence in immigra- 
tion matters, political branches should make decisions on such issues and courts 
should defer to the decisions). 
70. See infra text accompanying notes 167-80 (discussing plenary power doc- 
trine). 
71. See infra text accompanying note 94 (discussing Federation for American 
Immigration Reform); see also Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for 
Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1442 (1991) (offering an example of white 
minority prevailing over the majority); J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influ- 
ence Districts and the Pragmatic Tradition in Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 
551, 563-65 (1993) (arguing that cohesive minority may prevail over majority in 
elections); Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional Rep- 
resentation): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U .  PA. L. REV. 1991 
(1993) (advocating proportional representation because of potential for plurality, 
rather than majority, to win election in winner-take-all scheme). 
72. See Peter H. Schuck, The Emerging Political Consensus on Immigration 
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Although adhering to those views, the Silent Majority as  a 
group is not vitally committed to these  value^.'^ It, for exam- 
ple, is unwilling to act in the political marketplace with the 
vigor necessary to ensure that the balanced immigration pro- 
gram it supports is implemented. Third, noncitizens, docu- 
mented and lawful permanent residents alike, obviously are 
those most vitally concerned with fair implementation of the 
service provisions of the immigration laws. In addition, they 
probably are less concerned with border enforcement, but cer- 
tainly are opposed to abuse of the enforcement power. Their 
political influence primarily is a function of the force exerted by 
immigrant advocacy groups, including the votes of its members 
as well as those that the group influences, and citizens, includ- 
ing the Silent Majority, who tend to be "pro-immigrant" on 
service and some enforcement issues. Business (particularly 
agricultural) interests, in pursuit of a ready labor supply, some- 
times might side with noncitizens.'* The Silent Majority and 
noncitizens would be expected to be natural political allies with 
respect to their view on service issues and to curtail enforce- 
ment abuses. They may differ, however, in their views about 
the need for enforcement. 
At any one time, each of these groups in  theory has a cer- 
tain amount of influence on the various actors in the political 
process. As political scientists tell us, that influence is a func- 
tion of a wide variety of factors, including the percentage of the 
group willing to participate in political activities, the cohesive- 
ness of the group, the resources it is willing to devote, the effec- 
tiveness of their organization, and economic and other circum- 
stances at that time. At times, the Vocal Minority-mobilized, 
organized, and committed-might be expected to have greater 
Law, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 19-21, 25-26 (1991). 
Other groups may align themselves with the Silent Majority. Governments of 
countries from where immigrants came also have been known to protest INS en- 
forcement practices. See, e.g., Roberto Sanchez, Border Patrol Accused of Illegal 
Searches, PHOENIX G A Z ~ E ,  Feb. 25, 1993, at B1. There also presumably exists a 
group of voters who are indifferent to immigration issues. Although not necessarily 
in agreement with the Silent Majority, their inaction, which is not based on sup- 
port or antipathy for immigrants' rights, more resembles that of the Silent Majori- 
ty than the Vocal Minority. 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 49-70 (discussing reasons for lack of 
citizen commitment to immigration issues). 
74. See supra text accompanying note 60. However, unlike the Vocal Minority, 
business interests often focus on other sorts of legislation, such as farm subsidies, 
rather than immigration matters. Distracted by other agendas, these groups may 
behave as members of the Silent Majority do. 
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influence than would the weakly committed Silent Maj~ri ty .?~ 
Noncitizens are not willing, or perhaps not able, to organize 
politically and participate in the activities necessary to change 
the dynamic. 
Although this phenomenon might be characteristic of a 
number of subject areas where strong (often referred to pejora- 
tively as "special") interest groups might prevail over a majori- 
ty,?' it may be more likely to occur on immigration matters. 
Though vaguely supportive of fair enforcement and service, 
members of the Silent Majority perceive themselves as only 
tangentially involved with and generally uninterested in the 
immigration laws and their enforcement. Few close analogies 
come to mind. For example, welfare and social security disabili- 
ty programs may not be perceived as directly affecting the 
average citizen. Still, those affected by those laws in theory 
have recourse to direct political participation,77 and have sue- 
cessNly engaged in political action in certain  circumstance^.'^ 
75. See Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Fed- 
eralism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 n.18 (1988) ("[Elven a ma- 
jority of voters may not control the content of federal programs. The national elec- 
torate has become so large, and its majority so difise, that federal legislators and 
administrators may be more responsive to special interest groups and lobbyists 
than to the majority's will.") (footnote omitted); see also infra text accompanying 
notes 188-89 (discussing characteristics of groups likely to successhlly obtain con- 
gressional overrides). 
76. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 124-31 (1956); 
Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political In- 
fluence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 392 (1983); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups 
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) (arguing that judicial review 
should be exercised to ensure that the public good has been promoted and that 
government has not simply capitulated to  powerfbl private groups). Public choice 
theory, which attributes voting decisions to the economic power of interest groups, 
is roughly consistent with this thesis. For contrasting, though equally interesting, 
discussions of this theory and its impact on judicial review, compare DANIEL A. 
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL ~JTRODUCTION 
(1991) with GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC HOICE AND PUB- 
LIC LAW (1991). 
77. Of course, these groups encounter difficulties because they comprise a 
minority of the population. In other words, the poor and minorities are 
marginalized by the very fact that they are poor and minorities. See K e ~ e t h  L. 
Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1988); see 
also Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1277, 1278-79 (1993) ("[Tlhe poor are generally recognized as a politically 
powerless minority . . . ."). 
78. See generally LAWRENCE N. BAILIS, BREAD OR JUSTICE: GRASSROOTS ORGA- 
NIZING IN THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1974) (analyzing welfare rights move- 
ment in Massachusetts); FRANCIS F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S 
MOVEMENTS (1977) (analyzing mobilization of unemployed and workers, welfare 
recipients, and civil rights activists). 
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The Vocal Minority differs from other numerical minorities, 
such as the homeless, social security recipients, and others, 
including noncitizens, who pressure legislatures and adminis- 
trative bodies. They are not the persons most directly affected 
by the enforcement of the immigration laws. However, they are 
the only group that actively represents voters on the single 
issue of immigration. Though their self-interests are not as 
central to immigration decisions as those of noncitizens, this 
minority may prevail in the political process.79 
A final ingredient further complicates the dynamic. The 
powers of the Vocal Minority might be expected to increase 
exponentially during times of increased anti-immigrant sen- 
timent, which in turn is roughly correlated with the relative 
level of societal stress.80 In relatively calm times when immi- 
gration is not a major item on the political agenda, the Vocal 
Minority, the Silent Majority, and noncitizens oftentimes may 
play to a stalemate in the political m a r k e t p l a ~ e . ~ ~  Though not 
as powerful as interest groups representing voting constituents, 
immigrant rights advocates may derail punitive measures in  
calm times. Fewer such measures are proposed and limited 
resources can be directed to defeat them. Even when there is 
pressure for legislation not in the interests of noncitizens, advo- 
cacy groups may be able to ameliorate some of the harsher 
provisions in the legislation. In  contrast, when nativist senti- 
ment is a t  its zenith, the Vocal Minority, with little resistance, 
may be able to prevail. More "reform" measures will be pro- 
posed and the Vocal Minority even may grow in number. This 
is true even when the Silent Majority remains a majority and 
opposes the Vocal Minority's proposals. Ambivalence of the 
Silent Majority due to general societal tension, as well as other 
more tangible political and economic concerns, may result in its 
unwillingness to vigorously resist the direction in which the 
Vocal Minority seeks to take the political process. 
79. Cf. PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGEN- 
CIES 4-21 (1981) (discussing concept of "agency capture" occurring when powerhl 
private interests "capture" the agency regulating them); Richard B. Stewart, The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1684, 1687 
(1975) ("[Iln carrying out broad legislative directives, agencies unduly favor orga- 
nized interests . . . at the expense of diffise, comparatively unorganized inter- 
ests . . . ."). 
80. See infra text accompanying notes 82-129 (discussing "new* nativism and 
historical predecessors). 
81. See infra text accompanying notes 183-89 (recognizing similar phenomenon 
with respect to congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions). 
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B. The "New" Nativism and Its Impact 
Nativism and racism have a lengthy pedigree in United 
States immigration history.82 A few examples should suffice to 
illustrate this point. Chinese immigrants in the late 1800s were 
subject to a series of draconian laws, many of which remained 
on the books until the 1940s, virtually eliminating immigration 
from China.83 Mexicans, along with some Chicanos, were re- 
patriated en masse during the Great ~ e ~ r e s s i o n ~  and subject 
to an INS deportation effort with the racist moniker "Operation 
Wetback" in 1954 .~~  Internment of Japanese-Americans, many 
of whom were not recent immigrants at all, but were native- 
born citizens, is an infamous chapter in United States constitu- 
tional law? President Truman unsuccessfully sought to veto 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 because of its 
national origin quota system, which remained the central orga- 
nizing principle of United States immigration law until 
1965.'~ History may look back on the executive branch's treat- 
ment of Haitian asylum-seekers as another such epi~ode.~' 
These harsh measures all arose in times of turmoil. Unfortu- 
nately, other examples are plentiful. 
This nation historically has been susceptible to the search 
for scapegoats for the woes of the nation, particularly during 
lagging economic times.89 I t  often is not feasible for politicians 
82. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF 
AMERICAN ATMSM 1860-1925 (2d ed. 1955). 
83. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 15, a t  1 (referring to laws restrict- 
ing Chinese immigration passed by Congress in 1882, 1884, 1888, and 1892 as 
"statutes-like many later immigration laws-[that] were the product of economic 
and political concerns laced with racism and nativismn); see also FRED W. RIGGS, 
PRESSURES ON CONGRESS: A STUDY OF THE REPEAL OF CHINESE EXCLUSION (1950) 
(discussing repeal of exclusion laws, which was motivated in part to improve rela- 
tions with an ally (China) during World War 11). See generally BILL ONG HING, 
MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 1850-1990 
(1993) (analyzing impact of exclusionary immigration policies on development of 
Asian-American community); RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT 
SHORE: A HIS~ORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 79-131 (1989) (chronicling harsh treatment 
directed at  Chinese immigrants). 
84. See generally ABRAHAM HOFFMAN, UNWANTED MEXICAN AMERICANS IN THE 
GREAT DEPRESSION (1974). 
85. See generally JUAN R A M ~ N  GARC~A, OPERATION W ~ B A C K :  THE MASS DE- 
POR'I'ATION OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 (1980). 
86. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
87. See H. DOC. NO. 520, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4-5 (1952) (veto message of 
President Truman). 
88. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 130-59 (analyzing the plight of 
Haitians). 
89. See GORDON W. ALLPOW, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 236-38 (abridged 
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to blame, as Karl Marx did, economic downturns on the cyclical 
nature inherent in the capitalist system. Immigrants, often 
viewed as outsiders to the community, periodically have been 
one of the groups singled out for blame in the political pro- 
ce~s .~ '  This scapegoating function unfortunately is alive and 
well today. Antipathy toward the immigrant has increased in  
the United States, if not the world.g' With a slow economy, 
current political discussion of immigration in the United States 
tends to focus on how to stop the "flood" of "illegal aliens" from 
entering the United States and displacing "American" workers.92 
ed., Anchor Books 1958) (1954) (analyzing use of immigrants and other minorities 
as scapegoats by "in-groups"). 
90. See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
POLICY 1798-1965, a t  62 1-43 (198 1) (summarizing political party platforms from 
1848 to 1964 on immigration, many of which included anti-immigrant planks). 
91. A unified Germany, with a significant refugee population, also has seen a 
resurgence of concern with the numbers of refugees coming to the country that, as 
the increase in hate crimes against immigrants illustrates, is explained in part by 
racism. See Daniel Kanstroom, Wer Sind Wir Wieder? Laws of Asylum, Immigra- 
tion, and Citizenship in the Struggle for the Soul of the New Germany, 18 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 155, 155-61 (1993). 
92. See, e.g., FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, IMMIGRATION 
2000, at 1-114 (1992) [hereinafter FAIR, IMMIGRATION 20001 (collecting literature 
arguing that immigration has impeded improvements for minorities, displaced na- 
tive workers, and depressed domestic wages). Immigrants in recent memory also 
have been blamed for a myriad of social ills. See, e.g., Bill Stall & Patrick J. 
McDo~e l l ,  Wilson Urges Stiff Penalties to Deter Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 10, 1993, at  A1 (reporting that California Governor Pete Wilson, in open 
letter to President Clinton published in The New York Times, proposed numerous 
policies to halt illegal immigration because of its adverse impact); Ronald J. 
Ostrow, Faster Deportation of Criminals Sought, L.A. T~MES, June 24, 1992, a t  A3 
(reporting that Attorney General William Barr proposed increased efforts to deport 
"criminal aliens," stating that "[wle will not tolerate aliens who come here to prey 
on the American people"); Ronald J. Ostrow, LA. Police Too Small to Do Job 
Needed, Barr Says, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1992, a t  B1 (quoting Attorney General 
Barr's statement that "illegal aliens" accounted for one-third of those initially ar- 
rested in Los Angeles rebellion and that "there is a significant problem of illegal 
aliens in the Los Angeles area, and I think [the 'riot'] was a manifestation of the 
scope of the problem"); Ronald J. Ostrow, Action Urged on Stalled Immigration 
Reform; Meese Links Illegal Aliens, Drug Traffic, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1986, a t  23 
(quoting Attorney General Edwin Meese I11 as advocating immigration reform be- 
cause "[illlegal immigration is contributing to the drug problem"); FEDERATION FOR 
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, CROWDING OUT THE FUTURE: WORLD POPULATION 
GROWTH, U.S. IMMIGRATION, AND PRESSURES ON NATURAL RESOURCES (1992) (dis- 
cussing impact of immigration on the environment). This, of course, is eerily remi- 
niscent of the "evils of immigration" articulated over a century ago. See, e.g., 
BUSEX, supra note 37, at  107-30 (claiming that poverty, crime and low intelligence 
were prevalent among immigrants). 
THOMAS MULLER, IMMIGRANTS AND THE AMERICAN CITY (1993) offers a balanced 
discussion from a variety of perspectives on the pros and cons of immigration. See 
also Gerald P. Mpez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immt- 
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In the 1992 presidential campaign, for example, both Dem- 
ocratic and Republican candidates promised to increase immi- 
gration enforcement efforts.g3 Organizations advocating limits 
on immigration have become increasingly visible with growing 
political influence. The well-financed Federation for American 
Immigration Reform, which stridently advocates the need to 
place a moratorium on immigration, has embarked on an in- 
creasingly effective publicity campaign.g4 Local grass roots 
gration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 630-39 (1981). 
93. See Bush, Clinton Differ on Immigration, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1030, 
1030-31 (Aug. 24, 1992). To be fair, Bill Clinton focused on immigration enforce- 
ment to a lesser degree than did President Bush. See id.; see also D'Jamila Salem, 
Where the Candidates Stand on: Immigration, LA. TIMES, May 16, 1992, at  A20 
(reporting that, among other measures, candidate Clinton favored strengthening 
Border Patrol to reduce illegal immigration). 
Increased enforcement was one of the more moderate positions taken on immi- 
gration in 1992. The 1992 Republican party platform advocated providing "the 
tools, technologies and structures necessary to secure the borders" between the 
United States and Mexico. See, e.g., Major Garrett, Bush Campaign May Find Free 
Trade is a Hard Sell, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, at All .  A successful Democrat- 
ic candidate for Senate in California proposed use of the military to patrol the 
Mexican border, see Tracy Wilkinson, California Elections: US. Senate; Candidates 
Tough on Illegal Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Od.  19, 1992, at A3 (reporting position 
of Democratic Senate candidate Dianne Feinstein), and as a Senator helped elevate 
immigration to a high profile issue, see 139 CONG. R E .  S8276 (daily ed. June 30, 
1993) (floor statement of Senator Feinstein on immigration and outline of plan to 
enforce borders); D i a ~ e  Feinstein, Perspective on Illegal Immigration: We Can Get 
a Grip on Our Borders, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1993, at B7 (arguing that executive 
branch should increase immigration enforcement efforts). 
The bipartisan nature of anti-immigrant sentiment should not be surprising. 
Traditionally liberal groups, such as organized labor, historically have complained 
of the impact of immigration on the domestic labor market. See generally 
GWENDOLYN MINK, OLD LABOR AND NEW IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DE- 
VELOPMENT: UNION, PARTY, AND STATE 1875-1920 (1986) (discussing organized 
labor's often restrictionist positions on immigration). In addition, some lee-leaning 
environmental groups reportedly are moving toward supporting immigration restric- 
tions. See Steve Albert, Environmental, Population Groups Buy In, RECORDER (San 
Francisco), July 14, 1993, at 14; Vlae Kershner, A Hot Issue for the '90s: California 
Leads in Immigration-and Backlash, S.F. CHRON., June 21, 1993, at Al. 
94. See, e.g., FAIR IMMIGRATION 2000, supra note 92; see also SIMON & ALEX- 
ANDER, supra note 28, at  257-62 (noting groups, including the Federation for Amer- 
ican Immigration Reform (FAIR) "with an annual budget of $1.7 million," repre- 
senting organized opposition to-immigration and opining that FAIR is able to influ- 
ence media because it is homogeneous and organized around a single issue); infia 
text accompanying notes 188-89 (discussing characteristics of organizations obtain- 
ing congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions). FAIR claims, for example, 
that excessive immigration has adversely affected employment, increased social 
costs, especially crime, damaged the environment, and injured "our basic values." 
See, e.g., Cut Off Aid to Immigrant., Group Urges, LA. TIMES, NOV. 21, 1991, at  
A42 (quoting Alan Nelson, former INS Commissioner and FAIR consultant); Dan 
Stein, Drowning by Numbers, RECORDER (San Francisco), Dec. 5, 1991, at  8 (com- 
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restrictionist organizations, which not infrequently espouse 
thinly veiled racist arguments for curtailing immigration, also 
have grown in n~rnber?~ 
The woes of President Clinton in his attempt to select an 
Attorney General illustrate how immigration has grown in the 
national political consciousness. In the confirmation hearings of 
Zoe Bairdg6 and Janet Reno, a few senators interrogated the 
respective nominee about immigration enf~rcement.~~ One 
senator in particular fanned the anti-immigrant flames when 
questioning Reno by gratuitously mentioning that an alleged 
conspirator in a much-publicized bombing was an "illegal 
alien," that an "illegal alien" may have been involved in killings 
at the Central Intelligence Agency, and that some of the follow- 
mentary by FAIR'S Executive Director articulating similar themes); see also Amy 
Chance, Tough Laws Urged for Illegal Aliens, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 2, 1993, a t  
A3 (quoting Alan Nelson as advocating that California lawmakers "declare war on 
illegal immigration"). 
Besides engaging in publicity and lobbying efforts, FAIR sometimes files amicus 
curiae briefs, see, e.g., Brief of Federation for American Immigration Reform, Ami- 
cus Curiae, Supporting Reversal, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 
2549 (1993) (No. 92-344), and lawsuits, see, e.g., Federation for American Immigra- 
tion Reform v. Meese, 643 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (claiming that relatively 
lenient treatment of Cuban nationals violated immigration laws); Federation for 
American Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C.), appeal 
dismissed, 447 U.S. 916 (1980) (challenging inclusion of "illegal aliens" in census 
figures). 
95. See Amy Chance, Controls Defended a s  Economic, Not Racist, SACRAMENTO 
BEE, Jan. 24, 1993, at  A10 (quoting leader of newly formed restrictionist group: 
"It's like animals. When there's scarcity, they don't breed. When there's plenty, 
they breed."); see also LINDA CHAVEZ, OUT OF THE BARRIO: TOWARD A NEW POLI- 
TICS OF HISPANIC ASSIMILATION 92 (1991) (stating that Chavez, a well-known con- 
servative, resigned from U.S. English, which also was founded by Tanton, see 
Perea, supra note 45, at 341 & n.401, when she learned of this anti-Hispanic 
statement); Amy Chance, Illegal Aliens Increasingly Blamed for State's Problems, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 24, 1993, a t  A1 (quoting FAIR founder, John Tanton: 'Will 
the present majority peaceably hand over its political power to a group that is 
simply more fertile? . . . On the demographic point, perhaps this is the first in- 
stance in which those with their pants up are going to get caught by those with 
their pants down!"). 
96. See Confirmation Hearing for Zoe Baird, Attoney General-Designate: Hear- 
ing of the Senate Judiciary Comm., FED. NEWS SERV., Jan. 21, 1993, available in 
LEXIS, Exec Library, Fednew File (questioning by Sen. DeConcini); Confirmation of 
Attorney-General-Designate Zoe Baird: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Comm., FED. 
NEWS SERV., Jan. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Exec Library, Fednew File (ques- 
tioning by Sen. Simpson). 
97. See Nomination of Janet Reno to Be Attorney General: Hearing of the Sen- 
ate Judiciary Comm., FED. NEWS SERV., Mar. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Exec 
Library, Fednew File [hereinafter Nomination of Janet Reno] (questioning by Sena- 
tors Metzenbaum, Simpson, and DeConcini). 
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ers of a religious cult figure in a violent stand-off with federal 
law enforcement officers in Waco, Texas were "thought to be 
illegal aliens."98 As one might expect in response to such grill- 
ing, the now-confirmed Attorney General nominee, Janet Reno, 
promised to make immigration a priority?' 
Racial animus may explain some of the vehemence behind 
recent demands for increased immigration enfor~ement. '~ 
98. See id. (questioning by Sen. Simpson); see also Hearings Before a 
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 103d Cong., 
1st Sess. 220 (May 4, 1993) (Rep. Harold Rogers (R-Ky) telling acting INS Com- 
missioner that "I hope we do something before one of these illegal aliens commits 
another terrorist act."). 
This rhetoric has been sparked by the reporting that an alleged conspirator in 
the bombing in the World Trade Center was an "illegal alien" and another, who 
entered the United States as a result of a mistaken visa decision by the State De- 
partment, has an asylum claim pending. See, e.g, Ralph Blumenthal, $100,000 from 
Abroad Linked to Trade Center Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at 45; Francis 
X. Clines, The Twin Towers: After Bombing, New Scrutiny for Holes in Immigration 
Net, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at Al; Michael Hedges, New York Bombing Sus- 
pect Arrested, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at A10. In addition, press reports have 
mentioned that a number of those in a besieged religious cult camp in Texas were 
suspected to be "illegal aliens." See Mary Jordan & Sue Pressley, Freed Cult Mem- 
bers Depict Horror Scene, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1993, at Al. Spurred by these 
events, along with the suspected involvement of an "illegal alien" in a shooting 
outside Central Intelligence Agency headquarters, Congress began considering "re- 
form" of the immigration and asylum laws in early 1993. See Holly Idelson, Immi- 
gration Distress Signals: Asylum System Under Siege, 51 CONG. Q. 1227 (1993); see 
also infra note 121 (listing bills pending in Congress to amend asylum provisions 
of INA). 
The United States, in the name of fighting terrorism, hopefully will not overre- 
act as it did in the infamous Palmer Raids during the "Red Scare" of World War 
I. After a bombing of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer's home, as well as some 
other bombings, the Justice Department conducted a number of raids to round up 
"subversives" resulting in the deportation of many alleged communist "aliens." 
Many were active in leftist labor organizations. I t  never was established that any 
of the persons deported were terrorists. See generally EDWIN P. HOYT, THE PALMER 
RAIDS 1919-20: AN ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS DISSENT (1969); WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., 
ALIENS AND DISSENTERS 208-37 (1963); NATIONAL POPULAR GOVERNMENT LEAGUE, 
REPORT UPON THE ILLEGAL PRACTICES OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUS- 
TICE (1920) (prepared by committee of lawyers, including Roscoe Pound and Felix 
Frankfurter). 
99. See Nomination of Janet Reno, supra note 97. This questioning apparently 
left an impression on Reno. See This Week with David Brinkky (ABC television 
broadcast, June 20, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current file (inter- 
view with Reno in which she emphasized need for change in INS); Marcia Coyle et 
al., INS Overhaul, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 11 (reporting that Attorney General 
Reno visited INS offices during first full week on job). 
100. See, e-g., Douglas Jehl, Buchanan Raises Specter of Intolerance, Critics 
Say, LA. RMES, Mar. 17, 1992, at A1 (quoting Republican presidential candidate 
Patrick Buchanan on immigration: "[Ilf we had to take a million immigrants in 
say, Zulus, next year, or Englishmen, and put them up in Virginia, what group 
would be easier to assimilate and would cause less problems for the people of 
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The impact of a crackdown on "illegal" immigration unques- 
tionably would fall disproportionately on people of color from 
developing nations. The "new" immigrants, perhaps more ap- 
propriately called the "new" out-group,lO' tend to be people of 
color. lo2 As many restrictionists readily admit, immigration 
from Mexico is the focal point of their concern.lo3 This helps 
explain why restrictionist rhetoric often is colored by not-so- 
subtle racist overtones. lo4 
Virginia?"); Roger Worthington, Diverse Group Backs Duke's Narrow Pitch, CHI. 
R~IB., Dec. 29, 1991, at 19 (noting that "[olne of [Republican presidential candidate 
David] Duke's issues is immigration and a fear that the U.S. is becoming a Third 
World nation"); see also Lawmaker Offers Apology for Qffensive Poem, SACRAMENTO 
BEE, May 20, 1993, at A3 (reporting that California legislator apologized for dis- 
tributing poem to fellow legislators entitled " 'I Love America' in which a Mexican 
immigrant boasts in broken English of coming to America 'in rags and Chebby 
trucks' for welfare and free health care, and belittling U.S. taxpayers who foot the 
billS). 
101. See ALLPORT, supra note 89, at 33-35 (analyzing prejudice against immi- 
grants by "in-groups"). 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48. 
103. See, e.g., Garrett, supm note 93 (discussing Republican party platform); 
see also CORNELIUS, supra note 66, at 15 (discussing survey showing that Mexican 
immigrants were perceived as having more negative impact on American society 
than immigrants from Canada and Western Europe). 
1 0 4 ~  See, e.g., supra note 95. 
Because of the complexity of the political dynamic, however, the claim of rac- 
ism must be considered carefully. A few of the open questions about the views of 
minorities on immigration illustrate this point. It has been argued, for example, 
that some African-Americans want to restrict immigration because of the alleged 
preferences of whites to hire undocumented Latinos rather than black citizens. See 
Jack Miles, Blacks us. Browns, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, O d .  1992, at 41; see also Lisa 
C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African Ameri- 
canlKorean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S. CU. L. 
REV. 1581 (1993) (perceptively analyzing Korean-AmericanIAfrican-American ten- 
sions in South Central Los Angeles, California and the Spring 1992 uprisings). But 
cf. William Schneider, Americans lbrn Against Immigration, 25 NAT'L J. 1900 
(1993) (reporting poll results showing that less than 50% of blacks strongly felt the 
need to limit immigration, the smallest percentage of any group). Some surveys 
also suggest that Latino citizens desire less immigration, although they apparently 
do not view it as a high priority. See RODOLFO 0. DE LA GARZA ET AL., LATINO 
VOICES: MEXICAN, PUERTO RICAN & CUBAN PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 
87-89, 100-101 (1992) (reporting on a survey showing that although a majority of 
Latinos agreed that "there are too many immigrants," less than 1% agreed immi- 
gration was the "principal national problem"); see also Vlae Kershner, Liberal Lati- 
no Wants Tougher Immiation Law, S.F. CHRON., July 13, 1993, at A1 (reporting 
that a Latino California legislator, known as a champion of immigrant rights, sup- 
ported a moratorium on legal immigration so long as "civil and constitutional 
rights are protected"); Hispanics for Moratorium, PR NEWSWIRE, July 12, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Prnews Library (reporting that National His- 
panic Alliance in a letter to the President urged a three- to five-year moratorium 
on all immigration). As these examples suggest, it is overly simplistic to generalize 
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Besides fears about the economic impact of immigration or 
unconscious racism, uncertainty and insecurity caused by 
changing demographics may enhance the concern with immi- 
gration.'" The new immigrants are changing more than sim- 
ply the complexion of United States society. Many languages 
other than English today are commonly spoken in this country, 
particularly in large urban centers?" The new immigrants 
also bring with them a variety of diverse cultures. Some say 
that, although there is evidence to the contrary, today's immi- 
grants are less interested in assimilating (or maybe less able to 
assimilate) into mainstream America than past immigrant 
generations. lo' 
Most members of the in-group understandably are comfort- 
able with the status quo. Some feel threatened by change, par- 
ticularly change that goes to the heart of daily life. Moreover, 
the often-unstated fear-a fear that may come to pass in some 
states in the near future, and already is true in a few large 
citieslo8-may be that the current majority soon will become 
and conclude that all attempts to limit immigration are racist. It is fair to say, 
however, that the restrictionist efforts of some are motivated by conscious or un- 
conscious racism. See supra text accompanying notes 100-104. 
105. See Nathan Glazer, The Integration of American Immigrants, 21 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 256, 265-69 (1956); Schuck, supra note 72, at 23. 
This reminds me of two very different stories relayed to me within months of 
each other about the changing demographics of Monterey Park, a suburb of Los 
Angeles, which suggests the importance of perspective in evaluating the changes 
taking place. See NATIONAL BOARD OF THE CHANGING RELATIONS PROJECT, NEW- 
COMERS AND ESTABLISHED RESIDENTS IN U.S. COMMUNITIES 14-16 (1993) (studying 
six cities with large foreign-born populations and noting that Monterey Park's for- 
eign-born population grew from 8% in 1950 to 51.8% in 1990). On the one hand, 
an Asian-American student rejoiced in the fact that, due to the rapid growth of the 
Asian immigrant population, the city was changing. On the other hand, my aunt 
(who later moved), a long-time resident of the area, lamented the fact that she felt 
as if she lived in a foreign country. Tensions in Monterey Park evidently have re- 
sulted from the changes. See LA. Chung, State's Asians Stung by Immigration 
Backlash, S.F. CHRON., June 22, 1993, a t  A7. 
106. See Felicity Barringer, For 32 Million Americans, English Is a Second 
Language, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993, a t  A18 (reporting that 1990 Census showed 
that persons for whom English was foreign language increased by one-third from 
1980). 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48. But cf. DE LA GARZA ET AL., 
supra note 104, at 42 (reporting survey results showing that over 6Wo of US.-born 
Mexican-Americans spoke only English or spoke more English than Spanish in the 
home). 
108. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 1992, at 34 (112th ed. 1992) (presenting statistics showing that Los An- 
. geles and Miami metropolitan areas had a population composed of a majority of 
people of color); Chris Kelley, Texas' Predicted to Mirror California's Ethnic Diver- 
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a minority and transform the in-group into an out-group.'Og 
One of history's clearest lessons is that the majority in a soci- 
ety has not always been fair to  the minority. 
Whatever the cause, the new nativism is alive and well. 
California, especially hard-hit by the national recession, has 
proved to be fertile soil for the growth of anti-immigrant senti- 
ment."' As of March 1993, over twenty proposed bills pend- 
ing in the California legislature, several patently unconstitu- 
tional, were designed to punish the undocumented."' A Dem- 
sity, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 27, 1993, at 12A (reporting that the majority of 
both California's and Texas's populations may soon be "minorities"); see also Ramon 
G. McLeod, U.S. Population in 2050 Will Be Half Minorities, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 4, 
1992, at  A1 (reporting United States Census estimate that a majority of United 
States population will be non-white by 2050). 
109. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 45, at  120. 
110. See William Hamilton, Harvest of Blame; Californians Tun on Illegal Im- 
migrants, WASH. POST, June 4, 1993, at Al; Robert Reinhold, A Welcome for Im- 
migrants Turns to Resentment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1993, at  Al; Nancy Cleland, 
Rising Violence Against Migrants, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 13, 1993, at  A1 
(reporting hate crimes against undocumented migrants and increasing number of 
anti-immigrant groups, including one that produced a video on immigration entitled 
'Wetbacks"). For an analysis of the impad of immigration on California in the 
19809, see THOMAS MUUER & THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE, THE FOURTH WAVE: 
CALIFORNIA'S NEWEST IMMIGRANTS (1985). 
111. See Assembly Bill (AB) 150, Cal. Legislature, 1993-94 Sess. (requiring 
Medi-Cal providers to report undocumented patients to INS to receive reimburse- 
ment); AB 151 (denying workers' compensation benefits to undocumented workers); 
AB 263 (limiting Aid to Families with Dependent Children to "aliens" residing in 
state for less than twelve months); Senate Bill (SB) 406 (prohibiting workers' com- 
pensation for psychiatric injury to undocumented employees); SB 733 (requiring em- 
ployment and job training agencies to verify legal status of persons seeking to use 
services); SB 1131 (requiring person seeking emergency or pregnancy-related servic- 
es from Medi-Cal program to establish legal immigration status); AB 983 (prohibit- 
ing Department of Motor Vehicles from renewing drivers licenses or identification 
cards absent proof of citizenship or legal status); AB 2171 (similar but also requir- 
ing persons authorized t o  be in United States for limited time to have license or 
identification expire at  end of authorized stay); SB 976 (similar and. making it a 
misdemeanor to assist undocumented person to obtain a drivers license or 
identification); AB 149 (prohibiting allocation of state funds for education of "undoc- 
umented aliens"); AB 180VAB 2228 (prohibiting any student "not lawfully residing 
in United States" from enrolling in any public post-secondary school); AB 1968 
(requiring school district to report to INS names of students who cannot establish 
legal status); AB 299 (requiring housing programs to request proof of legal status); 
AB 86 (making any alien residing in state guilty of misdemeanor upon first convic- 
tion and felony upon second conviction); AB 87 (requiring study to estimate costs 
of building prison for undocumented aliens or residents in Baja California); AB 
1043 (requiring state to refer prisoners to INS); AB 1525 (allowing governor to call 
into service National Guard to patrol U.S.-Mexico border); SB 345 (requiring De- 
partment of Corrections to provide prison facilities, transportation, and general 
support for expediting deportation hearings); SB 691 (prohibiting local ordinances 
forbidding cooperation between local law enforcement officers and INS); SB 284 
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ocratic mayoral candidate in Los Angeles in 1993 claimed that 
gangs of "illegal aliens" killed over 100 citizens in the past year 
and, to avoid the necessity of time-consuming trials, criminal 
aliens should be immediately deported.ll2 Efforts to "Light 
Up the Border" through the use of automobile headlights in  
hopes of deterring border crossings have been organized to 
"stop the Me~icans.""~ 
This anti-immigrant fervor may have indirectly fueled 
already simmering racial tensions. In California's capital, Sac- 
ramento, fire bombings were directed at a state anti-discrimi- 
nation agency as well as African-American, Jewish-American, 
and Japanese-American targets."* A Japanese-American con- 
gressman, whose family spent World War I1 in an internment 
camp as a result of a xenophobic fear of the Japanese, attribut- 
ed the crimes to the fact that so many politicians-liberal as 
well as conservative-had scapegoated immigrants for 
California's  problem^."^ Such claims, though not empirically 
verifiable, raise troublesome concerns that have been voiced by 
immigrants' rights attorneys.' l6 
(making citizenship status available for public inspection under California Public 
Records Ad); Assembly Concurrent Resolution 16 (resolution declaring intent to 
"ensure that only legal immigrants receive specified employment and public bene- 
fits"); see also Eric Bailey & Dan Morain, Anti-Immigration Bills Flood Legislature, 
L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1993, at A3 (discussing immigration bills pending in California 
legislature). 
The bills that would bar educating undocumented children are squarely con- 
trary to Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating Texas law prohibiting 
public education of undocumented children). Nonetheless, Governor Wilson threat- 
ened to sign them into law if passed by the legislature. See Amy Chance & Her- 
bert A. Sample, Wilson's Latest Jab at Immigrant Laws, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 6, 
1993, a t  Al. 
112. See Frank Clifford, Houston Calls for Deporting Illegals in Two Deadly 
Gangs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at  B1; see also Frank Clifford, Local 
ElectionslLA. Mayor: Woo Seeks to Deport Illegal Immigrants Charged with 
Crimes, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1993, at  B1 (reporting that Democratic mayoral candi- 
date, who happened to be an Asian-American, called for the deportation of illegal 
immigrants charged with serious crimes). 
113. See John H. Lee, Army Announces Plan to Illuminate Border, LA. TIMES, 
Sept. 10, 1992, at Al; "Light up the Border" Makes a Comeback, NOTIMM MEXICAN 
NEWS SERV., Jan. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Notirnx file. 
114. See California Anti-Bias Department Fire Bombed in New Hate Attack, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at  A24. 
115. See Stephen Magagnini, Matsui: Rhetoric Fosters Hate Crimes, SACRAMEN- 
TO BEE, Od. 30, 1993, at B1; Immigrants Taking Bum Rap from Both Parties, 
Rep. Matsui Says, S.F. CHRON., Od. 30, 1993, at A7. 
116. Anti-immigrant sentiment also touched my relatively quiet, rural campus 
a t  the University of California at Davis. An undergraduate student, a Mexican im- 
migrant who had become a lawful permanent resident during her freshman year 
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More broadly, the new nativism has had an impact on 
immigration policies in the United States."' I t  almost inevi- 
tably influenced the nearly blanket INS opposition to the 
claims of persons seeking asylum in the United States in the 
1980s as well as the INS'S pursuit of policies designed to deter 
Central American asylum-seekers from pursuing their 
claims. l8 At various politically opportune times, the execu- 
tive branch has attempted to show a renewed commitment to 
halt illegal immigration from Mexi~o,"~ as has Congre~s . ' ~~  
and who had also become politically active, allegedly was accosted by two assail- 
ants who threatened her with a knife, cut her hair, beat her, threatened her life, 
and wrote "wetback" and other epithets on her. See Dan Morain, Immigrants Ad- 
vocate Tells of Racial Assault, LA. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993, at A3. The next night, 
she was stopped in the hallway in a campus building after leaving a student meet- 
ing, pushed into a stairwell and punched in the mouth. See id. The student ironi- 
cally had previously been featured in a local newspaper as a success story of the 
immigrant community. See Amy Chance, A Success Story for UC Davis Student 
from Mexico, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 24, 1993, at A10. The incident illustrates the 
heightened tensions surrounding the issue of immigration and the volatility of the 
hostile feelings about immigrants in California today. 
117. See Dick Kirschten, Catch-up Ball, 25 NAT'L J. 1976 (1993) (reporting that 
the Clinton administration felt political pressure to take tough stands on immigra- 
tion issues and was doing so). Besides the executive and legislative branches, na- 
tivism also may affect judges reviewing immigration decisions. See STEPHEN H. 
LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION A D THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND 
AMERICA 241-53 (1987) (arguing that social, political, and economic forces may 
affect judicial review of immigration decisions in United Kingdom and United 
States); see, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 975 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), 
aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (rejecting Haitians argument on the 
ground that "it would ultimately result in our losing control over our borders"). 
118. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(enjoining various practices of INS, including detention, that discouraged 
Salvadorans from pursuing right to apply for asylum). By labelling the influx of 
Central Americans in south Texas as "asylum abuse," the INS justified unprece- 
dented, expedited procedures that virtually assured quick denial of mostwell- 
founded as well as baseless-asylum claims. See A.B.A. COORDINATING COMM. ON 
IMMIGRATION LAW, LIVES ON THE LINE: SEEKING ASYLUM IN SOUTH TEXAS (1989); 
see also Robert E. Koulish, Systemic Deterrence Against Prospective Asylum Seekers: 
A Study of the South Texas Immigration District, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 529 (1992) (documenting INS and immigration court practices in South 
Texas that deterred asylum-seekers from pursuing claims); IMMIGRATION A D NATU- 
RALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ENHANCEMENT PJAN FOR THE SOUTH- 
ERN BORDER (1989), reprinted in Appendix 6 to Central American Asylum-Seekers: 
Hearing Before the Subconam. on Immigration, ReMees and International Law of 
the Comm. on the Judiciary, l O l s t  Cong., 1st Sess. 288-308 (1989)) [hereinafter 
Central American Asylum-Seekers] (discussing enhanced enforcement efforts to deal 
with "widespread abuse of the asylum process by applicants who make frivolous 
claims"); id. at 32-51 (prepared statement of Alan C. Nelson, Commissioner, Immi- 
gration and Naturalization Service on the need to increase enforcement efforts to 
combat "asylum abuse"). 
119. See, e.g., Tim Golden, U.S. BZocku.de of Workers Enmges Mexican Town, 
1172 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
Further restrictionist changes in immigration law and 
policy have been encouraged by the depiction of "asylum abuse" 
by the popular media.12' Well-publicized efforts to smuggle 
Chinese, some of whom may have legitimate asylum claims, in 
deplorable conditions on ships into the United States1% have 
fueled proposals for reform, including one from President 
Clinton with bipartisan In addition, public and 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1993, at A3 (discussing impact of Border Patrol's policy of 
deploying hundreds of officers along border between El Paso, Texas and Ciudad 
Juarez, Mexico); John H. Lee, Bank of Lights Planned to Deter Border Activity, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at  A3 (reporting Army Corp of Engineers' plan to erect 
floodlights along border); Burr Vows to Defend Border Integrity, LA. TIMES, Feb. 
11, 1992, at A24 (reporting that Attorney General told local law enforcement offi- 
cials that he wants "to get tough on illegal immigrants who are 'crashing in the 
back door' "). The INS released statistics a week before the 1992 Presidential elec- 
tion that it claimed showed that the Border Patrol had begun to "regain control" of 
the border. See Around the Nation, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1992, at  A10. 
120. See, e.g., House, Senate Approve 1994 Appropriations for INS, State Dept., 
3 0 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1033 (1993) (summarizing congressional debate in which 
House of Representatives violated its own budget rules by increasing INS appropri- 
ation so that more money could go to border patrol); 139 CONG. REC. H4429 (daily 
ed. July 1, 1993) (Rep. Traficant stating that "America is being literally overrun 
with illegal immigration . . . . We cannot complain about illegal aliens jumping our 
fence without putting in the funds and backing up the p e r s o ~ e l  to handle that."). 
121. The popular television show "Sixty Minutes" presented a decidedly one- 
sided account alleging widespread abuse of the asylum process and emphasizing 
that an alleged co-conspirator in the World Trade Center bombing was seeking 
asylum. See 'Sixty Minutes' Segment Reveals Massive Asylum and Immigration 
Fraud, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Prnews 
File. Soon after, Congress began considering various pieces of asylum "reform" 
legislation, which among other things would have provided for summary exclusion 
of applicants at ports of entry, would have overridden an important Supreme Court 
decision (in favor of the noncitizen) interpreting the asylum laws, and generally 
would have made it more difficult for certain noncitizens to apply for and obtain 
asylum. See Asylum Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 1679, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.; Exclu- 
sion and Asylum Reform Amendments of 1993, H.R. 1355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.; 
Immigration Preinspection Act of 1993, H.R. 1153, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.; Terrorism 
Prevention and Protection Act of 1993, H.R. 1301, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
Some persons who previously had been granted asylum could have been denied the 
opportunity even to apply if some of the bills had been in effect at the time of 
their entry into the United States. See Bob Herbert, In America: Send Them 
Back?, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1993, at A15 (telling stories of two young men from 
Afghanistan who used fraudulent documents to come to the United States and 
later were granted asylum but would have been returned to Afghanistan if some of 
the proposed legislation had been in effect); see also Jeffrey J. Chase, "Mummy, 
We're Free!"-In Defense of Asylum Rights, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1993, at A20 
(asking Congress to consider impact of summary exclusion proposals on legitimate 
refugees fleeing persecution). 
122. See, e.g., Steven L. Myers, Captain and Crew Charged in Voyage of Chi- 
nese to United States, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1993, a t  Al; Eric Young, Chinese Found 
at  Mall Part of a Larger Group, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1993, at  B1. 
123. See Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Seeks More Powers to Stem Ilkgal Im- 
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congressional attention has been focused on the story of a blind 
Muslim cleric seeking asylum who was implicated (and later 
indicted) as the "mastermind" of a much-publicized bomb- 
ing? Even if the allegations are true, one isolated incident 
obviously does not mean that all asylum applicants, or even 
more than a handful, have engaged in criminal activities of 
that magnitude. The mere fact that so much attention was 
focused on a single incident lends support to its extraordinary 
nature.'* Few could suggest that any significant percentage 
of asylum-seekers from Haiti, Central America, or many other 
nations come to the United States to engage in "terrorist" acts 
or less extreme abuses of the asylum system. Even if some do, 
there are ample means for the immigration bureaucracy to deal 
with any would-be asylum-seeker who poses a danger to the 
community. 126 
The backlog of asylum applications also has been pointed 
to as an indicator of systemic abuse.12' One oft-ignored possi- 
migration, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1993, at  A13 (describing Clinton proposal); see also 
Remarks on the Nomination of Doris Meissner to Be INS Commissioner and an  
Exchange with Reporters, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1110, 1110-11 (1993) 
(President Clinton announcing INS Commissioner nomination and outlining pro- 
posal to limit smuggling of Chinese into country). 
124. See Mary B.W. Tabor, Specter of Terror; US. Indicts Egyptian Cleric as  
Head of Group Plotting War of Urban Terrorism', N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1993, a t  
A1 [hereinafter Tabor, Terror]; supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing 
World Trade Center bombing). The Department of Justice originally concluded that, 
because there was no "concrete evidence" that Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman had par- 
ticipated in terrorist ads, it would not detain him during the pendency of the 
appeal of his asylum claim. See Mary B.W. Tabor, US. Rejects Sheik's Jailing as  
Too Costly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1993, a t  B1. I t  later decided to detain him, see 
Richard A. Semano & John J. Goldman, Islamic Cleric Arrested Amid Cheers and 
Jeers, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1993, a t  A23, and ultimately indicted him for allegedly 
conspiring to bomb the World Trade Center, see Tabor, Terror, supra. For a de- 
tailed description of the numerous irregularities, including blunders by United 
States officials (including CIA operatives), resulting in Sheik Rahman's admission 
into the country, see Sleuthing Shows Signif~ant Slip-ups in Sheik Saga, 70 IN- 
TERPRETER RELEASES 1207 (Sept. 13, 1993). 
125. See Terrorism, Asylum Issues and US. Immigration Policy: Hearing Before 
the I m m i a t w n  and Refugee M a i r s  Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (testimony of Neil Gallagher, Chief, FBI Counter Ter- 
rorism Section) ('While the entry of illegal aliens into the United States does rep- 
resent a concern, the fact remains that since 1983, only two a d s  of international 
terrorism have been conducted within the United States."), reprinted in REUTER 
TRANSCRIPT REP., May 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. 
126. See, e.g., INA 4 208(d), 8 U.S.C. 4 1158(d) (1988) (providing that person 
convicted of aggravated felony is ineligible for asylum); id. $6 2430(2)(B), 
1253(h)(2)(B) (providing that persons convicted of particularly serious crimes are 
ineligible for withholding of deportation). 
127. See Tim Weiner, Pleas for Asylum Inundate System for Immigration, N.Y. 
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bility is that the number of applications may be due to in- 
creased political or other persecution in the world.'" The 
backlog also may be the result of bureaucratic ineffi~iency.'~~ 
In light of the other possibilities, as well as the grave life and 
liberty interests a t  stake in the making of an asylum decision, 
one should be extremely cautious before labelling an increase 
in asylum requests as "abuse" and rashly making far-reaching 
policy judgments. Such care is missing &om the debate on the 
need for asylum reform. 
Although the growth in restrictionist sentiment has had an 
impact, we do not know how many voters strongly share the 
desire for increased immigration enforcement and restrictions 
at any cost. Even if a Silent Majority opposed the proposed 
changes in policy, it for whatever reason-ambivalence, dis- 
traction by other issues, indifference toward people unlike 
them, to name a few possibilities--does not appear to have 
emerged as a significant force in the political process. The Vo- 
cal Minority for the moment has prevailed. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at 1. 
128. See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY: 1989 IN REVIEW 
5, 30-31 (1990) (showing that world's refugee population totalled 15 million in 
1990, up about 50% from five years before). The current human rights abuses in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, which some have claimed are the most horrible since Nazi 
Germany, suggest that this may be the case. See Sara Fritz, Hawks, Doves Among 
Public Switch Sides, LA. TIMES, May 9, 1993, at A1 ("[A] powerful image that 
haunts Americans whenever they see pictures of the brutality in Bosnia is that of 
the Holocaust in Nazi Germany."). 
129. See Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: 
A Case S t d y  on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudica- 
tory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 456-57 (1992) (finding 
that principal causes of delay in asylum adjudication may be bureaucratic inefli- 
ciencies, particularly the nearly two-year delay in providing transcripts of immigra- 
tion court proceedings necessary for appeal); Meissner Praised in Senate Confirma- 
tion Hearing, REFUGEE REP., Sept. 30, 1993, at 8-9 (stating that, during confirma- 
tion hearings, Doris Meissner, now INS Commissioner, attributed "asylum abuse" 
as resulting primarily from delays by government in deciding asylum cases). This 
is supported by the fad that a ~ u a l  filings of asylum applications have declined 
since 1989. See 1991 INS STATISTICS, supra note 40, at 78. In addition, the backlog 
is due in part to the executive branch's settlement of a lawsuit claiming discrimi- 
nation against thousands of Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum-seekers that re- 
quired a de novo rehearing of all their claims. See infivc text accompanying notes 
283-84 (discussing American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 
(N.D. Cal. 1991)). 
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C. Political Failure and Haitian Repatriation 
A recent example of the political marginalization of the 
noncitizen population is the executive branch's grudging treat- 
ment of Haitians fleeing political violence in their homeland. 
Immigrant and refugee groups, with the assistance of Haitian 
and African-American advocacy organizations, unsuccessfully 
pressed three presidents to halt a program of interdicting Hai- 
tians on the high seas before they could reach the shores of the 
United States to apply for asylum. Indifferent to the pleas, the 
executive branch ratcheted up the severity of the measures to 
halt the flow of Haitians fleeing a violent military coup. Con- 
gress and the judiciary refused to intervene. Consequently, 
interdiction combined with repatriation remain the official 
policy. 130 
In 1981, in response to increasing numbers of Haitians 
coming to the United States on boats, President Reagan com- 
menced an unprecedented program under which Coast Guard 
cutters interdicted Haitians and interviewed them on board the 
ship to determine whether they should be brought to the Unit- 
ed States to pursue claims to a~ylum.'~' With judicial approv- 
al,lsz the policy continued unbroken for a decade until, in the 
fall of 1991, a military coup toppled the democratically elected 
government in Haiti. The State Department concluded that 
political violence in the coup's wake was rampant? Al- 
130. For a more thorough study of the Haitian interdiction and repatriation 
programs, see Symposium, The Haitian Refugee Crisis: A Closer Look, 7 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1993). 
131. The interdiction program, which was harshly criticized, see, e.g., Arthur C. 
Helton, The Mandate of U S .  Courts to Protect Aliens and Refugees Under Interna- 
tional Human Rights Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2335 (1991); Stephen H. Legomsky, The 
Haitian Interdiction Programme, Human Rights, and the Role of Judicial Protec- 
tion, INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 181 (spec. ed. Sept. 1990), was commenced pursuant to 
the U.S.-Haiti Interdiction Agreement, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241 (Sept. 23, 1981); Exec. 
Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. 180 (1982); Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 
48,107 (1981). 
132. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
133. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 103D CONG., ST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1992, at 421 (Joint Comm. Print 1993) ("Haitians 
suffered frequent human rights abuses throughout 1992 including extrajudicial 
killings by security forces, disappearances, beatings and other mistreatment of 
detainees and prisoners, arbitrary arrest and detention, and executive interference 
with the judicial process . . . . At year's end, widespread abuses continued, and 
there was no evidence either that the military was willing to  stop such practices 
or that the civilian Government was able to bring the military under control."); 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1991, at 633-34 (Joint Comm. Print 1992) ("Following the 
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though President Bush briefly lifted the interdiction program, 
he quickly reinstituted it and refused to grant "temporary pro- 
tected status" to Haitians in the United s t a t e ~ . ~ ~ ~  
Interviewing persons on-board ships became onerous in 
light of the increasing numbers fleeing Haiti and the adminis- 
tration began detaining them in Guanthamo Bay, Cuba to 
screen for bona fide asylum-seekers. After that policy was up- 
held by the courts,135 the executive branch took, and the Su- 
preme Court upheld, the extraordinarily stringent measure of 
immediately returning interdicted persons directly to  Haiti 
without any screening for legitimate asylum-seekers.ls6 Thus, 
in the face of its obligations under international law,ls7 the 
United States returned at least some Haitians to a land where 
they faced likely political persecution. 
coup . . . the [Haitian] army resorted to brutality and massacre to control the 
population . . . . [Tlhe army employed violence on several occasions to intimidate 
opposition political supporters, popular organizations, the urban poor, and the me- 
dia, and otherwise to discourage antiregime activity . . . . Hundreds were killed in 
political violence during 1991."). 
134. See Susan Beck, Cast Away, AM. LAW., Oct. 1992, at 54; see also Immi- 
gration A d  of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 8 302, 104 Stat. 4978, 5030 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. 8 1254a) (authorizing Attorney General to declare that per- 
sons from certain countries are eligible for "temporary protected status" in United 
States). Because of violence within their borders, several nations including El Sal- 
vador, Somalia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Liberia, Lebanon, and Kuwait have been 
granted temporary protected status since the Immigration Act of 1990 was passed. 
See id. 8 303(a) (El Salvador); Extension of Designation of Somalia Under Tem- 
porary Protected Status Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,898 (1993); Extension of Desig- 
nation of Bosnia-Hercegovina Under Temporary Protected Status Program, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 40,676 (1993); Extension of Designation of Liberia Under Temporary Protected 
Status Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 7898 (1993); Extension of Designation of Lebanon 
Under Temporary Protected Status Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 2931 (1992) (status ter- 
minated by 58 Fed. Reg. 7582 (1993)); Designation of Kuwait Under Temporary 
Protected Status ProgrG, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,163 (1991) (status terminated 57 Fed. 
Reg. 2930 (1992)). 
135. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992). 
136. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). 
The various administrations' decisions to implement increasingly extreme poli- 
cies were partly attributable to the Supreme Court's unswerving deference to the 
executive branch's judgment in a series of recent immigration decisions. See, e.g., 
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial 
Acquiescence to the Executive Branch's Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic Agen- 
das in Immigration Matters: The Case of the Haitian Asylum-Seekers, 7 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 27-37 (1993). 
137. See Carlos M. Vhzquez, The "Self-Executin& Character of the Refugee 
Protocol's Nonrefoulement Obligation, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 39 (1993) (analyzing 
obligations of states toward refugees under international law). 
11391 IMAGES OF THE IMMIGRANT 1177 
A variety of factors acting in confluence explain the inhos- 
pitable treatment accorded the Haitians? The executive 
branch's impermissible consideration of the foreign policy con- 
sequences of refugee admissions is perhaps the prime culprit. 
The long history of disparate treatment of Haitians from a 
fervently anti-communist nation and Cubans from a communist 
one is explicable by reference to foreign p01icy.l~~ The Hai- 
tians also ran head-on into a generally unsympathetic attitude 
among a segment of the electorate toward irnmigrati~n."~ 
Election year politics necessarily helped contribute to the Bush 
administration's escalating hard line on Haitian asylum-seek- 
ers. The treatment of the Haitians was criticized to some de- 
gree but countervailing forces, including restrictionist groups 
preaching the harms of excessive immigration, helped maintain 
138. This analysis is elaborated in Johnson, supra note 136. 
139. See, e.g., United States Refugee Programs: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980) (Senator Dennis DeConcini 
commenting to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance: "If you are a boat refugee from 
Cuba, INS automatically considers you a refugee. If you are a boat refugee from 
Baby Doc's Haiti, INS automatically considers you an illegal alien coming to the 
United States for economic purposes."). A recent example of this phenomenon is 
the arrest of a Haitian who hijacked a plane to Miami and was charged with air 
piracy, while a Cuban who did the same was not. See Howard Kleinberg, A Hijack- 
er Is a Huacker, Whether from Cuba or Haiti, STAR TRIB., Mar. 24, 1993, at 15A. 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 82-129 (discussing "new" nativism). 
The executive branch also might have been concerned that the Haitian exodus 
might turn into a repeat of the Marie1 boatlift, in which thousands of Cubans later 
found to be undesirable came to this nation. See Mark D. Kemple, Note, Legal 
Fictions Mask Human Suffering: The Detention of the Muriel Cubans Constitutional, 
Statutory, International Law, and Human Considerations, 62 S .  CAL. L. REV. 1733 
(1989). Another possible explanation for the strength of the resistance to the ad- 
mission of Haitian asylum-seekers may be that a number carried the HIV virus. 
Until ordered by a court to do so, the executive branch refused to bring Haitians 
found to have a credible fear of persecution to the United States to pursue their 
asylum claims and instead detained them in Guanthamo Bay, Cuba. See Haitian 
Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); see also id. at 1038 
(referring to Guantinamo Bay detention facility as "nothing more than an HIV 
prison camp"); Clinton Continues Summary Return of Haitians; U S .  Lawyers Inues- 
tigate In-Country Processing, REFUGEE REP., Jan. 29, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Return 
of Haitians] (quoting Professor Harold Koh as referring to facility as "the first HIV 
concentration camp in history"). In enacting legislation allowing for the exclusion of 
HIV-positive persons to  the United States, see National Institutes of Health Revi- 
talization Act of 1993, 5 2007, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), 
congressional debate often centered on the Haitians. See 139 CONG. REC. S1719 
(1993) (Sen. Nickles expressing concern that HIV population in Haiti may be as 
high as eleven percent and fear of spread of disease in United States); see also id. 
(denying that racism motivated HlV exclusion legislation and finding an anomaly 
in the fad that laws bar importation of diseased fruit but not immigration of dis- 
eased people). 
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the status quo. President Clinton, reneging on a campaign 
promise, continued to pursue Haitian interdiction and repatria- 
tion. 141 
The color of the Haitians, apparently the only group ever 
singled out for the extraordinary interdiction and repatriation 
program, may have indirectly influenced the formulation of the 
executive branch's evolving interdiction and repatriation poli- 
cies and decisions to allow them to remain in ~ 1 a c e . l ~ ~  Subtle 
racism inevitably diminished the domestic resistance to a harsh 
program directed exclusively at a group of black nonciti- 
z e n ~ . ' ~ ~  As aspiring immigrants of color, the Haitians were on 
the margins politically. Few strong political allies rallied to 
their cause. 
For whatever reason, the executive branch continued the 
interdiction and repatriation program. Congress showed its 
unwillingness to intervene. The House of Representatives re- 
jected a proposal that would have afforded temporary protected 
status in the United States to all ~aitians.'" Although the 
House passed a bill that would have dforded limited relief to 
Haitians then in United States custody, it died in the Sen- 
ate.145 Debate of this modest act often focused on anti-immi- 
141. During the campaign, candidate Bill Clinton harshly criticized President 
Bush's policies toward the Haitians. See, e.g., Arthur Brice, Immigration: One Can- 
didute Grabs Issue, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 6, 1992, at  B1. President-elect 
Clinton promised to change the administration's policy of immediate return of all 
Haitians. See Norman Kempster & Mike Clary, Clinton Says He'd Cancel Order of 
Haitians' Return, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1992, at A20. Shortly before the inaugura- 
tion, Clinton announced that his administration a t  least temporarily would continue 
the repatriation policy, though it hoped to improve processing of asylum claims 
filed in Haiti. See Elaine Sciolino, Clinton Says US. Will Continue Ban on Haitian 
Exodus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at  Al. 
142. See Brief of the NAACP, Transafrica, and the Congressional Black Caucus 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 
S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344) (claiming that Haitian policies violated Equal Pro- 
tection Clause); Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Cri- 
tique of the United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687 (1993) 
(claiming that racism influenced harsh treatment of Haitians); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 82-88 (discussing historical influence of racism on immigration 
law and policy in the United States). 
143. See James Harney, Critics of US. Policy See Racist Overtones, USA TO- 
DAY, Feb. 3, 1992, at  2A (quoting Professor Stephen Legomsky as stating that the 
public "would never stand for [treatment of the Haitians] if the boat people were 
Europeans"). 
144. See 138 CONG. REC. H808, 817-18 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1992). 
145. See Haitian Refugee Protection Act of 1992, H.R. 3844, 102d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (19921, 138 CONG. REC. H802, 824 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1992). 
11391 IMAGES OF THE IMMIGRANT 1179 
grant themes, such as the loss of "American jobs" and the fear 
of a Haitian "tidal wave."146 Thus, Haitians were the losers in 
the political branches, in which their influence was limited. 
The judiciary, in turn, deferred to the judgment of the 
political branches in the treatment of the Haitians. After pres- 
sure applied by some advocacy groups on the executive branch 
failed to  halt the program, a full-blown litigation strategy was 
pursued to no avail.14' The Supreme Court first denied certio- 
rari in a case upholding one version of the program14' and 
later reversed a decision enjoining a harsher version.14' 
Perhaps because of the efforts to  eliminate the entire pro- 
gram, little attention was paid to  the failings of the immigra- 
tion bureaucracy in implementing the few protections that 
existed for Haitians. For example, when a screening program 
was in place, although the INS determined that some interdict- 
ed Haitians had a credible fear of persecution, faulty 
recordkeeping resulted in the mistaken return of at least fifty 
of them to  Haiti.lso In addition, in-country processing of asy- 
In advocating legislative relief for the Haitians, one member of Congress ob- 
served: 
[Tlhe hypocrisy of [the interdiction policy] is glaringly evident. In the 
early 1980's, we opened our borders to hundreds of thousands of Cuban 
refugees fleeing the dictatorship of Fidel Castro. And it was not long ago 
that the administration was criticizing the British Government in Hong 
Kong for returning Vietnamese rehgees to their homeland against their 
will. Yet when a few thousand Haitian refugees desire to enter the Unit- 
ed States, the administration closes the door and turns out the light. 
Id. a t  810 (statement of Rep. Collins). The hypocrisy failed to convince Congress to 
act. 
146. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. H808 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1992) (statement of 
Rep. Stearns opposing Haitian Refugee Protection Act and emphasizing that "[tlhe 
fear that many Floridans have expressed to me is that [the a d ]  will create addi- 
tional waves of Haitians coming into Floridan); Cuban and Haitian Immigration: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Law, Immigration, and Refkgees of 
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 182, 193 (1991) (prepared state- 
ment of Daniel A. Stein, Executive Director, Federation for American Immigration 
Reform opposing end to interdiction program and emphasizing, among other things, 
the high unemployment rate and the problems caused by Haitians displacing do- 
mestic labor). 
147. See infra text accompanying notes 342-56 (discussing efficacy of litigation 
in facilitating social change). 
148. See Haitian Rehgee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992). 
149. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). 
150. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REFUGEES: U.S. PROCESSING OF HAI- 
TIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS 2 (Apr. 9, 1992). The report, however, cautioned that, be- 
cause INS records were incomplete, i t  might have understated the problem. See id. 
at  2-3. 
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lum applications, which President Clinton promised to improve 
while continuing interdiction and repatriation, appears prob- 
lematic.lsl Besides encountering lengthy delays, bona fide 
asylum-seekers may be intimidated and afraid to apply in Haiti 
in  light of the omnipresent political vi01ence.l~~ To make mat- 
ters worse, the opportunity to apply for asylum in the United 
States is little known in rural areas where political violence 
often is most prevalent. The inherent weaknesses of in-country 
processing were perhaps best illustrated by the arrest, while 
United States officials helplessly watched, of a Haitian found to 
be eligible for asylum. ls3 
The plight of the Haitians should trouble anyone aware of 
a few details of the political violence in Haiti. Extrajudicial 
executions, including that of twenty-five year old Matine 
Remilien, co-founder of a new political party calling for deposed 
President Jean Bertrand-Aristide's return to power, are com- 
monplace as are torture and mistreatment of perceived political 
opponents, arbitrary arrests, and detention. l" Amnesty Inter- 
national has documented incidents of persecution of supporters 
of the democratically elected Aristide by the military, in partic- 
ular the "disappearance" of Adelin Telemaque who was severe- 
ly beaten in  front of witnesses when caught writing a pro- 
Aristide political slogan on a wall.ls5 After being told by the 
United States consulate to secure additional proof of his claim 
of persecution, Carl Henri Richardson, who had campaigned on 
behalf of Aristide, was arrested by soldiers and beaten into 
~ n ~ ~ n s ~ i ~ ~ s n e s ~ .  ls6 
151. See supra note 141. 
152. See Return of Haitians, supra note 140, a t  5 (quoting Professor Harold 
Koh: "In-country processing is a rich person's option that is available to people who 
have time to wait, who can afford to be seen repeatedly in public, and who have 
the means to travel repeatedly."). 
153. See DeWayne Wickham, Janet Reno Faces Big Job: Turn Things Around 
a t  Justice, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Mar. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li- 
brary, Gns File. 
154. See William G. OWeill, The Roots of Human Rights Violations in Haiti, 7 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 87, 108-14 (1993). For an interesting article drawing parallels 
between the Holocaust and Haitian repatriation through the use of narrative, see 
Peter Margulies, Difference and Distrust in Asylum Law: Haitian and Holocaust 
Refugee Narratives, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. (forthcoming 1993). 
155. See AMNESTY INT'L REPORT 1992, at  34 (1992); see also AMNESTY INT'L 
REPORT 1993, at  146-49 (documenting numerous other similar incidents). 
156. See Asme Fuller & Andrew Levin, US Haitian Refugee Policy-A Brutal 
'Mternative', CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 8, 1992, at  19. 
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The stories of individual Haitians are not well known. 
Rather, there is a more general sense of chaos and violence in 
the so-called Third World among desperately poor peoples, 
which when presented in abstracted form,15' is less than grip- 
ping to the ordinary citizen.15' If the political system accu- 
rately gauged the will of the public, would the United States 
have treated the Haitians in this way?lSg We will never 
know. 
D. Preliminary Observations 
The noncitizen population in the United States is composed 
of people who live and work on the margins. While contributing 
to the economy, they are blamed by some for a litany of 
society's woes. Barred by law from the political process, 
noncitizens have limited ability to resist the attacks, protect 
their interests, and improve their lives. Many are further 
marginalized by their color, a stigmatizing attribute that also 
limits the political power of citizens. The plight of Haitians 
seeking asylum in this country is only one recent example of 
the weakness of noncitizens in the political arena. Although 
often less than clear, a majority of voters may agree with 
noncitizens but fail to act. Further exploration will make this 
clearer. 
111. THE ABILITY OF NONCITIZENS TO CHANGE THE 
LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 
Part I1 sketched some impressionistic thoughts about the 
political power of noncitizens. This Part presents and analyzes 
further evidence bearing on the ability of noncitizens to influ- 
ence the process. 
157. See, e.g., Kenneth Freed, Perils at  Sea Fail to Deter Haitians Fleeing Pov- 
erty, Repression a t  Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1991, a t  A8. 
158. See Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of 
Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 956 (1991) (contending that 
the dominant in society "focus[] our attention on abstraction, when it is particulari- 
ty and real-world detail that alone move us"); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking 
Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 
64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 893-94 (1989) (criticizing "abstraction" in law and 
legal reasoning). 
159. There is some evidence that the United States would not have treated 
Haitians as it did. See Cathy Booth, Send 'Em Back, TIME, July 8, 1992, at  43 
(reporting that 57% of persons in Miami, an area that would be most affected by 
generous treatment of the Haitians, favored giving them temporary refuge in the 
United States). 
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A. Overriding Suprem Court Decisions 
Before reviewing congressional overrides of Supreme Court 
decisions, some preliminary observations are in order. Salient 
characteristics of the immigration laws, as well as the nature of 
judicial review of immigration decisions, suggest that the power 
of noncitizens and their proxies is limited. Perhaps most impor- 
tantly, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is well 
known for its generous delegations of discretion to the execu- 
tive branch.I6' Congress, one might guess, generally does not 
delegate such unbridled discretion to agencies adjudicating the 
rights of citizens. In the immigration realm, Congress may 
conveniently dispose of thorny policy judgments with limited 
political payoffs (because the rights of a voting constituency are 
not at stake) by dumping the problem on the agency? 
The immigration laws also include substantive provisions 
that are difficult to reconcile with generally applicable legal 
prin~ip1es.l~~ For example, the INA barred the admission of 
communists for almost forty years,1" a prohibition in direct 
160. See Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1987) ("By statutory 
enactment, Congress has delegated its unusually broad dominion in the immigra- 
tion field to the Attorney General."); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 965-67 (11th 
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (referring to "sweeping delegations of congressional authority" 
in INA to Attorney General and stating that "the Attorney General . . . is the 
beneficiary of broad grants of discretion under the statute"), afd on other grounds, 
472 US. 846 (1985); see, e.g., INA 8 244, 8 U.S.C. 8 1254 (1988) (affording Attor- 
ney General discretion to grant relief of suspension of deportation); id. 8 245, 8 
U.S.C. 8 1255 (affording Attorney General discretion to grant relief of adjustment 
of status); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The 
Plain Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 
413, 455-56 (1993) (analyzing the special impact of plain meaning interpretation of 
immigration laws resulting from broad discretion delegated by INA to executive 
branch). 
For criticism of the delegations of unbridled discretion based on a case study of 
INS decisionmaking, see Abraham D. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discre- 
tionary Adjudication an& Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (1972), and Abra- 
ham D. Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the Informal 
Agency Process, 1 J. LEG. STUDIES 349 (1972). See also Maurice A. Roberts, The 
Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 144 (1975) (former Board of Immigration Appeals chair arguing for articu- 
lation of standards governing exercise of discretion by administrative actors under 
immigration laws). 
161. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 237 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Per- 
haps because of the intractability of the problem, Congress-vested by the Consti- 
tution with the responsibility of protecting our borders and legislating with respect 
to aliens-has not provided effective leadership in dealing with [the illegal alien] 
problem."). 
162. See generally Schuck, supra note 67 (analyzing discrepancies between clas- 
sical immigration law and mainstream legal doctrines). 
163. See INA $8 212(aX28XD), (GXv), 212(d)(3XA), 8 U.S.C. $8 1182(aX28)(D), 
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conflict with fundamental First Amendment principles.lB4 Up- 
held by the Court in Kleindienst v. M ~ n d e l , ' ~ ~  the exclusion 
remained for the most part intact until Congress substantially 
modified it in 1990.166 
Nor do the courts generally have the power to interfere 
with Congress's substantive judgments-even if those judg- 
ments would be patently unconstitutional if the rights of citi- 
zens were at stake. In addition to the now-popular deference 
frequently accorded agency action,lB7 the plenary power doc- 
trine circumscribes judicial review of immigration decisions of 
either Congress or the executive branch, the so-called political 
branches.'" This judicial hands-off policy is unlikely t o  
change in the near term. Congress obviously is one of the 
doctrine's principal beneficiaries and thus lacks any incentive 
to  require thorough judicial scrutiny of the immigration laws. 
The executive branch, which enjoys a reservoir of delegated 
discretion over immigration matters, naturally would not desire 
any change in the status quo and has been lax to limit its dis- 
cretion?' Crabbed judicial review, however, represents noth- 
ing less than a radical departure from elementary separation of 
powers prin~ip1es.l'~ Needless to  say, doctrines completely 
(6)(v), 1182(d)(3)(A) (providing that "aliens" advocating "world communism or the 
establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorshipn could be excluded 
from United States). 
164. See, e.g., John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Govern- 
ment, the Academy, and the McCarran-Walter Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1481 (1988); 
Steven R. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political Dissidents, 
100 HARv. L. REV. 930 (1987). 
165. 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (affirming the Attorney General's denial of visa to 
Belgian journalist and Marxian theoretician). 
166. See Immigration Act of 1990, $5 601, 602, 8 U.S.C. §$ 1182, 1251 (Supp. 
1992) (amending provisions for exclusion and deportation and limiting ability to ex- 
clude or deport persons on account of their political views). 
167. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
842-45 (1984). See generally Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the 
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989) (criti- 
cally analyzing Chevron deference). 
168. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606, 609 (1889). But see 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988 Term--Foreword: The Vanishing 
Constitution, 103 HAW. L. REV. 43, 77 (1989) (arguing that "the usual character- 
ization of executives and legislatures, but not the courts, as majoritarian exagger- 
ates the differences between the institutions and distorts analysis"). The plenary 
power doctrine has been harshly criticized. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitu- 
tion and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Proge- 
ny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987); Stephen H. Legornslry, Immigration Law and 
the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255. 
169. See Roberts, supra note 160. 
170. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is em- 
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precluding judicial review are few and far between when the 
rights of citizens are a t  issue.171 
A few examples of invocation of the plenary power doctrine 
demonstrate its dramatic implications. Draconian immigration 
laws designed not only to discriminate against, but to punish, 
Chinese immigrants were shielded by its immunity.172 The 
doctrine in more recent years has been invoked to uphold con- 
gressional limitations on the eligibility of noncitizens for cer- 
tain public benefits.173 In declining the invitation to invali- 
phatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is."); see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 117, at 178 (discussing Marbury v. Madison 
principles and observing that "[mlost are unaware that there is a vast . . . body of 
[immigration] law that the [Supreme] Court has explicitly treated as an exception 
to the principle of constitutional review"); Henkin, supra note 168, at 863 ("The 
[Supreme] Court has left only immigration and deportation outside the reach of 
fbndamental constitutional protections."); cf. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIPLOMACY 319-20 (1990) (arguing that "the Executive almost always wins if the 
courts sit on the sidelines" in foreign policy matters). 
171. But see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN 
LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 325 (1990) (arguing that Supreme 
Court afforded "federal government plenary power to control Indian affairs unre- 
strained by normal constitutional values"); Nell J. Newton, Federal Power over 
Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 199 (1984) 
("The mystique of plenary power has pervaded federal regulation of Indian affairs 
from the beginning."); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) ("The plena- 
ry power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both 
explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself."). 
172. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); The Chi- 
nese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). But see Wong Wing v. United States, 
163 U.S. 228, 233-34, 238 (1896) (invalidating on due process grounds law requir- 
ing that Chinese nationals unlawfully in United States "shall be imprisoned at  
hard labor for a period of not exceeding one year, and thereafter removed from the 
United States" (citing Act of May 5, 1892 ch. 60 § 4, 27 Stat. 25)). For an analysis 
of the impact of the plenary power doctrine on the development of constitutional 
law in the immigration realm and the interpretation of the immigration laws, see 
Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surro- 
gates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992) (analyz- 
ing impact of plenary power doctrine in fostering procedural due process doctrines 
protecting immigrants), and Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century 
of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 
YALE L.J. 545 (1990) [hereinafter Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms] (ana- 
lyzing impact of doctrine on statutory interpretation). See also Michael Scaperlanda, 
Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965 (criticizing plenary 
power doctrine as inconsistent with the evolving concept of state sovereignty under 
international law). 
173. For example, Congress enacted, and the Supreme Court upheld, a law 
excluding LPRs without five years of continuous residence in the United States 
from receiving certain medical insurance benefits. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 
67 (1976) (upholding 42 U.S.C. 8 1395(2)(B) (1988)); see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 1382j(a) 
(1988) (attributing income of an alien's sponsor to the alien, thereby limiting access 
of certain LPRs to some benefit programs); INA 245A(k)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
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date such laws, the Supreme Court observed with candor that 
"Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if 
applied to  citizen^."'^^ 
Despite strong reasons for not applying the doctrine, the 
Court recently reaffirmed this approach to the judicial review 
of immigration law and policy. The Court rejected a constitu- 
tional challenge to a new regulation promulgated by the Justice 
Department generally requiring the detention of undocumented 
children unless released to parents, close relatives, or legal 
guardians but not to respodsible, unrelated a d ~ 1 t s . l ~ ~  In 
doing, the Court emphasized that 
[flor reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for 
regulating the relationship between the United States and 
our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches 
of the Federal Government. [Olver no conceivable subject is 
the legislative power of Congress more complete. Thus, in the 
exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturaliza- 
tion, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unaccept- 
able if applied to citizens.176 
The plenary power doctrine thus shielded the Attorney 
General's judgment even though the INS failed to establish the 
need for the new regulation, which represented a change in 
policy.177 Further, when the regulation was adopted, the de- 
tention conditions by the INS'S own admission were "deplor- 
able,"17' thus making deference appear anomalous. 
$ 1255a(h)(l) (1988) (barring aliens eligible for amnesty from participation in major 
federal benefit programs for five years after obtaining temporary resident status). 
See generally John W. Guendelsberger, Equal Protection and Resident Alien Access 
to Public Benefits in France and the United States, 67 TUL. L. REV. 669 (1993) 
(comparing access to benefits in two countries). 
None of this is to suggest that the Court never has deviated from the plenary 
power doctrine. The Court sporadically has protected LPRs, sometimes even undoc- 
umented ones. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that states 
cannot bar undocumented children from public schools); Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (striking down statute limiting civil service employment 
to citizens); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (striking down exclusion of LPRs 
from law practice). 
174. Mathews, 426 U.S. a t  80 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 
U.S. 787, 792 (1977). 
175. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1993). 
176. Id. a t  1449 (emphasis added) (second bracketed letter in original) (cita- 
tions and quotations omitted). 
177. But cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
US. 29 (1983) (reviewing carefully agency change in policy). 
178. See Flores, 113 S. Ct. at  1460-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mi- 
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The plenary power doctrine has a profound, though subtle, 
impact on the interpretation of the immigration laws. When 
the courts interpret an ordinary statute, the Constitution 
serves as a moderating influence that tends to limit the possi- 
bility for extreme  construction^.'^^ Invocation of the plenary 
power doctrine, however, eliminates any constitutional con- 
straints in interpreting the immigration laws, thereby freeing, 
if not requiring, judges to allow extreme interpretations of the 
statute by the executive branch to stand.lgO Thus, the doc- 
trine allows the agency and the courts far greater freedom in 
interpreting the INA than is generally available under other 
bodies of law. Consequently, a plenary power world creates the 
distinct potential for immigration law and policies to linger a t  
the fringes of lawfulness. 
In  summary, Congress a t  various times in our histo- 
ry-perhaps a t  the behest of vocal minorities active at the 
time-has enacted laws that adversely affect noncitizens. The 
executive branch not infrequently acts in an even less solicitous 
manner. Nor can the courts, constrained by the plenary power 
doctrine, be depended upon to intervene to correct a dysfunc- 
tional political process. Under those circumstances, it would 
seem inherently difficult for noncitizens to override adverse 
judicial interpretations of the immigration laws (even those 
that run afoul of majoritarian spirit) and curb agency conduct 
that violates the law. 
chael A. Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children: Detention, Due Process, and 
Disgrace, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 159, 160-61 (1990) (describing conditions in 
which INS detained undocumented juveniles). 
179. See T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A 
Response to Martin, 44 U. P m .  L. REV. 237, 258-59 (1983) (arguing that certain 
applications of plenary power doctrine precluded dialogue between the courts and 
Congress on due process protections); Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, 
supm note 172, a t  562 (articulating how equal protection bar to racial discrimi- 
nation affected Supreme Court's interpretation of Internal Revenue Code and con- 
clusion that statute prohibited federal tax exemption for nonprofit private schools 
that discriminate); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 
346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasizing that Court should interpret 
statutes in a manner so as to avoid constitutional questions). I owe this thought 
(and many others) to Hiroshi Motomura. 
180. See Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 172, at 580- 
600. 
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1.  Overrides generally 
In theory, if Congress disagrees with the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of a statute, it  may amend the statute.lsl That, 
however, is easier said than done. Professor William Eskridge's 
empirical study of congressional overrides of Supreme Court 
decisions in the 90th (1967-68) through the lOlst (1989-90) 
Congresses found that Congress overrode only 121 Supreme 
Court decisions and 220 lower court decisions.182 
In light of the hundreds of Supreme Court decisions over 
the time period, the number of overrides is relatively small. 
This may be a product of the fact that Supreme Court cases 
"involve big stakes and sharply clashing interests" in which the 
winners are able to stave off override attempts.183 This might 
be expected in the few high-profile, controversial immigration 
cases.lg4 The federal government, a strong lobbyist,lS5 com- 
181. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989) 
("Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpre- 
tation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative 
power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.") 
(citations omitted). 
182. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Inter- 
pretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 338 (1991). 
183. See id. at 377. 
A recent non-immigration example is Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow 
v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991), in which the Court "borrowed" a limitations 
period for an implied private right of action under 5 lo&) of the Securities Ex- 
change Act of 1934 to fill a statutory gap. Some objected to the length of the peri- 
od selected. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Securities Fraud and the Mirage of Repose, 
1992 WIS. L. REV. 607; Barbara Roper, Stop the Clock on Swindlers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 19, 1991, a t  A25; 137 CONG. REC. H11,812 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (state- 
ment of Rep. Markey); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Bridging the Gap: Some 
Thoughts About Interstitial Lawmaking and the Federal Securities Laws, 48 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 879, 890-914 (1991) (analyzing Lampf in light of Supreme Court's 
vacillating jurisprudence on interstitial lawmaking). Business-related interests 
fought successfully to halt efforts to override the decision and extend the limita- 
tions period, although Congress limited Lampf's retroactive application. See Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 
3 476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (adding 5 27A to Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. 5 78aa-1, providing that 5 lo&) actions filed on or before date of decision 
would be governed by limitations laws then applicable in jurisdiction); see also 
Lyman Johnson, supra, at 610-11 n.6 (outlining circumstances behind congressional 
response to Lampfl. 
On the other hand, when business interests lose in the Supreme Court, they 
may face formidable dificulties obtaining passage of remedial legislation. See 
Eskridge, supra note 182, a t  366-67 11.103 (describing unsuccessful efforts of busi- 
ness to override Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481-500 (1985), which allowed 
criminal racketeering statute to be applied to commercial dispute). 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 130-59 (discussing Haitian repatriation 
and Supreme Court's upholding of program). 
185. Cf. Eskridge, supra note 182, a t  366-67 & n.103 (noting instances in 
1188 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
bined with restrictionist groups that have come to the fore- 
front,lS6 might be expected to effectively resist a pro-immi- 
grant override. One might expect that overrides are more likely 
in low stakes matters without "sharply clashing interests." As 
we shall see, many if not most of the few congressional over- 
rides of Supreme Court interpretations of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act do not implicate hotly contested  question^.'^' 
Based on the results of his study, Professor Eskridge hy- 
pothesized that "[gJroups are most likely to organize when they 
are small, cohesive, and sociopolitically privileged. Difusion, 
heterogeneity, and political marginalization render groups less 
likely to become organized, but sometimes potentially more pow- 
erful if organized."'" Organization obviously is critical to any 
override attempt. For that reason, consumers, welfare and 
other benefit recipients (i.e., diffuse, heterogeneous, or political- 
ly marginalized groups), for example, generally are unlikely to 
command the legislative interest that business and labor orga- 
nizations, women, the disabled, and environmentalists (i.e., 
small, cohesive, or sociopolitically privileged groups) do.'' 
Whatever the cause, the paucity of overrides has implica- 
tions. The Supreme Court may read its own preferences into a 
statute without colorable threat of congressional overridelso 
or, if it agrees with Congress's policy choices, defer to it 
through invocation of some sort of deference doctrine. Conse- 
quently, the judiciary, and often the executive branch through 
its interpretations of the laws,'" enjoy the final say about the 
which the Justice Department successfully lobbied against RICO overrides). 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95. 
187. See infra text accompanying notes 192-261. 
188. Eskridge, supra note 182, at  361 (emphasis added); see also id. at 358-59 
("Congress will generally not override Supreme Court statutory decisions unless a 
politically salient group presses for an override and unless other relevant groups, 
especially government officials and political party leaders, acquiesce . . . .") (foot- 
note omitted). 
189. See id at  362-63. Even organized groups, however, may find it dimcult to 
override Supreme Court decisions. For example, passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (cowed as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.), which had broad support from liberal interest groups, took a 
significant concentration of resources and several efforts, including a concerted cam- 
paign after a presidential veto. See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Busi- 
ness Necessity Standard, 106 HAFW. L. REV. 896, 897-906 (1993) (summarizing 
history). 
190. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at 416-17. 
191. See Chevron USA. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
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meaning of laws. As shall become apparent, this is especially 
true in immigration law. 
2. The Immigration and Nationality Act: 1952 to June 1993 
Intuition suggests that noncitizens, because of their 
"[dliffusion, heterogeneity, and political marginalizati~n,"'~~ 
would find i t  difficult to engage in the necessary organization 
to override Supreme Court decisions. Professor Eskridge's 
study shows that 3% (4 of 121) of congressional overrides of 
Supreme Court decisions from 1967-90 were immigration cases, 
which placed immigration in a tie for eleventh out of twenty- 
two subject matter categories.lg3 The small number of over- 
rides of immigration decisions prevented the formulation of any 
generalized conclusions on the subject.'% 
In light of the insularity of immigration law, one might 
even be surprised that there were four overrides. One explana- 
tion may be that the powerful Senate and House Judiciary 
Committees have jurisdiction over immigration matters.lg5 
These committees had primary or exclusive jurisdiction over 
54% of the overrides during 1967-90.1g6 The number of immi- 
gration overrides thus may be attributable more to the vagaries 
of committee assignments than to the political clout of 
noncitizens. 
The complex nature of the immigration laws,19' and the 
courts' difficulty in interpreting them, also might necessitate 
more overrides in the immigration area than in other areas. 
Their complexity may only be outmatched by their lack of clari- 
ty, a further factor militating in favor of frequent judicial inter- 
192. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at  361. 
193. Id. at 344. The top ten subject matters were criminal law (15%); antitrust 
(9%); civil rights (9%); bankruptcy (8%); federal jurisdiction and procedure (7%); 
environmental law (7%); income tax (7%); copyright, trademark, and patent law 
(7%); intergovernmental relations and federalism (5%); and longshoreman and ship- 
ping (5%). 
The study further concluded that noncitizens gained in 2% (two cases) of the 
total cases overridden within 10 years of the Court's decision. See id. a t  348. From 
1978 to 1984, 8Wo of the Supreme Court decisions (four of five cases) in which 
noncitizens lost were not overridden by Congress. See id. at  351. 
194. See id. at 376. 
195. See d. at  344. 
196. See rd.; see also id. at  339 (noting great increase in size of staffs of 
House and Senate Judiciary committees). 
197. See Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (referring to INA and 
stating that "Congress . . . has enacted a baffling skein of provisions for the I.N.S. 
and courts to disentangle"). 
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vention.Ig8 Moreover, due to substantive controversies sepa- 
rate and apart from Supreme Court decisions, Congress has 
revisited immigration policy a number of times.''' That fact 
alone has increased the likelihood of overrides, particularly 
when change without controversy can be achieved through 
inclusion in an omnibus piece of immigration legislation.200 
Even so, any success enjoyed by noncitizens in overriding 
Supreme Court decisions might well overstate their influence 
in the political process. The vast majority of immigration deci- 
sions, of which Congress generally is unaware, are finally de- 
cided in the lower courts.201 Most adverse lower court deci- 
sions therefore are left wholly intact.202 Professor Eskridge, 
for example, located a single override of a lower court decision 
interpreting the INA during 1967-go.203 That override at- 
tempted to facilitate criminal immigration e n f ~ r c e m e n t . ~ ~  
198. See, e.g., infi-a text accompanying notes 206-21 (discussing Errico and 
Reid, two Supreme Court decisions grappling with an opaque provision of INA). 
199. See 1991 INS STATISTICS, supra note 40, at  A.l-12 to A.l-21 (identifymg 
57 separate pieces of "immigration and naturalization legislation" from passage of 
INA in 1952 through 1990). 
200. See infra text accompanying notes 222-40 (discussing overrides of Boutilier 
and Phinpathya). 
201. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at 415-16. 
202. A particularly troubling example of a lower court case not even considered 
by Congress is Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 826 (1987). In that case, the court of appeals affumed the Board of Immigra- 
tion Appeals denial of asylum to a Salvadoran woman forced to watch relatives 
dismembered and murdered and later was raped while political slogans were chant- 
ed, on the ground that she had not been persecuted "on account of . . . 'political 
opinion.' " Id. at 288. Although harshly criticized, see ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra 
note 15, at 811 n.36 (referring to Campos-Guardado as a "stunning example of a 
nearly inexplicable hard-line decision, using highly restrictive 'on account of' doc- 
trine"); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of 'Persecution' in United States Asy- 
lum Law, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 5, 25 (1991) (criticizing decision in similar vein), 
Congress apparently never scrutinized the case. 
203. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at  428. 
204. See IRCA $ 112, 8 U.S.C. $ 1324 (1988) (overriding United States v. 
Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Zayas- 
Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982)). After the district court dismissed an 
indictment against defendants accused of violating criminal immigration laws, Con- 
gress amended the laws to expand their scope and permit future indictments based 
on the same conduct. The House Report left no doubt that the amendment was de- 
signed to further enforcement goals: "Without the threat of criminal prosecution, 
there is no effective way to deter potential transporters from inundating U.S. ports 
of entry with undocumented aliens." H.R. REP. NO. 682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5670; see id. at  112, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.AN. 5716 (stating that Reagan administration supported the amendment). 
Another example of Congress overriding lower court decisions (before the 1967- 
90 time frame scrutinized by Professor Eskridge) to pursue enforcement goals can 
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Moreover, default principles endorsed by the Supreme Court 
circumscribe appellate review of agency immigration deci- 
s ion~?~ '  In  this light, the override of less than a handful of 
Supreme Court decisions in  almost a quarter-century has limit- 
ed significance in evaluating the political influence of the non- 
citizen community. Scrutiny of the four immigration decisions 
overridden from 1967-90 sheds further light on the issue. 
a. Four overrides: 196 7-1 990 
(1) INS v. Errico (1966) and Reid v. INS (1975). 
Two of the Supreme Court decisions overridden during 1967- 
90 involved the same section of the INA. In INS v. E r r i ~ o , ~ ' ~  
the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, interpreted 
section 241(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which at 
the time provided as follows: 
The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of 
aliens within the United States on the ground that they were 
excludable a t  the time of entry as aliens who have sought to 
procure, or have procured visas or other documentation, or 
entry into the U.S. by fraud or misrepresentation shall not 
apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry 
be seen in the Refugee Resettlement Amendment, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504 
(1960). Sections 8 and 9 of that Act overrode Mendoza-Rivera v. Del Guercio, 161 
F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd, 267 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1959), and Rojas- 
Gutierrez v. Hoy, 161 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd, 267 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 
1959), which held that marihuana was not a "narcotic drug" for exclusion and de- 
portation purposes under the INA. Congress amended the INA to make it clear 
that exclusion or deportation could be based on "narcotic drugs or marihuana" 
convictions. See S. REP. NO. 1651, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), reprinted in 1960 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3135 (explaining changes as consistent with "original intent of 
Congress" and that "concern with violation of laws relating to marihuana was as 
great as its concern with violations of laws relating to other narcotic drugs"). 
Congress also overrode Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962), va- 
cated on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), which held that the term "psycho- 
pathic personality" for purposes of exclusion was unconstitutionally vague if read to 
include homosexuality. Congress amended the provision to provide that persons 
deemed to suffer from a 'sexual deviation" could be excluded from the United 
States. See Pub. L. No. 89-236, $ 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (1965); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 222-32. 
Finally, two lower court decisions involving the applicability of the INA that 
favored noncitizens were overridden along with United States v. Menasche, 348 
US.  528 (1955). See In re Naturalization of Wolff, 270 F.2d 422 (3d Cir. 1959), 
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 928 (1960); Medalion v. United States, 279 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 
1960); see also infra Appendix. 
205. See generally Johnson, supra note 160. 
206. 385 U.S. 214 (1966). 
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who is the spouse, parent, or a child of a U.S. citizen or of an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.207 
Two noncitizens, both of whom had children born in the 
United States (thus making the children citizens), attempted to 
invoke the protections of section 241(f). The INS sought to 
deport them on the grounds that they employed fraud in enter- 
ing the country to avoid then-existing national origin quota 
restrictions and therefore were not "otherwise admissible at the 
time of entry.'"08 Liberally construing the statutory provision, 
the Court held that, despite the fact that the fraud was de- 
signed to evade quota restrictions, the noncitizens were entitled 
to the mandatory section 241(f) waiver. 
Because Errico and its apparent deviation from the plain 
meaning of the statute resulted in some divergent interpreta- 
tions in the lower courts, the Court revisited section 241(f) in 
Reid v. INS.''' In Reid, the INS sought to  deport the Reids, 
who attempted to invoke section 241(f), on the ground that 
they entered the United States without inspe~tion;'~ even 
though they entered the country through use of false documen- 
tation. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, inter- 
preted section 241(f) so as to af'firm the agency's deportation 
order.211 Noting that "Errico was decided by a divided Court 
over a strong dissenting opinion,"212 the Court limited that 
holding to cases in which the INS sought to  deport noncitizens 
because entry was obtained through fraud, not when deporta- 
tion was based on the separate ground of entry without inspec- 
tion as in the case before the Court.213 
207. Id. at 215 (emphasis added) (quoting INA 8 241(f), 9 U.S.C. § 1251(0). 
This section was added to the INA by Pub. L. No. 87-301, 8 16, 75 Stat. 649, 655 
(196 1). 
208. Errico, 385 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted). The INS sought deportation 
under INA 8 241(a)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C. fi 1251(aXl)(A) (1988), which allows deportation 
of "aliens" who were excludable at  the time of entry. See Errico, 385 U.S. at 215 
& n.2. 
209. 420 U.S. 619, 620-21 & n. 1 (1975) (citing inconsistent lower court author- 
ity); see also Elwin Grifflth, Reforming the Immigration and Nationality Act: Labor 
Certifxation, Adjustment of Status, the Reach of Deportation, and Entry by Fraud, 
17 U. IMICH. J.L. REF. 265, 290-91 (1984) ("Needless to say, the Errico approach 
left the lower courts in a state of confusion about the appropriate application of 
section 241(f)."). 
210. See INA 8 241(aXlXB), 8 U.S.C. 8 1251(aXlXB) (1988). 
211. See Reid, 420 US. at 624-31. 
212. Id. at 628. 
213. See id. at 624-31. 
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The complexities of the interpretation and application of 
section 241(f) after these two Supreme Court decisions should 
be obvious. Not surprisingly, the lower courts encountered 
difficulties reconciling Errico and Reid?14 The 198 1 amend- 
ments to section 241(f) represent a response to the confusion 
sown by the two divergent interpretations of the section. The 
House Report states the following: 
[Tlwice litigation involving the proper interpretation of [sec- 
tion 241(f)l has reached the Supreme Court with no clear 
resolution. . . . The Committee amendment reconciles the 
confusing and conflicting judicial and administrative interpre- 
tations of the scope of this provision, and clarifies that the 
waiver is only intended to apply to immigrants and that it is 
available for innocent (as well as fraudulent) misrepresenta- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ' ~  
The 1981 amendments, however, definitely had a substan- 
tive slant. They made it clear that the section 241(f) waiver 
applied t o  willful or innocent fraud and, more importantly, that 
its relief was discretionary rather than mandatory (as it previ- 
ously had been)? The amendment thus afforded the agency 
214. Compare Persaud v. INS, 537 F.2d 776, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1976) (minimizing 
Reid's limitation of Errico) with Pereira-Barreira v. United States Dep't of Justice, 
523 F.2d 503, 508-09 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that Reid limited Errico to its facts). 
See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L J .  
1361, 1435, 1438 (1988) (listing Reid as decision "disavowing significant reasoning" 
of Errico). 
215. H.R. REP. NO. 264, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981), reprinted in 1981 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2577, 2594; see also id. a t  9-10, reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2578- 
79 (stating that amendments were designed to "improve the efficiency of the [INS] 
by streamlining certain . . . procedures, clarifying various ambiguities in current 
law and eliminating unnecessary reporting requirements," and that the House Judi- 
ciary Committee "attempted to restrict the scope of this legislation to those reforms 
which are urgently needed and noncontroversial"). 
216. INA 8 241(f), 8 U.S.C. 8 1251(f) (repealed and recodified as amended in 
1990). As amended, § 241(f) read, in pertinent part, as  follows: 
The provisions of this section relating to deportation of aliens . . . on the 
ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who have 
sought to procure or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry 
into the United States, by fraud or misrepresentation, whether willful or 
innocent, may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, be waived for any 
alien . . . who- 
(i) is the spouse, parent, or child of a citizen . . . or of an alien 
lawfully admitted . . . for permanent residence; and 
(ii) was in possession of an immigrant visa or equivalent document 
and was otherwise admissible . . . at  the time of such entry except 
for those grounds of inadmissibility . . . which were a direct result of 
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the discretion, which obviously would substantially limit judi- 
cial review on the question of section 241(f)'s applicability, in 
deciding whether the noncitizen was entitled to the benefits of 
the section. The ultimate victor in the congressional response 
to the Court's decisions in Errico and Reid thus was the INS. 
The executive branch, not surprisingly, supported the override. 
The acting INS Commissioner testified that "differing admin- 
istrative Ad judicial interpretations have left the law in a 
state of confusion which makes it virtually impossible for the 
INS to  uniformly administer Section 241(f).77217 The Depart- 
ment of Justice in a previous attempt to "clarify" the section 
had argued that "litigants have sought to expand Section 241(f) 
into a charter of amnesty, waiving all restrictions for those who 
had entered the United States through fraud."218 
In short, Congress attempted to clarify confused Supreme 
Court caselaw in favor of the government S o  obviate the need 
for further litigati~n.'~'~ The override apparently reflects the 
handiwork of diligent committee staffers2" and the power of 
the federal lobby.221 
(2) Boutilier v. INS (1967). In Boutilier u. 
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Clark, relied on legislative 
history in interpreting "psychopathic personality," which could 
that fraud or misrepresentation. 
(emphasis added). 
217. H.R. REP. NO. 264, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981), reprinted in 1981 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2577, 2594. 
218. See id. 
219. See id. 
220. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at  345 (attributing overrides in "low visi- 
bility" issues of criminal law, bankruptcy, and federal jurisdiction and procedure as 
the "result of ambitious codification and reform efforts by judiciary subco~nmittees 
responsible for each of those areas of law"). 
221. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. Congress later repealed 
8 241(f) and recodified it as amended when it revamped the deportation and exclu- 
sion provisions of the INA. See also Immigration Act of 1990, 8 602(a)(l)(H), 104 
Stat. 4978, 5079 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 8 1251(a)(l)(H)). 
222. 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967) ("The legislative history of the [Immigration and 
Nationality] Act indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Congress intended 
the phrase 'psychopathic personality' to include homosexuals . . . ."); see also Wil- 
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., GadamerlStatutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 
609-11, 639-46, 651-59, 661 (1990) (analyzing Boutilier's method of statutory inter- 
pretation). 
In dissent, Justice Douglas emphasized that "[]he term 'psychopathic personali- 
ty' is a treacherous one like 'communist' or in an earlier day 'Bolshevik.' A label of 
this kind when freely used may mean only an unpopular person. It is much too 
vague by constitutional standards for the imposition of penalties or punishment." 
Boutilier, 387 U.S. at  125 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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serve as the basis for exclusion under section 212(a)(4) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act:23 to include homosexuality. 
Repeated concerted override attempts were unsuccessful in the 
1 9 ~ 0 s . ~ ~ ~  Congress finally overruled Boutilier in the Immigra- 
tion Act of 1 9 9 0 . ~ ~ ~  
The override reflects, among other things, the increased 
political strength of the organized lesbian and gay communi- 
ty.226 The overriding of Boutilier became an important issue 
to lesbian and gay  organization^,^^^ similar in some respects 
to the current controversy concerning the ban on lesbians and 
gays from serving in the military.228 The issue did not appear 
to animate the advocacy efforts of immigrant and refugee 
groups to the same degree.229 Changing social mores also in- 
fluenced the congressional response.230 Moreover, the fact 
that the provision was enacted in a much larger amendment of 
the INA, the Immigration Act of 1990, with a large number of 
-- 
223. 8 U.S.C. 5 1182(a)(4) (1988) (amended 1990) (providing that excludable 
aliens include "[alliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation, 
or a mental defect") (emphasis added). 
224. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at  358 & n.77 (collecting citations to pro- 
posed override legislation). 
225. Immigration Act of 1990, 5 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067 (1990) (codified at  8 
U.S.C. 5 1182 (Supp. 1992)). 
226. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at 357-59, 411-12. 
227. See, e.g., Letter from Association of Gay and Lesbian Psychiatrists to Rep. 
Barney Frank (June 17, 1987), in Exclusion and Deportation of Mens: Hearings 
on H.R. 1119 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law 
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 266 (1987) [hereinaf- 
ter Exclusion and Deportation Hearings]; Letter from National Organization of Gay 
and Lesbian Scientists and Technical Professionals to Rep. Romano Mazzoli (June 
17, 1987), in Exclusion and Deportation Hearings, supra, at  387. 
228. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Race and Sexual Orientation in the 
Military: Ending the Apartheid of the Closet, 2 RECONSTRUCTION 52 (1993); Thomas 
B. Stoddard, Why We Are Marching, NEWSDAY, Apr. 23, 1993, a t  64; see also Wil- 
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: 
Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333, 347-52 (1992) (book review) 
[hereinafter Eskridge, Critique] (criticizing Richard Posner's analysis of military 
exclusions of lesbians, gays, and women). 
229. See, e.g., Statement of Ira J. Kurzban, Esq., President, American Immi- 
gration Lawyers Association, in Exclusion and Deportation Hearings, supra note 
227, at  257 (discussing elimination of ideological exclusions and not mentioning 
lesbian and gay exclusion); Statement by International Human Rights Law Group 
(1987), in Exclusion and Deportation Hearings, supra, a t  325 (same); Lawyers Com- 
mittee for Human Rights, in Exclusion and Deportation Hearings, supra, at  337 
(same). 
230. See H.R. REP. NO. 723, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6736 (stating that exclusion is "out of step with current notions 
of privacy and personal dignity" and "inconsistent with contemporary psychiatric 
theories"). 
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significant made its passage much more like- 
ly.232 In light of these facts, the override should be treated 
cautiously in calibrating the political strength of noncitizens. 
(3) INS v. Phinpathya (1984). In INS u .  
Phinpathyay the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice 
O'Connor, literally interpreted the "continuous physical pres- 
ence" requirement for eligibility for relief known as suspension 
of deportation under section 244 of the Immigration and Na- 
tionality ActO2= In so doing, the Court deviated from long- 
standing lower court precedent and endorsed the harsh deci- 
sion of the agency to deny relief t o  a person who had interrupt- 
ed a stay of eight years (as of the year that she applied for 
relief) in the United States with a three month trip to her na- 
tive country.235 Two years later, Congress in a comprehensive 
amendment to the INA, the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986, overrode Phinpathya by providing that a nonciti- 
zen had established a ''continuous physical presence" so long as 
any "absence from the United States was brief, casual, and in- 
nocent and did not meaningfblly interrupt the continuous phys- 
ical presen~e."~ 
231. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 15, at  61-62 (noting that the 1990 
Act "worked a major overhaul of the legal migration system" by, among other 
things, expanding employment-based immigration, adding visa numbers, creating a 
new category of "diversity immigrants," rewriting exclusion and deportation 
grounds, and creating "temporary protected status" for persons fleeing civil war and 
the like). 
232. See infia text accompanying notes 237-40 (noting similar phenomenon in 
override of Phinpathya). 
233. 464 U.S. 183 (1984). 
234. See INA, 8 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1988) (providing that applicant 
for suspension of deportation must have "been physically present in the United 
States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding 
the date of . . . application"). 
235. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 524 (1992) (re- 
ferring to Phinpathya as "a bombshell" and noting that the Court %ok on an is- 
sue that was not raised by the facts, that no one had argued or briefed, that re- 
quired the disapproval of twenty years of virtually unbroken case law, that reached 
a result at  odds with the [Board of Immigration Appeals] interpretation, and that 
produced law far more extreme than what even the INS had sought"); Eleanor 
Pelta, INS v. Phinpathya. Literalist Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 
23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 406-11 (1986) (criticizing Court's interpretation of stat- 
ute for, among other things, being inconsistent with a long line of authority, in- 
cluding the Court's interpretation of similar language in a different INA provision 
in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963)). 
236. IRCA 315@)(2), 8 U.S.C. 5 1254@)(2) (1988). The House previously had 
passed a bill five months aRer Phinpathya that would have overridden the deci- 
sion. See 130 CONG. REC. 16,348-50 (1984). However, the bill died in the Senate. 
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Except to immigration practitioners, the "continuous physi- 
cal presence" requirement for suspension of deportation is little 
known. It  is, of course, important to undocumented persons 
seeking to become lawful permanent residents through suspen- 
sion of deportation. From that respect, the override's more 
liberal treatment of brief trips out of the country was a signifi- 
cant gain. The issue, however, definitely did not rise to the 
significance in the eyes of public and Congress as, for example, 
such matters as the treatment of asylum-seekers~37 and 
therefore was an unlikely candidate to draw significant opposi- 
tion. This is especially true because, as was the Boutilier over- 
ride, the Phinpathya override was buried in a law with more 
significant changes to the immigration laws that dominated 
congressional debate over the bill. The lengthy debate over 
IRCA primarily focused on the controversial issues of employer 
sanctions and amnesty for certain undocumented immigrants, 
not on whether a provision of the INA concerning suspension of 
deportation would be changed.2s8 Of course, immigrants' 
rights groups supported the change in the face of executive 
branch opposition.23s As with previous overrides we have con- 
sidered, the override of the Supreme Court's plain meaning 
interpretation may have been facilitated by an active and in- 
formed Judiciary Committee ~ t a t f . ~ ~ '  
(4) Common features. After reviewing the Supreme 
Court decisions that were overridden, the political power of 
noncitizens appears all the more limited. Two of the four over- 
rides favored the executive branch rather than the noncitizen. 
Factors other than noncitizen influence played critical roles in  
ensuring passage of the two overrides in  their favor. The over- 
237. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 130-59 (discussing Haitian repa- 
triation). 
238. See H.R. REP. NO. 682(I), supra note 204, at  51-56, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5655-60 (summarizing lengthy history of legislation and major issues 
of debate, which did not focus on Phinpathya). The central issues of debate are 
reflected in IRCA's three purposes: "to control illegal immigration to the U.S., 
make limited changes in the system for legal immigration, and provide . . . for 
certain undocumented aliens who have entered this country prior to 1982." Id. a t  
45, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649. For a discussion of the many compromises in 
IRCA's legalization provisions, see Bill Ong Hing, The Immigration and Naturaliza- 
tion Service, Community-Based Organizations, and the Legalization Experience: 
Lessons for the Self-Help Immigration Phenomenon, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 413, 475- 
91 (1992) (Appendix B). 
239. See H.R. REP. NO. 682(1), supra note 204, at 116, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5720 (statement of administration position). 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 195-96, 220. 
1198 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
rides also tended to involve narrow, noncontroversial questions 
of little general significance to the noncitizen community. 
b. The bigger picture. This section attempts to take a 
more complete look a t  the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and congressional 
responses to those decisions. From December 1952 when the 
INA went into effect241 through June 1993 (the end of the Oc- 
tober 1992 Term), the Supreme Court decided 71 cases, which 
are listed in the Appendix, that interpreted or applied the 
INA.242 At the outset, it is important to note that the relatively 
241. See INA $ 407, 66 Stat. 163, 281 (1952). 
242. Let me describe the methodology employed to compile the Appendix. Cas- 
es referring to the Immigration and Nationality Act initially were identified 
through computer searches of United States Supreme Court decisions. Each deci- 
sion uncovered through this search was read and a summary of the important 
characteristics of the case prepared. All decisions that were determined to interpret 
and apply the INA were included in the Appendix. To locate any other INA cases 
not revealed through computer searches, research assistants reviewed the index of 
each volume of the Supreme Court Reporter from 1952 to the present and identi- 
fied a few cases that were added to the Appendix. These cases also were read and 
summarized. 
The selection of cases "interpreting or applying" the INA required some 
judgment calls. The primary criterion used in deciding to include a case was 
whether interpretation or application of the INA was necessary to the decision. To 
avoid overcounting decisions, I excluded reversals and remands in light of a recent 
decision or a change in the statute. I also excluded one case in which a lower 
court decision in favor of the noncitizen was affirmed per curiam by an equally 
divided court. See Brownell v. Rubinstein, 346 U.S. 929 (1954) (per curiam). 
Determining "winners" and "losers" as a general rule was fairly straightforward. 
However, a few judgment calls were made based on my reading of the decision 
and its impact. Some of the more difficult judgments are explained in the Appen- 
dix. 
In determining whether Congress "overrode" a decision, see infra note 243 (de- 
fining override), research assistants reviewed the legislative history for all enacted 
public laws involving immigration that were reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. All reports 
on immigration legislation enacted by Congress during the relevant time period 
that were reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. were reviewed for references to court decisions. 
Legislative history not reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. also was reviewed in some in- 
stances. 
One final caveat is in order. The sample did not include all cases involving the 
INS, or all decisions having some impact on immigration law and policy. Nor are 
decisions interpreting immigration laws other than the INA included. Rather, the 
sample is limited strictly to decisions interpreting or applying the INA. A wider 
sampling of cases might reflect even more skewed results in favor of the govern- 
ment, particularly in recent times. A number of recent non-INA cases involving 
immigration-related issues have been decided adversely to the noncitizen and in 
favor of the executive branch. See, e.g., United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. 
Ct. 541 (1991) (holding that Haitian asylum-seekers were not entitled under Free- 
dom of Information Act to certain information relevant to their claim); Ardestani v. 
INS, 112 S. Ct. 515 (1991) (holding that successful asylum applicant may not re- 
cover attorneys' fees from government under Equal Access to Justice Act). 
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small sample size militates in favor of caution in drawing in- 
ferences from the study. The Appendix also lists the INA sec- 
tion interpreted, the winner and loser, whether the decision 
was overridden:43 and, if so, who the "ultimate winner7'-the 
group that obtained the benefit of the override-was. 
Table 1 shows a breakdown of the results in cases involv- 
ing noncitizens and the federal government, and citizens and 
the federal government. 
In reviewing the Court's immigration decisions, I saw one pattern worthy of 
mention that is not directly related to my purpose in reviewing the cases. Besides 
frequently dissenting from decisions against noncitizens, see, e.g., supra note 222 
(discussing Justice Douglas's dissent in Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967)), 
Justice Douglas repeatedly voted to grant certiorari in immigration cases because 
of the important life and liberty interests at stake, see, e.g., Cheng Fu Sheng v. 
INS, 393 U.S. 1054 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Ng 
Kam Fook v. Esperdy, 375 U.S. 955 (1963) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari); see also United States Congress, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Special 
Subcomm. on H. Res. 920, Associate Justice William 0. Douglas, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 66-69 (1970) (investigating propriety of Justice Douglas's letter to INS Com- 
missioner stating that, based on knowledge of the region, a Kurd resisting deporta- 
tion to Iraq would be subject to "severe persecution" if returned there). As a young 
man with acquaintances in the Industrial Workers of the World, Douglas was well 
aware of President Wilson's mass deportation of noncitizen union members. See 
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG m: THE EARLY YEARS 77-80 (1974); see 
also supra note 98 (mentioning Palmer Raids during this time period). 
243. "Overrides" are defined here as changes to the law in which Congress 
consciously responds to a Supreme Court interpretation of the INA and attempts to 
change the result achieved by the interpretation. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at  
332 n.1 (employing similar definition). A classic override purports to "correct" a 
misinterpretation by the Court. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102- 
166, $ 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Similar to Professor Eskridge's study, this one 
classifies congressional action as an override only when legislative history focuses 
on one or more Supreme Court decisions. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at 332 n.1. 
I distinguish between an override and a change in the statute. Congressional 
action was classified as a "change" when the section was amended not because of 
any disagreement with the Supreme Court's interpretation but to change the policy 
preferences reflected in the statutory provision. An example is when Congress 
amends a statute after the Court upholds its constitutionality. See, e.g., supm text 
accompanying notes 165-66 (discussing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)). 
The Appendix does not purport to be a comprehensive list of all changes to the 
INA section interpreted by a particular decision but generally only lists those 
changes that somehow are tied to a Supreme Court decision (for example, when a 
House or Senate report mentions the decision). 
I recognize that, for some of the more recent decisions, especially those decided 
in the 1990s, Congress still may override the decision. As of this date, however, 
they have not. If past history proves to be a reliable guide, Congress will override 
few if any of the more recent Supreme Court decisions. 
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TABLE 1 
Noncitizens Versus 
Noncitizens Prevailed Government Prevailed 
Cases (%) Cases (%) 
17 (32.7%) 
Total Decisions: 52 
Citizens Versus Government 
Citizens Prevailed Government Prevailed 
Cases (%) Cases (%) 
Total Decisions: 15 
As Table 1 shows, the government, often the INS, pre- 
vailed in approximately two-thirds of the decisions over 
noncitizens. This victory percentage seems high, particularly in 
light of the abundance of criticism levelled a t  the immigration 
bureaucracy over the years.245 The raw numbers must be 
treated with some caution, however, because they do not ac- 
count for the relative importance of the decisions. Although 
noncitizens were net losers by a large margin in the Supreme 
Court in the 1980s, this was not always the case. INS v. 
Cardoza-F0nseca,2~~ for example, was an extremely important 
victory for asylum-seekers.247 Similarly, several losses in the 
244. All percentages stated in this Section are rounded to the closest .I%. 
In compiling Table 1 dealing with decisions involving noncitizens and the gov- 
ernment, the following should be noted. In one case, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983), which invalidated a legislative veto of an agency immigration decision, the 
noncitizen and the executive branch had roughly congruent interests in the out- 
come and the Court ruled in their favor and against Congress. In two other cases, 
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), and Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982), 
noncitizens were adversaries to entities other than the federal government. 
Noncitizens won one of those cases (Toll) and lost the other (De Cams). In Saxbe 
v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974), the government prevailed in pressing its interpreta- 
tion of the INA that benefited noncitizens (and, incidentally, agricultural interests) 
over a farm labor union. None of these four cases is included in Table 1, which 
exclusively considers cases in which noncitizens and the federal government are 
adversaries. If all Supreme Court decisions requiring interpretation or application 
of the INA (including these four cases) in which noncitizens were parties to a case 
are considered, noncitizens prevailed in about 35.7% of the total (20 of 56). 
245. See znfra text accompanying notes 262-317. 
246. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
247. See Deborah Anker & Carolyn P. Blum, New Trends in Asylum Jurispru- 
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Court for noncitizens involved relatively narrow issues that 
may not be of general significance to the noncitizen communi- 
ty.248 
One of the more startling, and completely unexpected, 
revelations from the review of the Supreme Court's decisions 
also is reflected in Table 1. Citizens, in suits in which the exec- 
utive branch was an adversary (often actions attempting to 
strip them of their citizenship in denaturalization or expatria- 
tion proceedings), won almost three-quarters of their cases in 
the Supreme Court. Thus, while noncitizens lost two-thirds of 
their cases against the federal government, citizens won three- 
fourths of their cases. Put simply, the Court in the aggregate 
was much more likely to  protect citizens than noncitizens. The 
pattern suggests that the Court places a high value on citizen- 
ship and is willing to  protect citizens resisting its loss.249 The 
equities intuitively may appear to weigh more heavily in favor 
of naturalized citizens who may have been in this nation for 
many years than for noncitizens who may have been here for a 
shorter time and know that their presence here is unlawful. 
dence: The Aftermath of the US. Supreme Court Decision in INS v. Cardoza- 
Fonseca, 1 Im J. REFUGEE L. 67 (1989); Arthur C. Helton, INS v. Cardoza- 
Fonseca: The Decision and Its Implications, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 35 
(1987-88). 
248. See, e.g., INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992) (revolving around proce- 
dural morass involving motion to reopen deportation proceedings); infra text ac- 
companying notes 306-17 (discussing Doherty). 
249. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) ("American 
citizenship . . . is 'one of the most valuable rights in the world today . . . .'") 
(citation omitted); United States v. Zucca, 351 US. 91, 99-100 (1956) ("The mere 
filing of a proceeding for denaturalization results in serious consequences to a 
defendant. Even if his citizenship is not cancelled, his reputation is tarnished and 
his standing in the community damaged."); United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 
193 (1956) (Black, J., concurring) ("Former cases have held that Congress has full 
power to bar or exclude aliens from the country. But citizenship, whether acquired 
by birth or by naturalization, cannot be taken away without a judicial trial in 
which the Government carries a heavy burden.") (citations omitted). 
It is uncertain whether the lower courts share the Supreme Court's solicitude 
for citizens in denaturalization proceedings. For example, John Demjanjuk, an ac- 
cused Nazi war criminal known as "Ivan the Terrible," was denaturalized, see Unit- 
ed States v. Demjanjuk, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982), 
and later extradited to Israel, see Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986), vacated, No. 85-3435, 1993 WL 469786 
(6th Cir. Nov. 17, 1993). Israel's Supreme Court later found that Demjanjuk was 
not Ivan the Terrible and that the case was one of mistaken identity. See Court in 
Ismel Clears Demjanjuk of Being Ivan,' a Nazi Criminal, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 
1993, at  Al. 
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Table 2 reflects a breakdown by decade of Supreme Court 
decisions between noncitizens and the federal government. 
Noncitizens Versus Government by Decade 
Government Prevailed Noncitizen Prevailed Total 
Cases (%) Cases (%) 
Total 35 17 52 
Except for the 1960s (not coincidentally the heyday of the 
Warren Court) when noncitizens prevailed in exactly one-half 
of the cases, they always have been considerably less successful 
than the federal government (the executive branch and Con- 
gress) in the Supreme Court. Moreover, in recent years, 
noncitizens have been markedly less successful. Since 1980, the 
executive branch has prevailed in over 80% of the INA cases, 
which is significantly greater than the 67% success rate for the 
entire time period. One explanation is that an increasingly 
more conservative Supreme Court has shown greater willing- 
ness to defer to the judgment of the immigration bureaucracy 
and Congress.250 Another entirely consistent explanation is 
that the current Court is not particularly sympathetic to the 
claims of noncitizens. 
With respect to  congressional overrides of Supreme Court 
interpretations of the INA, Congress overrode seven of the 
seventy-one decisions (9.~%),2~' including the four from 1967- 
90 previously discussed. This may seem to be a relatively high 
percentage. Only three other INA decisions were overridden 
250. See Johnson, supra note 160, at 459-98. See generally Thomas W .  Merrill, 
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE LJ. 969 (1992) (analyzing 
generally Court's deference to agency interpretation of statutes). 
251. Note that this might overstate matters because two of the decisions that 
were overridden (Errico and Reid) involved the same esoteric provision of the INA. 
See supra text accompanying notes 206-21. 
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from 1952-66 and 1991-93, the time period not covered by Pro- 
fessor Eskridge's study. Each involved overrides sought by the 
federal government to the detriment of noncitizens. In United 
States v. Menas~he:~~ the Court narrowly interpreted Section 
405(a) of the INA to  allow the noncitizen to apply for relief 
under a more generous predecessor statute. Congress overrode 
that interpretation in 1961 as "contrary to  the intent of Con- 
gress" and bound noncitizens to the provisions of the INA.253 
In Shaughnessy v. P e d r e i r ~ ~ ~ ~  and Brownell v. Tom We 
S h ~ n g , ~ ~ ~  the Court interpreted the INKS judicial review pro- 
visions liberally to allow multiple avenues for review. By mak- 
ing the court of appeals the sole avenue for judicial review of 
deportation orders and habeas corpus the exclusive mode of ap- 
peal of exclusion orders, Congress overrode the interpretations 
because of alleged lengthy delays caused by lawsuits filed by 
"undesirable aliens."256 
In five of the seven overrides (71.4%), the ultimate winner 
was the go~ernment.~" Noncitizens were the ultimate win- 
ners in two of the seven overrides (28.6%). The government 
clearly was more able than noncitizens to convince Congress to  , 
override an adverse Supreme Court decisi~n.~" This appears 
particularly true when one considers that several lower court 
decisions adverse to the government have been overridden.25s 
252. 348 U.S. 528 (1955). 
253. H.R. REP. NO. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2981-82; see Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301 $ 17, 75 
Stat. 649, 656 (1961). 
254. 349 U.S. 48 (1955). 
255. 352 U.S. 180 (1956). 
256. H.R. REP. NO. 1086, supra note 253, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 
2967 (expressing a desire to halt delays in deportation by "judicial actions being 
instituted by undesirable aliens whose cases have no legal basis or merit, but 
which are brought solely for the purpose* of delay, particularly by "subversives, 
gangsters, immoral [sic], or narcotics peddlers"); see Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. 
No. 87-301, 6 5, 75 Stat. 649, 651-53 (1961). 
257. The "ultimate winner" is the group that gained the benefits of the over- 
ride. Thus, it generally was the loser in the Supreme Court. This is true with 
respect to all but Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975), in which the government pre- 
vailed and the statute was amended as sought by the executive branch to narrow 
the provision further than had been done by the Court's interpretation. See supra 
text accompanying notes 206-2 1. 
258. This is consistent with the observation that the federal government can 
be an effective lobby. See supra note 185. 
259. See supra note 204 (discussing congressional overrides of lower court de- 
cisions). This review did not attempt to identify all congressional overrides of lower 
court interpretations or applications of the INA. My research, however, identified 
five lower court decisions that were overridden by Congress. See supra note 204 
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Table 3 illustrates the elapse of time between the Court's 
decision and the congressional override. 
Decision (Year) 
Menasche (1955) 
Shaughnessy (1955) 
Brownell (1956) 
Errico (1966) 
Boutilier (1967) 
Reid (1975) 
Phinpathya (1984) 
TABLE 3 
Year of Override 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1981 
1990 
1981 
1986 
Mean Difference : 
As one might expect, it generally takes some time before 
Congress overrides the Court's construction of a statute, if it 
ever does. If one throws out the overrides of Menasche, 
Shaughnessy, and Brownell, which alleviated perceived prob- 
lems in the early interpretation of a new, complex and 
Phinpathya, which may not have been overridden so quickly if 
not for the fact that Congress was considering comprehensive 
immigration reform a t  the time, then the average time between 
decision and override would be closer to fifteen (about 14.67) 
years. However, it is difficult to base firm conclusions on re- 
view of such a small sample. 
Several inferences may be drawn from a review of the 
Supreme Court's interpretations of the INA and congressional 
overrides from 1952-93. Noncitizens, particularly today, are 
unlikely to prevail against the immigration bureaucracy or 
Congress in the Supreme Court. The difference between the 
success rate of noncitizens and citizens is dramatic; citizens are 
much more likely than noncitizens to prevail. In  addition, al- 
though some Court decisions involving the INA are overridden, 
few that involve significant issues to the noncitizen community - 
(referring to cases). 
260. See supra text accompanying notes 252-56; infra Appendix (describing 
decisions). 
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are. The most divisive immigration decisions, such as the one 
allowing Haitian repatriation or the one defining political per- 
s e c u t i ~ n , ~ ~ '  are not likely to be overridden. Moreover, when 
there is an override, it is likely to favor the government. 
B. Policing the Immigration Bureaucracy? 
The immigration bureaucracy, particularly the INS, has 
been much maligned for most of recent memory.262 The Gen- 
eral Accounting Office, for example, has identified, among other 
deficiencies, coordination problems, enforcement shortcomings, 
mismanagement, faulty recordkeeping, and poor fiscal con- 
t ro l~ .~"  Despite unrelenting criticism, major reforms have 
been few and far between. To the extent that administrative 
agencies theoretically are politically accountable through the 
election of the P r e ~ i d e n t ? ~  noncitizens lack the franchise 
necessary to ensure accountability of the immigration bureau- 
~ r a c y . ' ~  Because administrative agencies with control over 
261. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (defining narrowly "per- 
secution on account of . . . political opinion" for purposes of asylum). 
262. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 15, at  102 ("INS was once re- 
spected as a relatively well-run and efficient administrative agency, even by those 
who disagreed with many of the policies carried out. But those days are long in 
the past."); MILTON D. MORRIS, IMMIGRATION-THE BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY 87-
88 (1985) ("In recent years, few agencies of the federal government have been as 
vigorously or persistently criticized as those engaged in enforcing immigration poli- 
cy. The INS in particular has been a target of widespread criticism, even among 
public officials."); see also H. REP. NO. 216, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (entitled 
"The Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overwhelmed and Unprepared for 
the Future"). 
263. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CUSTOMS ERVICE AND INS: 
DUAL MANAGEMENT S RUCTURE FOR BORDER INSPECTIONS HOULD BE ENDED 
(1993); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION MANAGEMENT: STRONG 
LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT REFORMS NEEDED TO ADDRESS SERIOUS PROBLEMS 
(1991); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT: IMMIGRA- 
TION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE LACKS READY ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL DATA 
(1990); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PROSPECTS DIM FOR EFFECTIVELY EN- 
FORCING IMMIGRATION LAWS (1980). 
264. See Chevron U.SA. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
865 (1984) ("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Govern- 
ment to make such policy choices . . . ."). This theory of political accountability of 
administrative agencies was seriously questioned long before Chevron. See generally 
THEODORE J. LOW, THE END OF LIBERALISM 195-97, 271-94 (2d ed. 1979). I find 
this theory to be deeply problematic, particularly when it comes to the immigration 
bureaucracy. Few voters appear to base their choice in selecting a presidential 
candidate on the candidate's position on immigration. 
265. I previously have touched on this theme in Johnson, supra note 160, at  
443-54. 
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the life, liberty, and destiny of many immigrants in fact are not 
subject to the "check" of the ballot box, the political process 
cannot be relied upon to correct unlawful or simply heavy- 
handed conduct. Put differently, noncitizens are not a constitu- 
ency with the power to influence, much less "capture," the 
agency that has great powers over them.266 
The immigration laws are administered by the INS and the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, both organizationally 
located in  the Justice Department.267 The location of the im- 
migration agencies in a department primarily devoted to law 
enforcement and headed by the nation's chief law enforcement 
officer, may place pressures on these agencies to emphasize 
immigration enforcement even if the laws passed by Congress 
call for a more balanced approach. Because an electorate com- 
posed exclusively of citizens generally does not elect the Presi- 
dent on the basis of the administration's immigration policy, 
this imbalance is unlikely to be corrected through electoral 
politics. Congress, for the same reasons that i t  is unlikely to 
override Supreme Court interpretations of the immigration 
laws, cannot be expected to intervene. 
The accountability question, however, becomes consider- 
ably more complicated once the multi-faceted nature of the 
immigration bureaucracy's constituency is considered. The 
diverse constituency results from the INS'S dual functions of 
enforcement and service, which at times place conflicting de- 
mands on the agency that are difficult to reconcile.268 The 
266. See supra note 79 (citing authorities describing phenomenon of "agency 
capture?. 
267. See INA 8 103, 8 U.S.C. 8 1103 (1988 & Supp. 1992); 8 C.F.R. 8 3.0 
(1992). 
268. See U.S. COMM'N ON CML RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CML 
RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 40 (1980) (The root of the problems encountered 
by United States citizens and residents in the service side of INS stem in large 
part from the conflicting missions of INS-service and enforcement."); SUSAN G. 
BAKER, THE CAUTIOUS WELCOME: THE LEGALIZATION PROGRAMS OF THE IMMIGRA- 
TION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT 133-34 (1990) (concluding that competing missions 
of INS impeded implementation of IRCA's legalization program in New York City); 
see also znfra text accompanying notes 363-64 (discussing proposals of two former 
INS Commissioners that might alleviate conflict). 
The conflicting functions are exemplified by an INS sting operation in which 
the INS sent a letter to undocumented persons and invited them to appear to 
obtain a work permit. Those that appeared were arrested and deported. See H.G. 
Reza, Immigrants Deported in INS Sting Operation, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1993, at  
Al. Such operations clearly inspire fear of the INS in the immigrant community 
and are likely to hinder the INS in attempts to gain the trust of that community 
necessary to  perform its service function. 
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INS serves noncitizens through adjudicating applications for 
the various forms of relief provided by the Immigration and 
Nationality Act. In serving noncitizens, the INS acts in accor- 
dance with the desires of the Silent Majority who desire hu- 
manitarian and fair treatment of noncitizens and admission of 
certain immigrants into the national community. At the same 
time, the INS is obligated to enforce the integrity of the bor- 
ders, thereby serving those citizens (particularly the Vocal 
Minority but to a lesser degree, the Silent Majority) placing a 
premium on immigration enf~rcement.~" When the INS vig- 
orously pursues enforcement priorities a t  the expense of all 
others, it acts in a manner entirely consistent with the de- 
mands of one of the agency's primary constituencies. 
The problem boils down to the fact that the INS, being 
responsive primarily to the enforcement constituency, might be 
expected to overemphasize enforcement. The group of voters 
strongly favoring strict enforcement may be perceived as the 
only one likely to apply political pressure of any significance, 
thereby holding the agency accountable if it does not act as  
desired. Particularly today, this group, even if only a Vocal 
Minority, is vigilant and appears willing to act.270 Conse- 
quently, the INS may fear most groups that strongly advocate 
increased immigration enforcement, such as the Federation for 
American Immigration Reform (FAIR). As is the case in lobby- 
ing Congress, small, cohesive, sociopolitically privileged, and 
homogeneous groups, like FAIR, might well enjoy a distinct 
advantage over other groups in  influencing agency action.271 
It  is true that immigrant and refugee rights groups moni- 
tor the INS and attempt to make it accountable to a "constitu- 
ency" lacking the right to vote. Without doubt, these groups 
have influenced some agency decisions. For example, the INS 
A similar structural conflict of interest situation exists in the Department of 
Interior, which houses the Bureau of Indian Affairs and also is the "federal 
government's primary land and resource management agency . . . . [Tlhere are nu- 
merous examples of conflicts between Indian interests and other Interior agencies." 
DAVID H. GETCHES & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW 234 (2d ed. 1986). As is immigration law and policy, United States 
Indian policy frequently is criticized. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 171; see also 
supm note 171 (citing sources criticizing the "plenary power" of federal government 
over regulation of Indian tribes). 
269. See supra text accompanying notes 71-81. 
270. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95 (discussing activities of FAIR 
and local affiliates). 
271. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89. 
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revamped the affirmative asylum decisionmaking process by 
creating a group of asylum officers with some independence 
from INS enforcement operations.272 The proposal originally 
would have eliminated the immigration court's role in certain 
asylum decisions.273 In response to objections from immigrant 
advocacy groups, the INS removed that part of the proposal 
from the fmal rule.274 Similarly, after discussions with noncit- 
izen advocates, the INS relaxed its policy of detaining all asy- 
lum applicants in exclusion ~r0ceedings.Z~~ 
Of course, this analysis begs the question whether 
noncitizens, who cannot vote, are a constituency of the immi- 
gration bureaucracy or, for that matter, legislative representa- 
tives. One could argue that disenfi-anchised noncitizens are not 
because they cannot vote and because some are not in this 
country lawfully. The problem with these arguments is that the 
laws passed by representatives of the citizenry protect 
noncitizens in various ways. By so doing, the laws transform 
noncitizens into de facto constituents or, in contract parlance, 
third party beneficiaries. Moreover, because they are directly 
affected, noncitizens are the most self-interested in bureaucrat- 
ic compliance with the law on service issues and in curbing - 
enforcement abuses. Consequently, they are the most likely 
(and, in law and economics jargon, the most cost-effective) 
monitors of the immigration bureaucracy. 
In any event, despite monitoring by advocacy groups, the 
root causes of the pattern of enforcement problems remain 
uncorrected. The explanation perhaps is the dynamic resulting 
in the Vocal Minority prevailing over the Silent Ma j~ r i ty .~ '~  
To reiterate, the average citizen is not directly affected by the 
INS on anything resembling a regular basis. Immigration en- 
forcement is not a visible part of the daily life of the average 
American. Outside of border communities, the most visible 
enforcement takes place far away from our homes and further 
272. See 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674 (July 27, 1990) (codified in scattered sections of 8 
C.F.R. (1992)). See generally Martin, supra note 61 (discussing asylum officer sys- 
tem). 
273. See Martin, supra note 61, at 1322-24. 
274. See id. 
275. See INS Liberalizes Policy for Releasing Asylum-Seekers, 69 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 503 (Apr. 27, 1992); see also INS Pilot Project to Parole 200 Detained 
Asylum Applicants, 67 LNTERPRETER RELEASES 530 (May 7, 1990) (discussing INS 
pilot project of paroling detained asylum applicants that led to decision to change 
policy). 
276. See supra text accompanying notes 71-81. 
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away from our collective consciousness. Indeed, the desperation 
of the persons seeking to enter a t  the border by whatever 
means may be unpleasant for many to ponder. In a different 
vein, immigration enforcement affects people from a different 
culture who often are "foreign" in many respects. Citizens intel- 
lectually troubled by frequent reports of abuse at the borders 
cannot be expected to explore beyond the headlines, much less 
mobilize politically to cease questionable practices, particularly 
when the abuse involves different people figuratively in a dif- 
ferent world. In any event, it is dacult to believe that  a major- 
ity of the public, even the Vocal Minority endorsing tough bor- 
der enforcement, supports the more egregious Border Patrol 
abuses.277 Still, because the Vocal Minority demands more 
enforcement, it seems unlikely that it would be as ready to act 
to halt such 
1. Trends in immigration litigation in the 1980s 
Professor Peter Schuck and Theodore Wang drew two con- 
clusions from their empirical study of immigration litigation in  
the 1980s that are particularly relevant here: (1) the immigra- 
tion bureaucracy is not especially responsive to criticism, and 
(2) structural flaws in the administrative structure may impede 
its ability to fairly apply and enforce the immigration laws.279 
Evidence supporting the conclusions included the fact that the 
success rates for affirmative challenges to statutes, regulations, 
and patterns or practices in the circuit courts increased from 
20% in 1979 to 32% in 1989-90.280 
277. See infia text accompanying notes 292-305. 
278. See, e.g., Ellen Gamerman, New Panel Would Probe Charges of Border 
Patrol Abuse, STATES NEWS SERV., May 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li- 
brary, Current File (quoting claim of Dan Stein, Executive Director of FAIR, to the 
effect that criticism of Border Patrol for abuses of noncitizens was "political"). 
279. See Schuck & Wang, supra note 44, at 177. 
280. See id. at 154-56. Overall, however, there was a higher affirmance rate of 
INS decisions in all reviewing courts in statutory review decisions-primarily 
claims to relief under the INA as opposed to affirmative challenges to statutes and 
regulations-from 1979 (68%) to 1989-90 (71%). See id. at  169 11.262; see also Peter 
H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1022 (analyzing data for 1984-85 
showing that 83% of INS rulemakings reviewed by courts were in full, a 
rate higher than that of several other agencies); 1991 INS STATISTICS, supra note 
40, a t  166 (stating that United States prevailed in over 91% of habeas corpus pro- 
ceedings challenging exclusion orders and over 64% of appeals of deportation orders 
in 1990). Nationals of El Salvador, however, enjoyed a relatively high success rate 
on their asylum claims, especially when compared to the low success rate before 
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The critical summary of the study's conclusions stated the 
following: 
[Alliens often prevail over the INS in asylum litigation and 
impact litigation. These results suggest that the government 
currently contests many meritorious claims by aliens, which 
in the interests of all parties would best be resolved a t  an 
early, pre-litigation stage . . . . 
In particular, aliens were successful in overturning ad- 
ministrative denials of asylum requests . . . . The fact that all 
these valid claims had been considered. . . by the [Executive 
Office for Immigration Review], and in  many cases by district 
directors as well, is indicative of a major failing in the Justice 
Department's processes for screening, adjudicating, and decid- 
ing to litigate these claims, and thus presents important op- 
portunities for reform. Furthermore, aliens and advocacy 
groups were also highly successful in impact lawsuits, most of 
which challenged the INS' failure to implement new immigra- 
tion policies in the manner prescribed by Congress. The na- 
ture and quality of these lawsuits, coupled with Congress' 
failure to overturn their results, provide a clear signal that 
some important aspects of the INS' administrative perfor- 
mance are deeply and systematically flawed . . . . 
[Olur impact litigation data furnish much unmistakable 
evidence that the INS' enforcement orientation has often hin- 
dered its ability to provide effective services and fair adjudi- 
cation. The many successful challenges to the INS' asylum and 
legalization programs suggest that the problem of integrating 
enforcement, service, and adjudication functions to produce 
consistent, judicially-approved standards may be an endemic 
the INS and the immigration courts. See Schuck & Wang, supra note 44, at 166. 
The Supreme Court has demonstrated a general willingness to defer to the 
immigration bureaucracy's judgment .in all types of cases in recent times. See gen- 
erally Johnson, supra note 160 (analyzing Court's deference to judgment of the INS 
despite red flags suggesting impropriety of deference). Two recent examples are the 
Court's refusal to disturb the unprecedented version of the Haitian interdiction pro- 
gram, see supra text accompanying notes 130-59, and the sanctioning of the denial 
of an asylum hearing to former Provisional Irish Republican Army member Joseph 
Patrick Doherty, who claimed a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to the 
United Kingdom, see infra text accompanying notes 306-17. 
281. Schuck & Wang, supra note 44, at 176-78 (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted). 
In reviewing the success of impact litigation geared toward agency reform, the 
study noted that 
[tlhe success of aliens in impact litigation reflects the INS' difficulties in 
implementing the Refugee Act and IRCA. The INS adherence to its tradi- 
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The empirical study's conclusions stand as nothing less 
than a stinging indictment of the immigration bureaucracy. 
Some well-publicized pieces of litigation illustrate the problems 
identified by the study. In Orantes-Hernandez u. 
Th~rnburgh:~~ the court of appeals affirmed a broad injunc- 
tion barring the INS from engaging in policies that the district 
court found to be designed t o  deter Salvadorans from seeking 
asylum and that interfered with the right to counsel. That 
lengthy litigation lasted for nearly a decade, through numerous 
appeals, only for the INS t o  lose on all counts. In American 
Baptist Churches v. Thornb~rgh;~~ the executive branch set- 
tled a class action by Salvadorans and Guatemalans challeng- 
ing the impartiality of the adjudication of their asylum claims. 
The settlement required the federal government to rehear the 
claims of over 100,000 class members:% obviously a time- 
consuming and costly endeavor not agreed to lightly. Finally, in 
INS u. Jean,285 the Court found that the INS, in defending its 
tional strategies for preventing aliens from entering the United States ille- 
gally probably caused it to interpret too narrowly the rights the new stat- 
utes conferred on aliens . . . . Another problem for the INS was its con- 
tinued use of ideological and geographic factors in asylum adjudications, 
despite the Refugee Act's repeal of such provisions in favor of a more 
universal human rights standard. The INS, i t  appears, remained wedded 
to the old criteria. 
Id. at  160 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
282. 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990). 
283. 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
284. See Carolyn P. Blum, The Settlement of American Baptist Churches v. 
Thornburgh: Landmark Victory for Central American Asylum-Seekers, 3 INT'L J .  
REFUGEE L. 347 (1991) (describing settlement and its impact); supra note 129 (dis- 
cussing possibility that backlog of asylum applications resulted from large number 
of cases reheard under terms of settlement). 
285. 496 U.S. 154 (1990) (holding that INS was required to pay attorneys' fees 
under Equal Access to Justice Act in class action). As the district court in the case 
summarized, 
The government took an unusually unwaivering [sic] and litigious position 
throughout the litigation. Many of the government's contentions and liti- 
gating postures were unwarranted and unnecessarily prolonged the litiga- 
tion. The government used all of its considerable resources in opposing 
Plaintiffs' contentions at every turn. From pre-trial discovery, through 
trial and successive appeals, the government moved for stays of Court 
Orders, forced repeated applications for emergency relief, put Plaintiffs in 
a posture requiring a brief on all pleaded issues, on every motion, and 
opposed, in fact as well as law, each and every important issue asserted 
by Plaintiffs. 
Louis v. Nelson, 646 F. Supp. 1300, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 1986); see also Jean v. Nelson, 
863 F.2d 759, 762 (11th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 496 U.S. 154 (1990) (describing case as 
"a long, complex, and bitterly contested lawsuit"). 
1212 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
detention policies toward Haitian asylum-seekers and expedit- 
ed exclusion proceedings in the 1980s, asserted wholly unjusti- 
fied legal positions that required nearly ten years of litigation. 
The INS is not the only agency whose decisionmaking has 
been questioned. The Executive Ofice for Immigration Review 
(EOIR), in charge of immigration adjudicat i~n;~~ generally 
has not been the subject of the trenchant criticisms levelled at 
the INS. However, as the conclusions of Schuck and Wang's 
empirical work suggest, the available evidence places in serious 
doubt whether the EOIR has remained faithful to the laws 
passed by Congress. For example, in addition to the success 
enjoyed by asylum applicants in the courts of appeals, imper- 
missible foreign policy, and possibly numbers-conscious, bias is 
suggested by the overall pattern of asylum decisions.287 Struc- 
tural characteristics of the organizational hierarchy no doubt 
contribute to the concerns. The Attorney General appoints the 
members of the EOIR's appellate body, the Board of Immigra- 
tion Appeals (BIA).288 The BIA not surprisingly is composed 
primarily of persons with immigration enforcement backgr~unds .~  
286. The immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals were re- 
moved from the INS in 1983 when the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
was created. See 48 Fed. Reg. 8038 (1983) (amending 8 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 100) (final 
rule). 
287. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A m W :  UNIFORM APPLICATION OF 
STANDARDS UNCERTAIN-FEW APPLICANTS DEPOWED 15, 22-23 (1987) (showing dis- 
parate treatment between asylum decisions of Poles and Iranians, who fled nations 
having good U.S. relations, and Salvadorans and Nicaraguans, leaving countries 
having bad U.S. relations and that, for the time period of the study, 96% of the 
final agency dispositions of asylum claims agreed with the State Department's 
advisory opinion on the application); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 202, at 8-10 
(suggesting that BIA interpreted "persecution on account of . . . political opinion" 
in "narrow and technical" manner possibly because of concern with increasing num- 
bers of asylum-seekers); Johnson, supra note 16, at 346-47 (analyzing evidence of 
possible bias in agency asylum decisions); Derek Smith, Note, A Refugee by Any 
Other Name: An Examination of the Board of Immigration Appeals' Actions in Asy- 
lum Cases, 75 VA. L. REV. 681, 711-19 & 11.145 (1989) (concluding that BIA's deci- 
sions reflect foreign policy bias and noting that Board treats similar claims differ- 
ently depending on applicant's nationality). Compare Matter of Salim, 18 Immig. & 
Nat. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982) (finding that applicant from Afghanistan who fled forced 
conscription into government army was eligible for asylum) with INS v. Elias- 
Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (affirming Board of Immigration Appeals ruling 
that Guatemalan who fled forced conscription into guerrillas was not eligible for 
asylum). 
288. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1992); ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 15, a t  111- 
12 & all. 
289. See Johnson, supra note 160, a t  448 11.156 (outlining career history of cur- 
rent Board members). Until 1993, nomination to the Board was treated like any 
other political appointment. See "Plum Book" Reflects Few Political Immigration 
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At least some practitioners believe that the immigration 
judges, who conduct trial-style hearings in the immigration 
courts, are unduly sympathetic with INS enforcement 
goals.290 The belief that the administrative hearing body is 
biased toward those who practice before it is troubling. A sys- 
tem that lacks the appearance of even-handedness is not one 
likely to inspire the confidence necessary to minimize the likeli- 
hood of appeals that slow down the system. In addition, a n  
empirical study of adjudications in one immigration court 
found, among other problems, that ideological bias and foreign 
policy judgments not permitted by law influenced asylum deci- 
s i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  
- 2. INS enforcement excesses 
The Border Patrol performs the INS'S enforcement func- 
tion. In a time of renewed focus on border enforcement, there 
have been all too frequent allegations of serious, shocking abus- 
es by Border Patrol officers.292 Officers have been charged 
Openings Under Clinton, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1457 (Nov. 16, 1992). 
290. See Gerald H. Robinson, A Paradox of Asylum Law-The More Due Pro- 
cess, the Harder the Case, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 833, 835 (1992) ("To the extent 
that INS personnel, or former INS p e r s o ~ e l  functioning as IJs [immigration judg- 
es], are involved in the asylum process, for many, only the most obvious asylum 
cases will be approved, regardless of the amount of legal authority cited to show 
that a lesser burden of proof is required. For some IJs, a grant of asylum is tanta- 
mount to a personal gift, bestowed grudgingly on only a few, as if the trier of fact 
were made personally poorer by each award.")footnote omitted); Frederick M. 
Muir, Legal Aid Raps Immigration Judge; Foundation Asks He Be Barred from 
Hearing Its Cases, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1988, pt. 2 a t  7 (reporting claims that an 
immigration judge repeatedly demonstrated bias against Central American asylum- 
seekers); Susan Freinkel & Alexander Peters, Alien Justice, RECORDER (San Fran- 
cisco), Jan. 29, 1991, at  6-7 (noting that attorneys had nicknamed one immigration 
judge "Dr. Death" because of lack of sympathy for asylum claims and reporting 
that four of six immigration judges in San Francisco district previously served as 
trial attorneys for INS); see also Bruce J. Einhorn, Political Asylum in the Ninth 
Circuit and the Case of Elias-Zacarias, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 612-13 (1992) 
(article by immigration judge suggesting that the Ninth Circuit decision on imputed 
political opinion doctrine was in error). 
291. See Anker, supra note 129, at  445-48; see also Martin, supra note 61, a t  
1333-34 (describing subtle foreign policy bias of some immigration judges against 
communist nations). 
292. See, e.g., AMERICAS WATCH, BRUTALITY UNCHECKED: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUS- 
ES ALONG THE U.S. BORDER WITH MEXICO (1992) (reporting shootings, use of lethal 
force, physical abuse, and racially discriminatory conduct by Border Patrol); AMERI- 
CAN FRIENDS SERVICE C O M M ~ E E ,  SEALING OUR BORDERS: THE HUMAN TOLL (1992) 
(same); NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
OF MEXICAN MIGRATORY WORKERS ON ROUTE TO THE NORTHERN BORDER CROSSING 
THE BORDER AND UPON ENTERING THE SOUTHERN UNITED STATES BORDER STRIP 52- 
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with crimes ranging from first degree murder of a Mexican citi- 
zen293 to a severe beating of a legal United States resident 
believed to be an "illegal."z94 An American Friends Service 
Committee report documented some unfortunate byproducts of 
increased border enforcement, such as psychological and verbal 
abuse (including racial and ethnic insults), physical abuse 
(such as shootings, beatings, sexual assaults, illegal or inappro- 
66 (1991) (same); Haydeh Behbehani, Note, La Migra and the Voices of the Un- 
heard: The LA. Uprising, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 214-18 (1993) (documenting 
INS enforcement abuses during and immediately after rebellion in Los Angeles in 
the spring of 1992); Nudez, supra note 48 (collecting evidence of border violence); 
Brae Canlen, Sun Diego Burning, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1993, at  44 (reporting on vio- 
lence against Mexicans on the border, including use of deadly force by vigilante 
groups); Sebastian Rotella & Patrick J. McDo~ell ,  Calls Increase for Border Patrol 
Reforms, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1993, at A1 (discussing call for reforms in wake of 
reports of abuse); Sebastian Rotella & Patrick J. McDonnell, A Seemingly Futile 
Job Can Breed Abuses by Agents, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1993, at  A1 [hereinafter, 
Rotella & McDonnell, Futile Job] (reporting allegations that Border Patrol agents 
used vehicles to force Mexicans attempting to cross border into Tijuana River, 
which was at flood stages); Sebastian Rotella & Patrick J. McDonnell, 5 Killed as 
Truck Fleeing Border Agents Crashes, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1992, at A1 (reporting 
that truck fleeing Border Patrol in high speed chase crashed into car outside high 
school, killing four students and father driving son to school); see also ALlegations 
of Violence ALong the Un'ited States-Mexico Border: Hearing Before the Subcornrn. on 
Human Rights and International Organizations of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (hearing testimony of border violence); California Leg- 
islature, Joint Comm. on Refugee Resettlement, International Migration and Cooper- 
ative Development, International Migration and Border Region Violence (1990) 
(same); Patrick J. McDonnell, Moschorak to Leave INS this Month, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 24, 1993, at B1 (reporting that INS district director was retiring and denying 
any relationship between retirement and alleged physical attack on "female subor- 
dinate who reported him for attempting to expedite his wife's citizenship applica- 
tion"); Ex-INS Inspector Guilty of Corruption, LA. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1992, at  B2 
(reporting conviction of INS inspector for, among other things, corruption and aid- 
ing and abetting importation of over 3000 pounds of cocaine); Sun Gabriel Valley 
Digest: El Monte: Ex-INS Oficer Is Sentenced, LA. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1992, at  52 (re- 
porting that INS officer was sentenced for sale of false immigration documents); 
Peter Lewis, INS Agents Are Accused of Threats, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 11, 1992, at  
D4 (alleging that INS officers threatened to deport witness and his family unless 
he cooperated with prosecutors in criminal immigration proceedings and that wit- 
ness perjured himself before grand jury). 
Border patrol abuses, of course, are not an entirely new phenomenon. See, e.g., 
Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 234-35 (1981) (describing case in which Bor- 
der Patrol officer used excessive force-three shotgun blasts-that crippled a Mexi- 
can national who had been running away); United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239 
(1974) (describing case of immigration inspector convicted of bribery and perjury). 
See generally ALFREDO hrLIRANDk, GRINGO JUSTICE 107-45 (1987) (analyzing history 
of Border Patrol and its abuses). 
293. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Border Patrol Agent Charged in Murder Is 
Linked to Drug Theft, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at  A3. 
294. See Sebastian Rotella, Border officer Pleads Not Guilty in Beating Case, 
L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1992, at  A3. 
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priate searches), and illegal or inappropriate seizures.295 Spe- 
cific examples included threats by Border Patrol officers direct- 
ed a t  a Salvadoran woman and abusive language deriding her 
mother,296 and taunts of a Guatemalan about his sexuality 
combined with threatened sexual assault.2g7 A significant 
number of victims of abuse (17.7%) were United States citizens, 
which might concern even those with little sympathy for undoc- 
umented persons.298 To make matters worse, according to the 
report, the Border Patrol lacks the controls necessary to ensure 
officer accountability for misconduct.299 
Americas Watch also found human rights abuses to be 
prevalent along the United States-Mexico border, including 
shootings and other uses of lethal force.300 Most shocking was 
the finding of sexual abuse of undocumented women."' For 
example, one nineteen-year-old reported that  a Border Patrol 
officer sexually molested her during a drug raid.302 Evidence 
of a callous attitude among Border Patrol officers toward per- 
sons attempting to unlawfully enter the country may tacitly 
encourage such misconduct. Officers routinely refer to "illegal 
aliens" as "tonks" because the nickname is similar to "the 
sound of a flashlight hitting somebody's head: t ~ n k . " ~ ~ ~  By de- 
295. AMERICAN FRIENDS ERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 292, at 3. 
296. Id. at 20 (presenting claim of Salvadoran woman that INS sought her to 
sign papers, presumably for voluntary deportation: "I was very upset and crying. 
[He] said he would get me to sign at gunpoint . . . . They . . . told me to be 
quiet, and used abusive language [such as] 'A tu pinche madre' [Your f . . . 
mother']). This upset me even more, because I do not like anyone speaking ill of 
my mother. I then signed, since he had threatened me to sign at gunpoint and I 
was frightened."). 
297. Id. at 21 (quoting Guatemalan man stating that INS officers remarked, 
'You are queer, you like dick. Do you have AIDS?" and "go to the bathroom and 
wash off real good with the other oficer so he can screw you?. 
298. See id. at 4, 35. 
299. See id. at 4.  
300. AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 292, at 9-36 (documenting individual inci- 
dents). 
301. See id. at 34-35. 
302. See id. at 35; see also Lisa Baker, INS Guard Pleads Guilty to Molesting 
Two Teen-Agers, BROWNSVILLE HERALD, Aug. 31, 1989, at 1, cited in Michael A. 
Olivas, "Breaking the Law" on Principle: An Essay on Lawyers' Dilemmas, Unpopu- 
lar Causes, and Legal Regimes, 52 U .  FTw. L. REV. 815, 830 n.60 (1991) (reporting 
that INS officer admitted to sexual molestation of juveniles in detention and that 
INS was investigating prevalent use of drugs in detention facilities). 
303. AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 292, at 27 (quoting Earl Shorris, Raids, 
Racism and the INS, NATION, May 8, 1989); see Rotella & McDo~el l ,  Futile Job, 
supm note 292, at A1 (reporting that Border Patrol officers used terms "tanks" and 
"wets" to refer to Mexican nationals seeking to cross border despite the fact that 
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humanizing the undocumented in this manner, it  assists offi- 
cers in rationalizing the mistreatment of them.304 
In the current political environment buttressed by the 
Supreme Court's effective sanctioning of stringent enforcement 
measures,305 i t  may be unrealistic to expect the INS to re- 
structure the current enforcement regime to curtail the poten- 
tial for abuse. To the contrary, because of the Vocal Minority's 
current enforcement fervor and its effectiveness in light of the 
political dynamic, increased enforcement efforts have been 
forthcoming. Although there are natural impulses to curtail 
clear abuses of power resulting in negative publicity, less ex- 
treme, though still abusive, practices stemming from a zeal for 
enforcement are unlikely to remedy themselves. 
3. The story of Joseph Patrick Doherty 
One extraordinary immigration case that inspired commu- 
nity, congressional, and press interest shows the inherent diffi- 
culties in ensuring the executive branch's political accountabili- 
ty to majoritarian desires on immigration matters. Joseph 
Patrick Doherty, formerly a member of the Provisional Irish 
Republican Amy,  through a byzantine procedure was denied a 
hearing on asylum and related claims based on his fear of polit- 
ical persecution if returned to the United Kingdom.306 Among 
the reasons that the Attorney General, who reviewed and re- 
versed BIA decisions regarding Doherty on two separate occa- 
sions, offered for the denial was that Doherty was not entitled 
to asylum because it would be contrary to United States foreign 
Political pressure from Britain's Prime Minister, 
such use violates internal policy, that former INS commissioner, who was Latino, 
was nicknamed "Chief Tonk," and that a statue in front of Border Patrol station 
depicted an agent with a net and a chicken, the chicken representing Border Pa- 
trol slang for Mexicans, "pollo"). 
304. In this way, use of the labels of "tonks" or "wetbacks" or "pollos" serves 
the same abstraction function as referring to undocumented persons as "illegal 
aliens." See supra text accompanying note 16. 
305. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that the 
exclusionary rule based on unconstitutional arrest and seizure generally does not 
apply to deportation hearings). 
306. For a decidedly different, and in my view cynical and unsympathetic, 
view of Doherty and his conduct from an English perspective, see MARTIN DILLON, 
KILLER IN CLOWNTOWN: JOE DOHERTY, THE IRA AND THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 
(1992). 
307. See INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719, 723 (1992); see also Johnson, supra 
note 160, at 472-79 (analyzing Doherty). 
11391 IMAGES OF THE IMMIGRANT 1217 
Margaret Thatcher, to return Doherty to the United Kingdom 
evidently caused the executive branch's insistence on returning 
him without even hearing the merits of his asylum claim.308 
Doherty, incarcerated throughout the lengthy proceed- 
ings:' developed a significant following in the Irish 
community3'' and attracted considerable political interest. 
The Senate passed a resolution asking the Attorney General to 
provide Doherty with an  asylum hearing? Refusing to re- 
lent, the Attorney General ordered Doherty's deportation. For- 
ty-six members of Congress filed an amici curiae brief in the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit supporting Doherty's 
petition for review of the deportation order.312 Doherty 
prevailed313 and the INS petitioned for certiorari. One hun- 
dred thirty-two members of Congress filed a n  amici brief in the 
Supreme The Court deferred to the Attorney 
General's judgment315 and Doherty was deported to the Unit- 
ed Kingdom.316 
If political pressure was unsuccessful in the high-profile 
asylum case of Joseph Patrick Doherty, i t  is difficult to imagine 
how political action focused on a single case might improve the 
executive branch's treatment of the masses of more mundane, 
if not just as weighty, asylum cases. Despite the extraordinary 
level of congressional interest in his case as well as the consid- 
erable amount of media attention,317 the Attorney General 
308. See DILLON, supra note 306, a t  xxiii-xxv. 
309. See Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 205 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dis- 
missed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992). 
3 10. See Cal McCrystal, Notebook: A Tug-of- War for America's Irish Soul, INDE- 
PENDENT, Feb. 2, 1993, at 23 (reporting that Doherty had attained symbolic status 
in Irish-American community and had been designated grand marshal of St. 
Patrick's Day parades in cities throughout the United States). 
311. S. Con. Res. 62, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S10,347 (1989) 
(entitled "Relating to Political Asylum to Joseph Patrick Doherty"). 
312. Brief of Amici Curiae, Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 
1108 (2d Cir. 1990) (Nos. 88-4084, 89-4092). I was co-counsel on the brief. 
313. See Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 
1990), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992). 
314. Brief for Amici Curiae Members of the United States Senate and Mem- 
bers of the United States House of Representatives in support of Respondent, INS 
v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992) (No. 90-925). The members joining the brief 
ranged in political views from Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) to Paul Simon @-Illinois). I 
was co-counsel on the brief. 
315. 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992). 
316. See, e.g., James Barron, I.R.A. Fugitive Sent to Belfast from US. Jail,  
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1992, at Al. 
317. See, e.g., Wade Lambert, The Drawn-Out Case of a n  Irish Guerrilla 
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staunchly refused to afford Doherty a hearing. Doherty inspired 
the community but other agendas prevailed. Absent concerted 
effort, noncitizens definitely face an uphill battle. 
IV. TELLING THE UNTOLD STORIES: CHANGING 
THE IMAGES OF THE IMMIGRANT 
As Part I11 demonstrated, the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches often are less than responsive to the needs of 
the noncitizen community, even when those needs are consis- 
tent with majoritarian desires. In order to place the pressure 
on the political branches necessary to change their ways, 
noncitizens must improve their competitiveness in the political 
marketplace. Insulated from society, the basic facts about the 
lives of noncitizens often are not widely circulated in the popu- 
lar milieu. Instead, the conventional wisdom propagated by a 
few about "illegal aliens9'-that they take jobs, sap social servic- 
es, victimize citizens, etc.-remains effectively unchallenged. It 
is these images that inform and influence lawmakers and 
policymakers and, for that matter, judges. Several alternatives 
exist to offer a truer picture of the reality for noncitizens. 
A. The Franchise 
A popular misconception is that the Constitution bars 
voting by noncitizens. That, however, is not the case.318 At 
least white male noncitizens enjoyed suffrage in a number of 
states until the early 1900s.~'~ Forceful arguments have been 
made for the extension of the franchise to lawful permanent 
 resident^.^" Still, along with convicted mi- 
Reaches High Court, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1991, at Al. 
318. See Neuman, supra note 41, a t  291-92 (observing that, although United 
States Constitution is "oblique" on the question of "alien" suffrage (including Article 
I's reference that members of House of Representatives shall be "chosen . . . by 
the People of the several States," U.S. CONST. art. I, 2, cl. I), "it appears to be 
settled doctrine that [under the Federal Constitution], alien suffrage is entirely 
discretionary"); Raskin, supra note 41, at  1417-41 (analyzing various constitutional 
provisions and concluding that the Constitution permits, but does not compel, non- 
citizen suffrage); see also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1973) (rec- 
ognizing "State's historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its demo- 
cratic political institutions" and stating that "citizenship is a permissible criterion 
for limiting [voting] rights"). 
319. See Neuman, supra note 41, at 291-310; Raskin, supra note 41, a t  1397- 
417; Rosberg, supra note 22, at  1093-100. 
320. See Neuman, supra note 41, a t  310-34 (arguing that allowing LPRs to  
vote is a "permissible option"); Raskin, supra note 41, at  1456 & n.339 (arguing 
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 nor^,^^ and others, lawful permanent residents as well as the 
undocumented lack the right to vote in every state. This is true 
even though lawful permanent residents owe obligations to the 
community, including but not limited to paying taxes and mili- 
tary service.323 Expansion of the franchise to noncitizens, or 
even to some of them, would represent a movement toward 
making suffrage more inclusive.324 A number of countries, in- 
apparently in favor of suffrage for LPRs and claiming that, even if they had the 
right, the undocumented would be too fearful of deportation to register to vote); 
Rosberg, supra note 22, at 1110-11 (contending that the Equal Protection Clause 
mandates voting rights for LPRs); see also NATIONAL BOARD OF THE CHANGING 
RELATIONS PROJECT, supra note 105, at  7 (recommending that LPRs be permitted 
to vote in local elections); Sanford Levinson, Suffrage and Community: Who Should 
Vote?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 545, 555-57 (1989) (questioning citizenship requirement for 
voting); cf. Ldpez, supra note 92, at  696 ("It is not possible . . . to have persons 
live, work, and participate in a community over many years without creating in 
them a sense of entitlement to some benefits of community membership and a 
moral obligation based on their reasonable expectations. No matter how strongly 
our formal laws deny it, our conduct creates the obligation.") (footnotes omitted). 
321. See Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, 
and "The Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989) (criticizing 
disenfranchisement of convicted felons). One argument against extending the right 
to vote to convicted felons is that, by violating the law, they violated the social 
contract and therefore are not morally competent to vote. See id. at  1304-09. The 
same argument might be made with respect to undocumented immigrants. Howev- 
er, disenfranchisement by stigmatizing outsiders may most appropriately be viewed 
as simply a device that artificially limits those who are defined as part of the 
community. See id. a t  1310-14. 
322. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (providing 18-year-olds with right to vote). 
This limit on voting has been challenged because of the failure of the political 
process to consider adequately the interests of children. See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson, 
An Immodest Proposal: Let's Give Children the Vote, BROOKINGS REV., Winter 1993, 
at  19; Vita Wallace, Give Children the Vote, NATION, Oct. 14, 1991, at  439. 
323. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 US .  68, 81  11.14 (1979) (Blackrnun, J., dis- 
senting) ("[Rlesident aliens pay taxes, serve in the Armed Forces, and have made 
significant contributions to our country in private and public endeavors."); see also 
Charles E. Roh, Jr. & Frank K. Upham, Comment, The Status of Aliens Under 
United States Draft Laws, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501 (1972) (discussing application of 
military draft to LPRs). 
324. See generally JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR 
INCLUSION (1991) (documenting general trend toward expansion of benefits of citi- 
zenship). But cf. PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGER M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT 
CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985) (arguing that, contrary 
to current state of the law, "illegal aliens" born in United States should not auto- 
matically be afforded citizenship). 
Expansion of the franchise also would be consonant with the call for a move- 
ment toward civic republicanism. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE 
L.J. 1539 (1988). See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 
33-54 (1975) (criticizing distinction between citizens and noncitizens in the distribu- 
tion of rights). Of course, because noncitizens even with the franchise still would 
be outsiders with limited power, there is good reason for skepticism about the en- 
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cluding Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands, to 
some degree have granted noncitizens the right to vote in local 
and regional  election^.^* 
There is one group of noncitizens, the undocumented, who 
nobody apparently claims is deserving of voting rights. This 
omission is a material one, if only because the undocumented 
population in this country may well include millions of peo- 
ple.326 The continued disenfranchisement of so large a group 
of persons physically present in this nation for extended peri- 
ods (and thus subject to its laws) should be significant to any- 
one with anything approaching an idealistic conception of de- 
mocracy. 
Arguments for direct participation by noncitizens, includ- 
ing the undocumented, in the political process may be based on 
a few foundational concepts. Many, perhaps most, undocument- 
ed persons are contributing members of the community. They 
work, pay taxes, and participate in  the community in other 
important ways.327 Undocumented or not, noncitizens un- 
doubtedly comprise a part of society. Consequently, noncitizens 
in theory should have some input into the operation of govern- 
ment, just as they influence the economy through their labors 
and consumption.32g Empowerment of the faceless "illegal 
alien" population might better ensure congressional and bu- 
reaucratic acco~ntab i l i ty .~~  
That is not to suggest that the idea of enfranchisement of 
the undocumented is not without significant theoretical as well 
as practical problems. Many might scoff a t  the idea. Allowing 
tire civic republican vision in a heterogenous society fraught with deep power im- 
balances. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial 
Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609 (1988). 
325. See Raskin, supra note 41, at 1459. 
326. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40 (discussing estimates of undocu- 
mented population in United States). 
327. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Consti- 
tution, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 9, 23 (1990) (making similar points with respect to 
lawful permanent residents); see also Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship, 
and the Search for National Identity, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1504 (1986) (discussing 
relation between citizenship and community). 
328. The important question perhaps is who among noncitizens might qualify 
for input into the political process. For example, a residency requirement of some 
length of time for all voters intuitively seems reasonable. 
329. Others have made the argument to extend voting rights to LPRs. See 
supra note 41 (citing authority). It is leR for someone in the future to articulate 
fully the arguments for enfranchising the undocumented. The point made here is 
that suffrage might improve bureaucratic accountability. 
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the undocumented to vote is a radical thought penetrating the 
core of this nation's self-definition-who is part of the commu- 
nity and who is not.330 Mere mention of the franchise possi- 
bility would further irritate the restrictionist nerve. Moreover, 
the perplexing duality of the undocumented-outsiders in this 
country unlawfully and, a t  the same time, present in soci- 
ety-complicates the question ~onsiderably.~~' Some might 
argue that, because the undocumented are in this country "ille- 
gally" (and thus in violation of the social contract), they should 
have few, if any, rights and certainly not one of the most cher- 
ished, the right to vote.ss2 To extend the franchise to those 
who violate the immigration laws, so the argument goes, only 
would encourage their violation. The borders will mean nothing 
and a greater flood of "illegals" than already are coming will 
flock here. Extension of the suffrage to "illegal aliens" would 
further "devalue" the already dwindling worth of American 
citizenship.333 
Arguments of this sort might be attractive, and possibly 
persuasive, politically. However, they ignore the fact that, ab- 
sent an unforeseeable revolution in immigration enforcement or 
in the world economy, undocumented persons, whether we like 
it or not, will remain in this country and will continue to 
come.3s4 In addition, some of the arguments made in  opposi- 
330. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982) ("Self-govern- 
ment . . . begins by defining the scope of the community of the governed a i d  thus 
of the governors as well: Aliens are by definition those outside of this communi- 
ty."). 
331. See generally Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual 
Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 
955 (explaining this duality). 
332. See Alan C. Nelson, Undermining Democracy in Takoma Park, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 8, 1991, at  C8 (criticizing allowing undocumented residents to vote be- 
cause, among other things, "it undermines the value of U.S. citizenship" and argu- 
ing that a five-year requirement for naturalization is not too much to ask). 
333. See Foley v. Comelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978) (emphasizing that states 
need not "obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus de- 
preciate the historic values of citizenship")(quoting Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 
14 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)); Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal 
Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 9 (1989) 
(arguing that development of constitutional and other law protecting "aliens" has 
"devalued" citizenship); see also David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in 
the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PIIT. L. REV. 165, 
230-34 (1983) (arguing that, because the undocumented are in this country in vio- 
lation of its laws, these "clandestine entrants" are entitled to minimal due process 
protections). 
334. See WAYNE A. CORNELIUS, MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: 
THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 2-4 (Program in United States-Mexican 
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tion to extension of the suffrage are difficult to measure. The 
devaluation argument, for example, requires inquiry into 
whether there is a general understanding of the "value" of 
citizenship. (Noncitizens ironically may be the ones to place the 
highest value on citizenship.) In a sense, expanding the right to 
vote might &lute the individual's voting power to some degree. 
That dilution, however, is difficult to measure. Citizens also 
might gain from a more democratic government that allows 
more rather than less p a r t i ~ i p a t i o n . ~ ~ ~  It  also seems unlikely 
that extension of the franchise might serve as a magnet to 
people more worried about alleviating poverty, fleeing perse- 
cution, and the like, than the luxury of voting. 
All this said, I have no illusions that noncitizens, or even 
lawful permanent residents, will be afforded the right to vote in 
the near future. True, a few localities have expanded the fran- 
chise to n o n c i t i z e n ~ . ~ ~ ~  A mass political movement successful 
in gaining the right to vote for noncitizens, however, seems 
little more than a pipedream, a t  least for now.337 Moreover, 
Studies Working Paper No. 5, 1981) (arguing that it is difficult for the United 
States to limit illegal Mexican migration because of family and employer networks 
developed between United States and Mexico dating back to the late 1800s). 
335. See Bosniak, supra note 331, at  1002-04 (suggesting that community's 
unwillingness to extend membership to outsiders hinders United States participa- 
tion in world economy); Raskin, supra note 41, at 1466-67 (suggesting that urban 
unrest is less likely if noncitizens are allowed to participate in political process). 
336. See Raskin, supra note 41, at 1460-67 (discussing cities, including New 
York and Chicago, which allow noncitizen parents to vote in school district elec- 
tions, and city council decision in Takoma Park, Maryland, to allow noncitizens to 
vote in local elections). 
A particularly compelling argument can be made for allowing LPRs to vote in 
school board elections. To become a naturalized citizen, a LPR must understand, 
read, and write "simple English" and understand the fundamentals of United 
States history and government. See MA 9s  312(1), (2), 8 U.S.C. $9 1423(1), (2) 
(1988 & Supp. 1992). Without access to the political process to ensure that the 
educational system teaches these skills, some LPRs might never be able to become 
naturalized citizens. This issue was squarely raised in Ojeda v. Brown, Sac. 7974 
(Cal. 1973), reported in Cal. Official Reports No. 16 (Advance Sheets), at  1, June 
14, 1973 (on file with author) (denying petition for writ of mandate over the dis- 
sent of Chief Justice Wright and Justice Mosk). See also Padilla v. Allison, 113 
Cal. Rptr. 582, 584 (1974) (holding that the 14th Amendment does not require 
enfranchisement of LPRs). That case involved an equal protection challenge by 
Spanish-speaking LPRs to the citizenship requirement for voting in school board 
elections. John Oakley brought this case to my attention. 
337. See supra text accompanying notes 82-129 (analyzing new nativism). Even 
the recent "motor voter" legislation, which allows voter registration by persons 
applying for drivers licenses, drew heated opposition on the ground that "illegal 
aliens" who seek a drivers license as identification for employment purposes would 
engage in massive fraudulent voter registration. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 9, 103d 
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even if all noncitizens enjoyed the right to vote, in any election 
they would still represent a distinct minority and, similar to 
any minority, would find it difficult to vindicate their inter- 
e s t ~ . ~ ~ ~  The hope that the franchise might lead to affirmative 
change further assumes that economically marginalized undoc- 
umented persons enjoy the luxury of devoting the time and re- 
sources to participate in the democratic process.33g 
One less extreme, and more practical, strategy would be a 
drive to convince lawful permanent residents eligible for natu- 
ralization to become citizens and participate in the political 
process.340 Not only is this strategy a real possibility, it might 
also be particularly effective for some groups, such as Mexi- 
cans, with a relatively large lawful permanent resident popula- 
tion in this country but who also have one of the lowest natu- 
ralization rates.341 
Despite the many caveats, the vote might a t  least make it 
theoretically possible for noncitizens to achieve reform of the 
immigration laws and ensure even-handed enforcement by the 
immigration bureaucracy. A theoretical possibility presently 
does not even exist. In the short term, however, it seems unten- 
Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1993) (minority views) (arguing that act will result in fraud by 
"illegal aliens"), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 138; see also 139 CONG. REC. 
H2273 (daily ed. May 5, 1993) (statement of Rep. Livingston (R-La.) that without a 
provision requiring documentation of citizenship the legislation should be an "auto- 
fraudo" bill and that "[ilt is an inducement to illegal aliens, to people that are 
ineligible to vote to not only register but ultimately to cast their votes and to help 
slant elections depending on who is pulling their strings"). The law ultimately 
enacted repeatedly emphasized that its provisions only allowed registration by 
citizens. See National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, $ 2(a)(l), 
(b)(l), (b)(2), 107 Stat. 77 (1993). 
338. See supra text accompanying notes 71-88; Guinier, supra note 71; see also 
Lani Guinier, Second Proms and Second Primaries: The Limits of Majority Rule, 
BOSTON REV., Sept./Oct. 1992, at  32 ("[Wlith majority rule and a racially organized 
majority, 'we don't count' is the 'way it works' for minorities. In a racially divided 
society, majority rule is not a reliable instrument of democracy."). 
339. See generally FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WTHY AMERI- 
CANS DON'T VOTE (1988) (analyzing reasons for low voter turnout for national elec- 
tions). 
340. See 1991 INS STATISTICS, supm note 40, a t  118 (noting 37.4% natural- 
ization rate for lawful permanent residents admitted in 1977 through fiscal year 
1990); see also Rodolfo 0. de la Garza & Louis DeSipio, Save the Baby, Change the 
Bathwater, and Scrub the Tub: Latino Electoral Participation After Seventeen Years 
of Voting Rights Act Coverage, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1479, 1522 (1993) (advocating that 
the federal government promote naturalization in order to increase Latino political 
participation). 
341. See 1991 INS STATISTICS, supra note 40, at 120 (showing that Mexican 
naturalization rate for LPRs admitted in 1977 was 15.1% compared to overall aver- 
age of over 37%). 
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able, particularly in light of the rise of the new nativism, to 
believe that the electorate will allow noncitizens to vote. Direct 
political participation in the electoral process fortunately is 
only one method of attempting to facilitate change. 
B. Litigation 
As the historic case of Brown u. Board of 
amply demonstrates, litigation often is an integral component 
in  any comprehensive strategy for social change. Litigation by 
immigrant and refugee advocacy groups has successfully se- 
cured some protections and improvements for noncitizens. Liti- 
gation may fulfill other functions as well. For example, by 
bringing to the forefront the stories of the immigrant commu- 
nity, litigation may serve as a useful publicity device.343 
Though unsuccessful legally, the protracted litigation over 
interdiction and repatriation helped bring the plight of the 
Haitians to national attention? The same can be said about 
litigation over the rights of Central Americans to apply for 
asylum .345 
Litigation, however, by definition has its limits.346 De- 
342. 347 US. 483 (1954). See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S TRUGGLE FOR 
EQUALITY (1975). 
343. See NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN 
THE 1980s AND BEYOND 91-93 (1989); John Denvir, Towards a Political Theory of 
Public Interest Litigation, 54 N.C. L. REV. 1133, 1137-38 (1976); Peter Gabel & 
Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the 
Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 379-94 (1982-83). 
344. See supra text accompanying notes 130-59. 
345. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(affirming far-reaching injunction limiting INS detention of asylum-seekers from 
Central America). 
346. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS 
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). (questioning ability of courts and litigation to 
facilitate social change); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Specu- 
lations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974) (analyzing 
how deck is stacked against reformers seeking change through litigation). In formu- 
lating a nonviolent strategy based on civil disobedience, Martin Luther King, Jr. 
recognized that the law sometimes might be an impediment to change. See MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., L ~ R  FROM BIRMINGHAM JAIL (1963), reprinted in 26 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 835 (1993) (observing that everything that Hitler did in Nazi Ger- 
many was 'legal"). For a fascinating analysis of the effectiveness of various strate- 
gies for social change in modem Japan ranging from "denunciation" of a discrimi- 
natory status quo to more traditional forms such as litigation, see FRANK K. 
UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987). 
This discussion should not be read to suggest that immigration litigation, in 
which I have been involved as an attorney before and after joining the academy, 
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spite the aggressive and often successful litigation strategy of 
various immigrant and refugee groups in the 1980s, the chang- 
es wrought generally were incremental and piecemeal in na- 
t ~ r e . ~ ~ '  Mounting litigation setbacks for the executive branch 
have not remedied the serious structural flaws in the immigra- 
tion bureaucracy. The continued existence of such flaws consis- 
tently requires more costly litigation, which drains the limited 
resources of immigrant and refugee groups. Thus, despite suc- 
cessful litigation and despite the intense criticism of the immi- 
gration system in recent years, major institutional reform has 
not been forthcoming. Put simply, although litigation may have 
assisted in some ways, the continued need for it-and the mon- 
itoring function that it serves-amply illustrates its shortcom- 
ings. 
Reform litigation also is fraught with hazards in light of 
the current composition of the Although there has 
has not proven worthwhile. Nor do I question the value of the work and commit- 
ment of the many attorneys who have devoted their working lives to protecting 
immigrants and refugees. Successful litigation undoubtedly has made a difference 
for innumerable noncitizens and clearly is one ingredient in any social movement. 
The question addressed here is what mix of strategies best promotes substantial 
reform of the immigration system. 
347. See Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for 
the Poor, 56 BROOKLYN L. REV. 861, 872 (1990) ("Legal remedies that are designed 
by lawyers to impose improved conditions upon the poor aren't likely to  do much 
to challenge subordination in the long run. In many cases, lawyer-engineered reme- 
dies will not work as intended. Even in the rare cases when such remedies do 
work according to plan, they still do not challenge the lived experience of subor- 
dination-the experience, that is, of other people controlling the terms of one's 
life."). 
348. See Eva M. Rodriguez, Federal Judicialy Will Soon Feel Clinton's Stamp, 
LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at 13 (observing that Presidents Reagan and Bush 
appointed a majority of Supreme Court Justices and more than two-thirds of all 
sitting federal judges, including a majority of all judges in each circuit court); see 
also Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by Presioknt 
Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298 (1993) (empirical study of published opinions by judges 
appointed by President Bush finding that in the aggregate they tended to decide 
cases in relatively conservative fashion); Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on 
the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74 JUDICATURE 294 (1991) (studying Presi- 
dent Bush's appointments to the federal judiciary and finding similarities with 
President Reagan's appointees). One prominent court of appeals judge went so far 
as to say that "Presidents Reagan and Bush have ensured that the federal courts 
will not be representative. Instead, they are a bastion of white America. They 
stand as a symbol of white power." Stephen R. Reinhardt, Riots, Racism, and the 
Courts, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1993). 
Advocates for the subordinated obviously have recognized the inhospitality of 
the current judiciary to their claims in formulating strategies. See White, supra 
note 53, at  536-37 (noting difficulties facing poor people's advocates due to swing 
to the right of federal government and courts and suggesting that impact litigation 
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been some success, there have been stunning litigation failures 
as well, particularly in the Supreme C ~ u r t . " ~  Some refugee 
rights advocates, claiming that negotiations with the executive 
branch might have produced more favorable results, second- 
guessed the decision to attempt to halt the Haitian repatriation 
program through litigati~n.~" Whether or not that criticism 
is justified, the evaluation of possible litigation must be viewed 
in light of viable alternatives. During the 1980s, the Reagan 
administration took some rigid stands on immigration matters, 
which President Bush often continued.351 The Presidency has 
changed hands, however, and negotiation may prove more 
fruitful than it once 
Deeper criticisms of litigation require consideration as 
well. In other substantive areas, critics have argued that litiga- 
tion has preserved, if not strengthened, the status 
Care must be taken in formulating and pursuing litigation 
strategies to avoid that pitfall. More fundamentally, litigation, 
particularly impact litigation with its laudable reform goals, 
may do little in the long run to empower the disempower- 
ed.354 Impact litigation in particular often treats class mem- 
bers as little more than passive observers, pawns of well-mean- 
ing attorneys pursuing social change.355 The nominal role of 
may not be "optimal response" to social problems). 
349. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); Reno v. 
Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993). 
350. See Beck, supra note 134, at 59 (quoting Arthur Helton, Lawyers Com- 
mittee for Human Rights: "I think it's fair to say that the [Haitian] litigation has 
contributed to revision of the executive order [which ultimately ended screening for 
asylum applicants] . . . . I think it was unanticipated, but an unfortunate conse- 
quence . . . . I t  should remind us all of the inherent risks in the throw of the dice 
that is an inevitable part of public interest litigation in the policy area."); see also 
Gregg A. Beyer, Establishing the United States Asylum O#iier Corps: A First Re- 
port, 4 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 455, 463 n.63 (1992) (suggesting that INS delay in 
improving asylum adjudication system may have been caused by litigation challeng- 
ing the system and fear of acknowledging weaknesses in current procedure). 
351. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 130-59 (discussing Haitian inter- 
diction program). 
352. But see supra text accompanying notes 123, 141 (discussing Clinton 
administration's proposed asylum "reforms" and rehsal to change President Bush's 
Haitian repatriation policy). 
353. See, e.g., Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. 
REV. 1049 (1978); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicdization of the Wagner Act and 
the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 
(1978). 
354. See White, supra note 53, at 540-41. 
355. See F. RAYMOND ~ R K S  ET AL., THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND PROFES- 
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noncitizens in the legal system can be nothing other than 
disempowering. That glimpse at law in action is unlikely t o  
mobilize them to demand change when attorneys are unavail- 
able to  take charge. Empowerment is necessary to avoid future 
litigation. Noncitizens have limited power in society and may 
be left after litigation, even if successful in its aims, with the 
firm impression that legal institutions-strange, alienating, 
and foreign as they are-render them just as powerless.356 
Lawyers therefore must address strategies besides litigation, 
which may require them to re-evaluate their role as attorneys 
promoting social change. 
C. Strategies that Facilitate Storytelling 
At least in the long run, political solutions to the plight of 
noncitizens appear more likely to bear fruit than does litiga- 
t i ~ n . ~ "  Indeed, mobilization may be the only long-term solu- 
tion t o  the political powerlessness of the immigrant community 
and allow noncitizens to  control their destiny. Concerted pres- 
sure, even during conservative presidencies, at times has con- 
vinced the INS to alleviate the harshness of its policies.358 
Lobbying efforts might change the immigration laws and re- 
strain the immigration bureaucracy. In light of the new nativ- 
ism,ss9 however, it may be unrealistic to  hope to convince 
Congress to affirmatively enact legislation significantly chang- 
SIONAL RESPONSIBIL~ 230-31 (1972) (describing public interest client as "client for 
the situation" in which client cedes decisionmaking authority to attorney because 
public interest is paramount); White, supra note 53, at 545 ("[Iln practice, welfare 
litigators often subordinate their clients' perceptions of need to the lawyers' own 
agendas for reform. They rarely design litigation to respond to their clients' own 
priorities and ideas. Rather, litigation is designed to effect broad reforms that will 
benefit the whole class of welfare recipients.") (footnotes omitted); id. at 545 11.45 
("Clients rarely deliberate with the lawyers, as equals, in formulating . . . goals, 
and clients' personal feelings of injury are seldom the primary data that counsel 
respond to."). 
356. See Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in 
the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1615 n.21 (1989) (observ- 
ing that "the relatively disempowered feel profoundly ambivalent about law and 
lawyers"); White, supra note 53, at  542 (contending that litigation is unlikely to 
mobilize clients because "the majority of poor people perceive litigation as an alien 
or even hostile cultural setting"). 
357. See generally GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT (1993) 
(arguing that subordinated minorities must seek greater influence in political com- 
munity to foment change, rather than pursue litigation). 
358. See supra text accompanying notes 272-75 (mentioning INS creation of 
semi-autonomous asylum officers and its change in parole policy). 
359. See supra text accompanying notes 82-129. 
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ing the status quo (at least in a manner favorable to 
noncitizens). Indeed, it  may be overly optimistic to believe that 
immigrant advocates will be able to stave off the growing spate 
of anti-immigrant legi~lation.~" In any event, the reforms 
that might be achieved through lobbying and negotiation obvi- 
ously would be incremental and, in that way, face limitations 
similar to those of litigation? 
The political winds, however, may well change. At some 
point, broad support might coalesce around meaningfid immi- 
gration reform that resolves the serious deep-seated problems 
in the immigration bureaucracy. Numerous immigration en- 
forcement and adjudication reforms have been advocated for 
many years.362 A key ingredient to fundamental change in my 
view is a restructuring of the immigration bureaucracy. One 
ambitious proposal, advocated by a former INS Commissioner, 
calls for the removal of the INS from the Justice Department, 
thereby affording the agency more political i n d e p e n d e n ~ e . ~ ~  
Another former INS Commissioner suggested removal of the 
Border Patrol from the INS so that the agency may devote its 
attentions to its service  obligation^.^" Either proposal might 
free the INS from attempting the near impossible task of bal- 
360. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11, 121-23 (discussing anti-immi- 
grant legislation). 
361. See supra text accompanying notes 346-47. 
362. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency 
Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297 (1986); 
Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1980); Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 1141 (1984); see also Johnson, supra note 160, at 443-54 (discussing 
possible reforms to the structure of asylum adjudication). 
363. See Gene McNary, Testimony Before the Congress of the United States 
House of Representatives, Information, Justice, Transportation, and Agricultural 
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations 7-8 (Mar:30, 1993) (unpub- 
lished manuscript on fde with the author) [hereinafter McNary Testimony] (stating 
that Justice Department's enforcement nature was inconsistent with INS service 
function and emphasizing lack of Attorney General's knowledge of immigration 
law-"Most Attorneys General not only don't know anything about immigration, 
they don't have the slightest interest."); see also H.R. REP NO. 216, supra note 262, 
a t  27 (noting that former Commissioner McNary advocated that INS should report 
directly to the President as a Cabinet level position or an independent agency). 
364. See Leone1 J. Castillo, Summary of Testimony to the Information, Justice, 
Transportation, and Agricultural Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Opera- 
tions 8-9 (Mar. 30, 1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 216, supra note 262, at 23, 26 (mentioning that former Commis- 
sioner Castillo observed that the Border Patrol traditionally provided leadership to 
INS, which gave the INS a non-service-oriented background and that, consequently, 
the INS is "torn in several directions") (footnote omitted). 
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ancing the agency's wildly divergent service and enforcement 
To facilitate favorable change a t  the proper time, efforts 
might wisely be directed a t  mobilizing the immigrant commu- 
nity in creative fashions to allow their voice to be heard. Such 
efforts may be the only long-run alternative likely to facilitate 
meaningful change in the immigration bureaucracy. To do so, 
lawyers may need to reconceptualize their function as agents of 
change. Imaginative approaches to the practice of law may 
assist attorneys attempting to empower marginalized peo- 
p l e ~ . ~ ~ ~  
Novel efforts a t  community organization and mobilization 
of noncitizens may educate the public about the true state of 
affairs, which is a prerequisite to positive change.367 The im- 
ages we collectively share about immigrants affect how people 
(including their  attorney^):^ lawmakers, and policymakers 
view immigrants and decide how they should be treated.369 
365. See supra text accompanying notes 268-69. 
366. See, e.g., GERALD P. L~PEZ,  REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VI- 
SION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 11 (1992) (advocating active collaboration 
between lawyer and minority client in "lawyering against subordination" as opposed 
to the "regnant" idea of the lawyer for the subordinated); White, supra note 53, a t  
546-63 (discussing use of "speak outs" among disability recipients to allow them to 
describe their plight, and use of theater group of homeless, to assist in mobilizing 
to bring change); see also Richard F. Klawiter, Comment, iLA RERRA ES NUESTRA! 
The Campesino Struggle in El Salvador and a Vision of Community-Based Lawyer- 
ing, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1625, 1680-89 (1990) (arguing that community-based strate- 
gies rather than litigation should be utilized to attack deeper causes of subordina- 
tion). 
367. See Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness 
Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1764 (1990) (arguing that we should listen "long 
and hard to less privileged voices" to rectifjr "historical devoicing"); Robert A. Wil- 
liams, Jr., Gendered Checks and Balances: Understanding the Legacy of White Pa- 
triarchy in an American Indian Cultural Context, 24 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (1990) 
("[The] common tendency 'to treat one's own perspective as true, rather than as 
one of many possible points of view,' is particularly complicated by the continuing 
and pervasive legacy of four centuries of white patriarchy in our society.") (footnote 
omitted); cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Case for a Constitutional Right to 
Minimum Entitlements, 44 MERCER L. REV. 525, 528-29 (1993) (noting that "[tlhe 
poor are invisible to most Americans" and that war on poverty in 1960s followed 
growing public awareness of poverty). 
368. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning 
Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) (arguing that poverty law- 
yers should listen to the stories of their clients). 
369. See Delgado, supra note 14, a t  2413 (arguing that "[s]tories, parables, 
chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for destroying mindse t the  bundle 
of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a back- 
ground of which legal and political discourse takes place"); Gerald P. L6pez, Lay 
Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984) (analyzing how "stock stories" affect percep- 
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One well-known immigration example of how stories affect 
legislative judgments involves the INA's juhcial review provi- 
sions. In response to the much-discussed delay and manipula- 
tion of the deportation process by Carlos Marcello, a reputed 
racketeer:?' Congress significantly narrowed the review pro- 
visions. The truth of the matter was that "[tlhe magnitude of 
the delay in [Marcello's] case was hardly typical, and in any 
event the bulk of that delay resulted from other countries' 
refusals to receive him rather than from defects in the review 
system.'"71 Unless appropriate measures are taken, stories of 
a radical sheik, Chinese being smuggled by organized crime 
into the country, and the like will animate legislative and regu- 
latory change to the detriment of noncit izen~.~?~ These stories 
may distort reality.373 
Many citizens are unaware of how the ordinary noncitizen 
lives in this country, many of whom are not nearly as lucky as 
Victor and Lillian Cordero temporarily were. A great number of 
undocumented persons, for example, live difficult lives on the 
economic, as well as political, margins. But how many people 
tion and interpretation of everyday world and analysis of problems as well as solu- 
tions); see also David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 
M I C H .  L. REV. 2152, 2155-56 (1989) (claiming that law silences "the voices of racial 
minorities, of women, of homosexuals, of the poor"); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to 
the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 
(1987) (arguing that Critical Legal Studies movement should look to voices of sub- 
ordinated peoples in developing theory); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of 
Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White 
Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219 (analyzing how myths about 
Indians affected development of federal Indian law). This view is not limited to 
those deeply critical of the status quo. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Rule lob-5 
as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S7, S8-11 (1993) (discussing psy- 
chological literature and analyzing how "stories about investing" affected develop- 
ment of securities law). 
370. See H.R. REP. NO. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, 11 (1961); see also 
ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 15, a t  859-61 (discussing Marcello story's influ- 
ence on congressional revision of judicial review provisions); supra text accompany- 
ing notes 254-56 (discussing congressional amendment of the INA's judicial review 
provisions). 
371. LEGOMSKY, supra note 235, at 698. 
372. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11, 121-23. 
373. See Sue Fishkoff, More Illegal Israelis in New York than Chinese, JERU- 
SALEM POST, Sept. 5, 1993 (reporting results of study by the State of New York 
concluding that more undocumented Israelis lived in New York than undocumented 
Chinese); Deborah Sontag, Study Sees Illegal Aliens in New Light, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 2, 1993, at B1 (reporting that same study showed that the three largest 
groups of undocumented persons in New York were from Ecuador, Italy, and Po- 
land, contrary to popular perceptions that Chinese and Central Americans were the 
most numerous). 
11391 IMAGES OF THE IMMIGRANT 1231 
know of the everyday difficulties facing undocumented persons 
like Maria Elena, a housekeeper living in San Francisco's Mis- 
sion What about the travails of undocumented 
families-men, women, and children-who pick the crops that 
feed the nation?375 What about the lives of undocumented 
workers who work behind the scenes in many of our favorite 
restaurants376 or in urban sweatshops?377 How about the 
success stories of undocumented noncitizens, such as the high 
school valedictorian who earned a scholarship to the University 
of Chicago and turned himself in to the INS?378 Why is it that 
so much is said about "asylum abuse"37g with so little men- 
tion made of the details of the political persecution feared by 
asylum-seekers, such as the Haitians380 and others?381 
374. See Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (1989) (recounting story of Maria Elena); see also Kate Taylor, Bleak Life 
for Illegals in Marin, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 1, 1993, at A1 (describing difficult lives of 
undocumented population in Marin County, California); Suzanne Espinosa, Hard 
Times in Nation of Opportunity, S.F. CHRON., June 22, 1993, a t  A1 (describing 
conditions of undocumented families living in garages and overcrowded apartments). 
375. See generally CLETUS E. DANIEL, BITER HARVEST: A HISTORY OF CALI- 
FORNIA FARMWORKERS, 1870-1941 (1981) (analyzing the historical political 
powerlessness of farmworkers in California); PHILIP L. MARTIN, HARVEST OF CONFU- 
SION: MIGRANT WORKERS IN U.S. AGRICULTURE (1985) (study of migrant farm-work- 
ers in the United States). Most recently, increasing numbers of indigenous people 
from southern Mexico, Mixtecs, have joined the farm labor force in California. See 
generally CAROL ZABIN ET AL., MIXTEC MIGRANTS IN CALIFORNIA GRICULTURE: A 
NEW CYCLE OF POVERTY (1993). Undocumented Mexican farm labor in California, 
for example, includes a variety of different types of people, including those who 
commute daily to the United States, single males who will work for almost any 
rate so long as they are able to work many hours, families that migrate seasonal- 
ly, and others. See JUAN L. GONZALES, JR., MEXICAN AND MEXICAN AMERICAN 
FARM WORKERS: RIE CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY 35-47 (1985). 
376. See Pamela Burdman, Huge Boom in Human Smuggling-Inside Story of 
Flight fiom China, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 27, 1993, a t  A1 (describing operations that 
charge thousands of dollars to smuggle Chinese into United States and force them 
to work long hours in restaurants and other jobs to repay debt); see also Vicki 
Torres, 2 Men Tell of Torture a t  Hands of Smugglers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, at  
B1 (reporting torture of Chinese immigrants held for ransom by smugglers). 
377. See, e.g., Mark Thompson, Threadbare Justice, CAL. LAW., May 1990, a t  
28 (discussing "lawless" exploitation of workers, many undocumented, in Los An- 
geles garment industry); see also JUDITH BENTLEY, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION TODAY 
154 (1981) (discussing Labor Department discovery of exploitation of undocumented 
labor in garment, construction, hotel, and restaurants in large cities). See generally 
SASHA G. LEWIS, SLAVE TRADE TODAY: AMERICAN EXPLOITATION OF ILLEGAL ALIENS 
(1979). 
378. See Valedictorian Given Scholarship Admits Illegal Immigrant Status, CHI. 
TRIB., July 4, 1993, at 4. 
379. See supra text accompanying notes 121-29. 
380. See supra text accompanying notes 130-59. 
381. A compelling example is the story of one Cambodian refugee told in his 
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Noncitizens, particularly the undocumented, in a sense are 
"closeted" and, because "information about the[ir] lives . . . may 
be unavailable . . . . [,I storytelling may be particularly useful 
as a way of filling in informational gaps."382 
The facts about the undocumented are shielded from public 
view because of their political insularity as well as the relative 
isolation in  which they live. They avoid visibility because dis- 
covery by the INS may result in deportation. A high premium 
is placed on secrecy, privacy and maintaining a low profile. 
Their world, unbeknownst to many, in numerous ways is very 
different from that of the average citizen. Daily fear and uncer- 
tainty, combined with difficult working conditions, mark their 
lives. Language barriers may contribute to the isolation. The 
undocumented community fears-and legitimately so-retaliat- 
ion in the form of deportation by authorities for any political 
activity. That fear, which is not inconsequential, must be over- 
come if the popular images of the undocumented are to be 
transformed. 
Besides the hardships of difficult employment conditions 
and the omnipresent threat of deportation, noncitizens often 
are the most vulnerable to crime. At the same time, they fear 
approaching the authorities for protection.383 Undocumented 
own words: 
When the Vietnamese came to Cambodia, I wound up running all the 
tin-can factories. The Vietnamese said I did a good job, and they were 
going to give me a big reward. They were going to send me to the Soviet 
Union. 
So I ran to Thailand. The communists catched me and put me in a 
camp. In midnight, I say I go to the bathroom. I run away. They catched 
me again. They line us up along the road and walk behind and chop, 
chop, chop . . . chop our heads off. But they make us dig our graves 
first. Three, four, five miles, nothing but blood. 
The soldiers hit me on the head with a machete. I fell. I pretend I 
was dead. I hide in the reeds besides a boat in a canal. I put mud and 
ash and urine on my wound. I cross through the jungle at  night into 
Thailand. Church group bring me here. I haven't seen my family since 
1979. But now I just heard they are alive. My mom and dad were killed 
by the Khmer Rouge. 
At night, when I dream, I worry and wake up. I wony about my 
family and my country. 
RICHARD S. STREET, ORGANIZING FOR OUR LmS: NEW VOICES FROM RURAL COM- 
MUNITIES 41 (1992). 
382. Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 829 11.119 (linking concept of "closet- 
ing" to lesbians and gays) (citing Fajer, supra note 14, at  512-22 and Eskridge, 
Critique, supra note 228, at  385-86). 
383. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 682(I), supra note 204, at 49, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5653 (explaining need for IRCA's amnesty program and stating that, 
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women, for example, are reluctant to report rape, physical and 
verbal abuse, and violation of the minimum wage laws.384 
Noncitizens generally are subject to more dangerous working 
conditions and the like.385 While a few citizens highlight the 
negatives about "illegal aliens," the noncitizen community re- 
mains silent in the ongoing public dialogue. The Vocal 
Minority's stories of the undocumented are the most widely cir- 
culated. A fuller, truer picture of the undocumented reality 
must be drawn. 
By happenstance, I caught a glimpse a number of years 
ago of the lives of a few undocumented Mexicans in the restau- 
rant business. (The story may or may not be representative, 
but I tend to think that it is.) In high school, I came to know 
Jose Serrano, an undocumented Mexican, who supervised my 
work in a restaurant in southern California. Serrano, who 
supported a family in Mexico, lived with a number of other 
men in a small apartment in a complex populated primarily by 
the undocumented. Talking with them convinced me that these 
men deeply feared "La Migra," which periodically raided and 
emptied the apartment building. Deported to Mexico on several 
occasions, Serrano returned. Despite the interruptions in his 
employment, he was, in the eyes of the employer, the most 
reliable and trusted employee.386 I learned much from 
although many undocumented persons "have become a part of their communities" 
and "have contributed to the United States in myriad ways," they "live in fear, 
afraid to seek help when their rights are violated, when they are victimized by 
criminals, employers or landlords or when they become ill"); Michelle J. Anderson, 
Note, A License to Abuse: The Impact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 
102 YALE L.J. 1401, 1401-02, 1420-22 (1993) (discussing spousal abuse of immi- 
grant women and their fear of reporting it to authorities); McNary Testimony, 
supra note 363, at  5 (stating that the "illegal alien" population "live[s] in constant 
fear of being detected and deported. They work at  the mercy of often un~crupulous 
employers, they are deprived of the protection of our laws-afraid to report the 
crimes that are routinely committed against them."). 
384. See Martha F. Davis, Domestic Workers: Out of the Shadows, HUMAN 
RTS., Spring 1993, at  14, 15, 28 (telling stories of undocumented women abused in 
domestic employment). 
385. See Peter T. Kilborn, For Hispanic Immigrants, a Higher Job-Injury Risk, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at Al. There is a burgeoning literature in the area of 
the disparate impact of pollution on minority communities generally. See, e.g., Regi- 
na Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor and Poisoned: Minority Grassroots 
Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69 
(1991); Luke W. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View from the Field, 
90 MICH. L. REV. 1991 (1992); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Jus- 
tice? The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787 
(1993); Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Dis- 
crimination, 41 KAN. L. REV. 271 (1992). 
386. I recall that the employer trusted only Serrano with the secret recipe for 
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Serrano. He earned my deepest respect for his devotion to job 
and family. My experience with other undocumented Mexicans 
in that and other jobs was little different. 
I have suggested that revision of the images of the undoc- 
umented in particular and noncitizens generally is a precursor 
to change. The reason for this is simple. As an intellectual 
matter, it  is far easier to blame the faceless "illegal alien," who 
we do not know and rarely see, for society's woes and to label 
"them" as criminals stealing American jobs.387 At its most 
basic level, this is nothing other than a rationalization. "Illegal 
aliens7'-largely non-white, often non-English speaking, and 
apparently willing to do the work that many citizens will 
not-in fact are different from the in-group. Despite the differ- 
ences, i t  is more difficult to blame the nation's woes on persons 
known to be hardworking and contributing members of society, 
and who make the best of difficult lives. Put differently, if "we" 
believe that "they" are "good" people, it is difficult to blame 
"them" for all that is wrong. In contrast, if "we" believe that 
"they" are "bad," it becomes easier to do 
Ignorance of the basic facts makes it simple to believe that 
crime is perpetrated by "criminal aliens" or that "illegal aliens" 
are exhausting our social services dollars. Changing the images 
of the immigrant in the minds of citizens and their elected 
representatives would diminish the possibility that anti-immi- 
grant hysteria would shape immigration laws and policies. 
Perhaps more importantly, if the imagery were revised, the 
powers that be might be more amenable to push for the much- 
needed changes in the immigration bureaucracy. 
This is not to suggest that the relevant information about 
noncitizens currently is unavailable. Many works, literary as 
well as  legal, tell the stories of noncitizens in detaL3" They 
the restaurant's most popular dish. 
387. This is suggested by psychology's cognitive dissonance theory, which is 
based on the idea that individuals have a need for consistency in their thoughts 
and beliefs. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); see 
also Delgado, supra note 14, at 2413-14 ("Those in power sleep well at nightctheir 
conduct does not seem to them like oppression."); Charles R. Lawrence 111, The Id, 
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 317, 328-44 (1987) (discussing psychological literature on racism). 
388. See genemlly Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: 
Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10 (1987) (analyzing importance of per- 
ceived differences between groups in constitutional adjudication). 
389. A sampling that illuminates the lives of undocumented Mexicans includes 
RAYMOND BARRIO, THE PLUM PICKERS (1969) (novel chronicling lives of migrant 
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paint a picture very different from the one in the minds of 
many. Perhaps what is missing is a triggering event that 
brings the issue to the forefront in a sympathetic way. For 
example, the nation's ignorance of the plight of farmworkers 
was briefly interrupted by Edward R. Murrow's television spe- 
cial in the 19608, Harvest of Shame, which brought the issue to 
national attenti~n.~" Chance, it seems, plays a role in social 
change. 
There are some examples of organizations attempting to  
change the shared beliefs about their clientele. The United 
Farmworkers Union (UFW) led by the late Cesar Chavez en- 
joyed some early success in bringing to light the lives of mi- 
grant farm worker^.^^' Early in the UFW's history, Chavez en- 
capsulated his strategy as follows: 
I have always believed that, in order for any movement to be 
lasting, it must be built on the people. They must be the ones 
involved in forming it, and they must be the ones that ulti- 
mately control it. I t  is harder that way, but the benefits are 
more meaningful and lasting when won in this fashion. I t  is 
necessary to build a power base. Money by itself does not get 
the job done. This is why poverty programs have so much 
difficulty. Although many nice things are said and many 
wheels are spinning, very little real social change takes place. 
Mexicans picking prunes under horrible conditions in California); TED CONOVER, 
COYOTES: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE SECRET WORLD OF AMERICA'S ILLEGAL ALIENS 
(1987) (account of Mexican undocumented workers in United States by author who 
lived in that community for over a year); JOHN CREWDSON, THE TARNISHED OOR: 
THE NEW IMMIGRANTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA (1983) (describing 
travels in United States and interactions with immigrants); JOKN DAVIDSON, THE 
LONG ROAD NORTH (1979) (same); EUGENE NELSON, PABLO CRUZ AND THE AMER- 
ICAN DREAM (1975) (same); R A M ~ N  "TIANGuIs" PI~REZ, DIARY OF AN UNDOCUMENTED 
IMMIGRANT (1989) (Dick J. Reavis trans., 1991); SAMORA, supra note 60 (study of 
migrant Mexicans working in agriculture). 
390. Harvest of Shame (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 30, 1960), cited in 
Jeanne M .  Glader, Note, A Harvest of Shame: The Imposition of Independent Con- 
tractor Status on Migmnt Farmworkers and Its Ramifications for Migrant Children, 
42 HASTINGS L.J. 1455, 1460-61 (1991) (noting how Murrow's "documentary on the 
deplorable conditions of migrant labor in American agriculture[] drew national 
attention to the plight of the migrant farmworker in the United States" and 
"helped garner popular support for" legislative action). The plight of farmworkers 
unfortunately has changed little in the intervening 30 years. After 30 Years, 
America's Continuing Harvest of Shame: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on 
Aging, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). 
391. See genemlly MARK DAY, FORTY ACRES: CESAR CHAVEZ AND THE FARM 
WORKERS (1971) (describing and analyzing UFVCPs early history); JACQUES E. LEVY, 
CESAR CHAVEZ: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LA CAUSA (1975) (oral history of creation of 
U l V  and Chavez's role in it). 
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To try to change conditions without power is like trying to 
move a car without gasoline. If the workers are going to do 
anything, they need their own power. They need to involve 
themselves in meaningful ways. Once they achieve a victory, 
they can make use of their power to negotiate and change 
things for the better.392 
By cooperation with groups such as California Rural Legal 
Assistance, which combines law reform litigation, community 
organizing, and lobbying,393 the UFW tried to "humanize" the 
migrants in the fields for many citizens.394 
392. Cesar Chavez, Introduction to FORTY ACRES, supra note 391, at 9-10. In a 
similar vein, Timothy Wexler observed with respect to the poor that: 
Poverty will not be stopped by people who are not poor. If poverty is 
stopped, it will be stopped by poor people. And poor people can stop pov- 
erty only if they work at  it together. The lawyer who wants to serve poor 
people must put his skills to the task of helping poor people organize 
themselves. This is not the traditional use of a lawyer's skills; in many 
ways it violates some of the basic tenets of the profession. Nevertheless, a 
realistic analysis of the structure of poverty, and a fair assessment of the 
legal need of the poor and the legal talent available to meet them, lead a 
lawyer to this role. 
Wexler, supra note 54, at 1053; see Anthony V. AKeri, The Antinomies of Poverty 
Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
659 (1987-88) (arguing that poverty lawyers should focus on client empowerment 
through development of class consciousness and political organization rather than 
direct service and reform litigation). 
Some claim that the UFW erroneously abandoned organizational activities, 
which reduced its later effectiveness. See Beatriz J. Hernandez, Cesar's Ghost, CAL. 
LAW. REV. 48 (1993) (discussing indigenous Mexican farmworkers' organizing efforts 
and disenchantment with UFW); see also Refugio I. Rochin, Farmworkers: Strategies 
for Empowerment, Paper presented at  the National Council of La Raza 1993 Silver 
Anniversary Conference in Detroit, Michigan (July 21, 1993) (on file with the au- 
thor) (discussing current conditions in which farmworkers live and advocating strat- 
egies for group empowerment). 
393. See PHILIP B. HEYMANN & LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF LAWYERS 22-48 (1988) (case study of California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) 
describing its organization). CRLA has been involved in some novel organizing 
activities of the rural poor, including many undocumented persons, attempting to 
improve their lives. See STREET, supra note 381 (recounting organizing efforts in 
rural communities). For an inside account of how CRLA successfully survived at- 
tacks by federal, state, and local governments, see Michael B e ~ e t t  & Cruz 
Reynoso, California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA): Survival of a Poverty Law 
Practice, 1 CHICANO L. REV. 1 (1972). 
394. Community-based strategies are not unheard of in the immigration realm. 
Community organizations have, at times, worked successfully with the INS to im- 
plement certain programs. See Hing, supra note 238, at  444-59 (evaluating involve- 
ment of community organizations in implementing IRCA legalization program); see 
also Marla Cone, Oppressed Take a Stand in Drywallem' Strike, LA. TIMES, Sept. 
7, 1992, at  A1 (describing strike by drywallers, many of whom were undocument- 
ed). 
11391 IMAGES OF THE IMMIGFUNT 1237 
This is not to  suggest that the task will be easy; it most 
definitely will not be. With respect to  noncitizens, it will be 
necessary not only to  "h~rnanize'~ them, but also to  neutralize 
their demonization by the Vocal Minority. Mobilization will be 
even more difficult when policies, such as the Haitian repatria- 
tion program or the expedited asylum procedures applied to  
Central Americans in the 1980s,3~~ are directed only toward 
one segment of the noncitizen population. As with minority 
groups of citizens:% noncitizens are not monolithic. Sub- 
groups exist with different, sometimes conflicting, demands. As 
with other marginalized groups, however, the common interests 
of noncitizens frequently will outweigh their differences, partic- 
ularly with respect to curbing INS abuses. 
Filling the void through storytelling and image modifica- 
tion is simply the beginning. It is not simply the marginal- 
ization of noncitizens, particularly the undocumented, that 
requires their stories to be told.397 Nor should we fall into the 
trap, as exemplified by President Reagan's colorful parables, of 
manipulating questionable, if not downright fictitious, stories 
to promote pre-selected policy  preference^.^^' Instead, strate- 
gies for change must employ and circulate the stories of 
noncitizens to assist in persuading policymakers, lawmakers, 
and the electorate of the need for positive reforms.3gg This is 
only the first step. Innumerable reasonable changes to the 
immigration law and bureaucracy have been advanced in re- 
cent years. More often than not, they have fallen on deaf ears. 
The INS, though frequently attacked, continues business as 
usual. So does the EOIR. The inherent logic of reform proposals 
apparently has little impact. Resort to the stories of the people 
affected may be the last hope of spurring political action. 
395. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
396. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE AC- 
TION BABY (1991) (discussing division in African-American community on civil 
rights issues); Randall L. K e ~ e d y ,  Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 WV. 
L. REV. 1745, 1778-87 (1989) (same). 
397. See Anthony D. Taibi, Race Consciousness, Communitarianism, and Bank- 
ing Regulation, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1106-07 n.13. 
398. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 839 n.159. 
399. See Eskridge, Critique, supra note 228, a t  385-86 (advocating narrative to 
"redifjr stereotypical misconceptions . . . and . . . educate society" and "creat[e] 
conditions of empathy and emotional ~ 0 ~ e d i o n " ) .  
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D. A Recapitulation 
Suffrage would be an  invaluable (though highly improba- 
ble) tool to the noncitizen community, even if only on the state 
or local level. As an alternative, incremental steps must be 
taken to improve the political power of immigrants. More im- 
portantly, innovative strategies for change must be pursued to 
empower noncitizens and spur them to act politically. 
Whatever the method, the untold stories of the noncitizen 
community, as well as disclosure of its very existence in cities 
across the nation, must be told. If not, the only stories that we 
will hear are those of the Vocal Minority who claim that "ille- 
gal aliens" are taking "American" jobs, sapping the limited 
financial resources of state and local governments, and preying 
upon the citizenry. I t  will be those images that fuel retrograde 
changes in  immigration laws and policy. 
Immigration may well become the civil rights issue of the 
twenty-first century in the United  state^.^" If that is so, one 
might wonder where this Article leaves us with respect to the 
political power of noncitizens and the opportunities for social 
change. The potential for future action is shaped by several 
forces. 
New immigrants often are not popular among certain seg- 
ments in the United States. This historically has been the case 
for previous "new" immigrants. The lack of popularity is more 
likely to remain with this group of new immigrants of today, 
however, because many are people of color who are physically 
unable to assimilate entirely into a white-dominated society. 
The persistence of nativism, with its undisputed influence on 
the political process, appears likely in the near future. This is 
not to suggest that a majority of the electorate accepts restric- 
tionist views. Rather, it may well be that a well-organized 
minority that feels deeply about halting immigration has be- 
come increasingly involved in the political process and may 
successfully play (hopefully only for a time) on the fears of a 
nation frantically searching for answers. 
400. See Stephen H .  Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 
COLUM. J .  TRANS. L. 319, 320 (1993) ("predict[ing] that, in the United States, im- 
migration policy will become the civil rights issue of the 21st century"). 
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Whether or not sanctioned by the law, undocumented 
noncitizens long have been part of the society. Lawful perma- 
nent residents are in this nation entirely consistent with its 
laws. Both noncitizen groups contribute economically and oth- 
erwise to the well-being of the nation. The question is how they 
will be treated under the immigration laws and by the agencies 
enforcing those laws. Barred from the voting booth, noncitizens 
cannot check the abuses of the immigration bureaucracy. This 
helps explain the continued and consistent criticism of INS 
policies and practices. Congress, without a strong noncitizen 
constituency and pressured by a restrictionist lobby represent- 
ing a minority of voters, frequently may have little incentive to 
protect the noncitizen and may gain much politically by punish- 
ing them. For similar reasons, it lacks the motive to intervene 
to override the anti-immigrant decisions of the Supreme Court, 
even when inconsistent with the desires of the majority. Con- 
gress instead often has every reason to appease a restrictionist 
minority by acting in an anti-immigrant manner, knowing that  
the Vocal Minority cares about the issue while aware that the 
Silent Majority and noncitizens in all likelihood will remain 
silent. 
Even if immune from sympathy to human devastation, it 
should be intellectually troubling that the checks-and-balances 
system that the framers sought to create through the elaborate 
Constitutional architecture401 fails to monitor the conduct of 
the immigration bureaucracy and judicial interpretation of the 
immigration laws. Continued INS abuses alone demonstrate 
the weakness of the dynamic in the immigration realm. The 
lack of overrides in important substantive immigration areas is 
more of the same. 
What will ensure serious consideration of the numerous 
rational reform proposals that have fallen on deaf ears?*02 
Extending the franchise to noncitizens, or a t  least to lawful 
permanent residents, might improve matters by creating the 
theoretical possibility of political accountability. Such a far- 
reaching proposal, however, for a variety of reasons is highly 
unlikely in the short term. Litigation has offered some benefits 
to some noncitizens on some issues. However, despite sustained 
401. See Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Ad- 
ministrative Courts Un&r Article 111, 65 IND.  L.J. 233 (1990). 
402. See supra text accompanying notes 362-65 (noting proposals for reform of 
agency structure). 
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successful litigation, unlawful conduct continues unabated. 
That alone suggests the need for deeper reform.403 
Noncitizens, as other disempowered groups are doing, must 
articulate, envision, and adopt innovative strategies for social 
change. Political mobilization and organization that empowers 
noncitizens offers the only meaningful opportunity for change. 
Ingenious strategies have been developed for other subordinat- 
ed groups and must be experimented with by noncitizens. The 
obstacles t o  the development of such strategies is formidable. 
Noncitizens, particularly the undocumented, deeply fear gov- 
ernmental authority and the power that it wields, especially 
the power to deport them to their native country if their pres- 
ence in this nation comes to light. They expose themselves to  
great risks if they become visible and try to  wrestle control of 
their lives from the powers that be. But more of the same-e.g., 
fear, abuse, helplessness, exploitation-will continue if strate- 
gic changes are not forthcoming. 
The facts, the stories, and the truth about noncitizens will 
hopefully come to light. Then, the electorate will know how 
noncitizens live and will learn how the economy depends on 
their continued exploitation. They will learn of the lives of the 
exploited and the difficulty and sadness of their daily toils. 
These are the stories that must gain common currency to wake 
up a sleeping public that finds the subject of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Ser- 
vice, the Border Patrol, and the Executive Office for Immigra- 
tion Review to be at most of vague interest. Until that is 
changed, noncitizens, a significant part of the national commu- 
nity, will continue to be Los Oluidados, The Forgotten. Al- 
though this strategy for change may fail:* and may be 
403. This is not to suggest that attempts at incremental change should be 
abandoned. At least with respect to asylum decisionmaking by the INS, such re- 
form has wrought some improvement. See, e.g., NATIONAL SYLUM STUDY PROJECT, 
AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT OF THE &XLUM PROCESS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATU- 
RALIZATION SERVICE 2 (1992) (concluding that there had been an overall improve- 
ment in INS asylum decisions as a result of initial implementation of Asylum 
Officer program in July 1990, although noting some lingering problems). Some 
changes might be simple in nature, such as institutionalizing avenues for input of 
the groups most significantly affected by INS and EOIR decisions. See Schuck & 
Wang, supra note 44, a t  178 (The patterns of impact litigation against the INS 
also suggest a need for the agency to solicit outside advice from advocacy groups 
before developing and implementing new programs."). Others are more fundamen- 
tal. See Johnson, supra note 16 (suggesting that courts engage in "hard look" re- 
view of agency asylum decisions). 
404. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in Ameri- 
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doomed from the outset by its underlying optimism, if not na- 
ivete, we will never know unless we try.405 
International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 
37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954) 
Provision : INA 4 2 12(d)(7) 
Winner: Government 
Losers : Union and Noncitizen Members 
Overridden: No 
Note: This case is included in Table 1 (supra page 
1200). 
2. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955) 
Provision : INA 8 405(a) 
Winner: Noncitizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: Yes. Pub. L. No. 87-301, 3 17, 75 Stat. 649, 656 
(1961). Reason Offered for Override: To "over- 
come interpretations placed on" § 405 by 
Menasche and two lower court decisions 
reaching similar conclusions (In re Naturaliza- 
tion of Wolff, 270 F.2d 422 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
362 U.S. 928 (1960), and Medalion v. United 
States, 279 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1960)) because 
"such interpretations are contrary to the intent 
of Congress clearly indicated in the" INA. H.R. 
REP. NO. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted 
in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2981-82. 
Ultimate 
Winner: Government 
can Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 COR- 
NELL L. REV. 1258 (1992) (arguing that simply circulating stories of outgroups may 
not affect consciousness of in-group or change the dominant social structure that 
ensures hegemonic status quo). 
405. See Anthony E. Cook, Bqond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive 
Theology of Dr. Martin Luther Ring, Jr., 103 HAW. L. REV. 985, 993 (1990) ("Al- 
though theoretical deconstruction is important, the ultimate goal of critical theory 
should be the reconstruction of community from the debris of theoretical 
deconstruction . . . ."). 
406. The methodology used in compiling this Appendix is described supra note 
242. 
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3. Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540 (1955) 
Provision: INA $3 318, 405(a), 405(b) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
4. Shaughnessy v. 
Provision: 
Winner: 
Loser: 
Overridden : 
Ultimate 
Winner: 
Note: 
Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955) 
INA $ 242(b) 
Noncitizen 
Government 
Yes. Pub. L. No. 87-301, $ 5, 75 Stat. 649, 651- 
53 (1961). Reason Ofered for Override: To halt 
delays in deportation and exclusion by "judicial 
actions being instituted by undesirable aliens 
whose cases have no legal basis or merit, but 
which are brought solely for the purpose" of 
delay, particularly by "subversives, gangsters, 
immoral [sic], or narcotics peddlers." H.R. REP. 
No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2967. The override was 
supported by the administration. See id. a t  
2968-70. 
Government 
In Brownell v. Rubinstein, 346 US.  929 (1954) 
(per curiam), a lower court conclusion to the 
same effect as Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro was 
by an equally divided Court. 
5. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) 
Provision: INA $3 241(a)(ll), 241(d), 242(b) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
6. United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956) 
Provision: INA $9 235(a), 340(a) 
Winner: Citizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
7. United States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91 (1956) 
Provision : INA $ 340(a) 
Winner: Citizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
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8. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956) 
Provision: INA $5 244(a)(5), 244(c) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
r 
9. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956) 
Provision : INA 5 236(c) 
Winner: Noncitizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: Yes. Pub. L. No. 87-301, 8 5, 75 Stat. 649, 651- 
53 (1961). Reason Offered for Override: To halt 
delays in deportation and exclusion by "judicial 
actions being instituted by undesirable aliens 
whose cases have no legal basis or merit, but 
which are brought solely for the purpose" of 
delay, particularly by "subversives, gangsters, 
immoral [sic], or narcotics peddlers." H.R. REP. 
No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2967. The override was 
supported by the administration. See id. a t  
2968-70. 
Ultimate 
Winner: Government 
lo. United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957) 
Provision: INA 5 242(d) 
Winner: Noncitizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden : No 
11. Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957) 
Provision : INA $5 405(a), 241(a)( l), 241(a)(4), 241(d) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
12. Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692 (1957) 
Provision: INA $5 241(a)(ll), 241(d), 405(a) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
13. Dessalernos v. Savoretti, 356 U.S. 269 (1958) (per curiam) 
Provision : INA 3 244(a) 
Winner: Noncitizen 
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Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
14. United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405 (1958) 
Provision: INA 5 252(c) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
15. Maisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S. 670 (1958) 
Provision: INA § 340(a) 
Winner: Citizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
16. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958) 
Provision: INA 8 243(h) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
Note: Provision amended. Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96- 
212, 9 202(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107, extended section 
243(h) to noncitizens in exclusion proceedings. 
Other aspects of the Court's decision remain in- 
tact. Reason Offered for Amendment: To conform 
domestic law with obligations under internation- 
al law. See H. CONF. REP. NO. 781, 96th Cong., 
2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.AN. 160, 
161. The report explaining the amendment does 
not mention Leng May Ma. 
17. Rogers v. Quan, 357 U.S. 193 (1958) 
Provision : INA $5 243(h), 237(a) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
Note: Provision amended. Section 243(h) was amended 
as  described in the entry for Leng May Ma (No. 
16, supra). The conference report explaining the 
amendment does not mention Rogers. 
18. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) 
Provision: INA 5 242(a) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
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19. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) 
Provision : INA 5 340(a) 
Winner: Citizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
20. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961) 
Provision : INA 5 340(a) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Citizen 
Overridden: No 
21. Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962) 
Provision : INA $5 360(b), 360(c) 
Winner: Citizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
22. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) 
Provision: INA 3 349(a)(10) 
Winner: Citizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
Note: Provision repealed, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 
501(a)(2), 90 Stat. 1255, 1258 (1976). Reason 
for Repeal: The Court found that the provision 
was unconstitutional. 
23. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963) 
Provision : INA 5 101(a)(13) 
Winner: Noncitizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
Note: Congress overrode the lower court decision in 
this case dealing with the exclusion of a gay 
man, an issue that was not addressed by the 
Supreme Court. See supra note 204. 
24. Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469 (1963) 
Provision: INA 3 241(a)(6)(C) 
Winner: Noncitizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
25. Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963) 
Provision: INA 3 106(a) 
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Winner: Noncitizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
Note: In a somewhat similar case, the Court in a one- 
paragraph per curiam opinion relied on the fact 
that the United States and the noncitizen both 
requested reversal and reversed the court of 
appeals' conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to 
review denial of a motion to reopen deportation 
proceedings. See Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 
18 (1964) (per curiam), rev& 308 F.2d 347 (9th 
Cir. 1962) (per curiam). Because of the extraor- 
dinary circumstances, Giova was not included as  
a separate entry. 
Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120 (1964) 
Provision : INA $§ 241(a)(4), 340(a) 
Winner: Noncitizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
Mrvica v. Esperdy, 376 U.S. 560 (1964) 
Provision: INA 9 249 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) 
Provision : INA $ 352(a)(1) 
Winner: Citizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
Note: Provision repealed, Pub. L. No. 95-432, 9 2, 92 
Stat. 1046 (1978). Reason for Repeal: The Court 
found that the provision was unconstitutional. 
See H.R. REP. NO. 1493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 
(1978). 
INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966) 
Provision : INA fj  241(f) 
Winner: Noncitizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: Yes. Pub. L. No. 97-116, fj  8, 95 Stat. 1611, 1616 
(1981)-. Reason Offered for Override: To clarify 
inconsistent interpretations of 9 241(f); the act- 
ing INS Commissioner and the Department of 
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Ultimate 
Winner: 
Note: 
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Justice supported the override. See H.R. REP. 
No. 264, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981), reprint- 
ed in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2577,2594. 
Government 
Section 241(f) eventually was repealed and re- 
codified as amended. See Immigration Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, $ 602, 104 Stat. 4778, 
5079 (1990) (codified a t  8 U.S.C. $ 1251(a)(l)(H) 
(Supp. 1992)). 
30. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) 
Provision : INA $9 106(a)(4), 242(b)(4) 
Winner: Noncitizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
31. United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967) 
Provision: INA 5 2 15(b) 
Winner: Citizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
Note; The Court, in a companion case, Travis v. Unit- 
ed States, 385 U.S. 491 (1967), issued a decision 
reversing a lower court decision based on its rea- 
soning in Laub. 
32. Berenyi v. District Director, 385 U.S. 630 (1967) 
Provision : INA $5 101(f), 316(a) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
33. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967) 
Provision : INA $ 2 12(a)(4) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: Yes. Pub. L. 101-649, $ 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 
5067 (1990). Reason mered  for Override: The 
exclusion ground was "out of step with current 
notions of privacy and personal dignity" and "in- 
consistent with contemporary psychiatric theo- 
ries." See H.R. REP. NO. 72, lOlst Cong., 2d 
Sess. 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6710, 6736. 
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Ultimate 
Winner: Noncitizens 
34. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968) 
Provision : INA 9 106(a) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
Note: In the Supreme Court, the INS sided with the 
noncitizen on the jurisdiction question. See 392 
U.S. a t  210. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
held that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction 
to hear the noncitizen's petition for review and 
flirrned dismissal of the petition for review. The 
noncitizen thus did not prevail. 
35. INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62 (1969) 
Provision : INA 99 252(b), 242(b) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
36. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) 
Provision : INA 6 301(b) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Citizen 
Overridden: No 
Note: Provision amended. Although the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the provision, Congress 
amended the statute. See Pub. L. No. 92-584, 86 
Stat. 1289 (1972). Reason Offered for Amend- 
ment: The provision placed hardships on citizens 
living abroad. See H.R. REP. NO. 1386, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4826, 4827. The report acknowl- 
edged that Congress had upheld the constitu- 
tionality of the provision. Congress repealed 
9 301(b) in 1978. See Pub. L. No. 95-432, 9 1, 92 
Stat. 1046 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 1493, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978) (noting inequity of 
6 301(b)). 
37. Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49 (1971) 
Provision: INA 5 203(a)(7) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
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Overridden: No 
Note: .Provision repealed. Ideological considerations for 
refugee status were removed by the Refugee Act, 
Pub. L. No. 96-212, Ij 203(c)(3), 94 Stat. 102, 107 
(1980). Reason Offered for Repeal: To bring Unit- 
ed States into compliance with international 
law. See S. REP. NO. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144. 
38. Astrup v. INS, 402 U.S. 509 (1971) 
Provision : INA $ 315 
Winner: Noncitizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
39. United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293 (1971) 
Provision: INA Ij§ 402(a), 101(a)(13) 
Winner: Noncitizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
Note: Without mention of the decision in the legisla- 
tive history (including committee hearings), the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
amended the statutory provision a t  issue in 
Campos-Serrano to offer greater specificity about 
the type of fraudulent documents that may serve 
as the basis of criminal penalties. See Immigra- 
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-603, 103, 100 Stat. 3359, 3380 (1986). Be- 
cause Congress does not appear to have con- 
sciously responded to the Supreme Court's deci- 
sion, i t  is not classified as an override. See supra 
note 243 (defining override). 
40. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) 
Provision: INA Ij$ 212(a)(28), 212(d) 
Winners: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
Note: Provision amended. Although the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the provision, Congress 
amended the statute. See Immigration Act of 
1990, Pub. L. 101-649 601, 602, 104 Stat. 
4978, 5076 (1990). Reason Offered for Amend- 
ment: To bar exclusion based merely on the 
speech or beliefs of noncitizens. See H. CONF. 
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REP. NO. 955, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 128-31, re- 
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 6793-96. 
41. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) 
Provision: INA § 287(a)(3) 
Winners: Government and Noncitizens 
Losers : Labor Union 
Overridden: No 
42. Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974) 
Provision: INA § 101(a)(27)(B) 
Winner: Noncitizen and Government 
Loser: Noncitizen and Government 
Overridden: No 
Note: The judgment below was affirmed in part, re- 
versed in part. 
43. Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975) 
Provision : INA 85 241(f), 241(a)(2) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: Yes. Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 8, 95 Stat. 1611, 1616 
(1981). Reason Offered for Override: To clarify 
inconsistent interpretations of 241(f); the act- 
ing INS Commissioner and the Department of 
Justice supported the override. See H.R. REP. 
NO. 264, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981), reprint- 
ed in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2577,2594. 
Ultimate 
Winner: Government 
Note: * Section 241(f) eventually was repealed and re- 
codified a s  amended. See Immigration Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,g 602, 104 Stat. 4778, 
5079 (1990) (codified a t  8 U.S.C. 5 1251(a)(l)(H) 
(Supp. 1992)). 
44. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) 
Provision : INA $9 287(a)(l), 287(a)(3) 
Winner: Citizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
Note: Although the decision is opaque on this point, an 
apparent citizen unlawfully attempted to bring 
noncitizens into the country. 
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45. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) 
Provision : No specific provision. Court addressed the scope 
of INA for purposes of federal preemption 
Winners: Migrant Farmworkers, State Government 
Losers: Farm Labor Contractors, Noncitizens 
Overridden: No 
Note: Migrant farmworkers based a claim on a state 
law barring employment of undocumented labor. 
The Court found that the Immigration and Na- 
tionality Act did not preempt the state law. 
State government was the indirect beneficiary 
(because the decision offered greater power to 
legislate in the immigration realm) and 
noncitizens were indirect losers (because the 
Court unheld a state law barring their employ- 
ment). The precise holding of the decisions is no 
longer good law because IRCA, which makes it 
unlawful to employ undocumented persons, 
expressly preempts state laws on the subject. 
See INA 8 274A(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. 5 1324a(h)(2) 
(1988). IRCA's legislative history apparently 
does not mention De Canas. 
46. INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976) (per curiam) 
Provision : INA 8 245 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
47. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) 
Provision: INA $8 101(b)(l), 101(b)(2) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
Note: Provision amended. Although the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the provision, Congress 
amended the statute. See IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99- 
603, 5 315(a), 100 Stat. 3359, 3439 (1986). Rea- 
son Offered for Amendment: To afford equal 
status to natural fathers as well as  mothers of 
illegitimate children in obtaining immigration 
benefits. See H.R. REP. NO. 682(1), 99th Cong., 
2d Sess., 124, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5649, 5728 (statement of administration's posi- 
tion). 
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48. Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748 (1978) 
Provision : INA 5 106(a)(5)(B) 
Winner: Person Claiming to Be Citizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
Note: The INS claimed that Agosto was a noncitizen. 
For purposes of Table 2, supra page 1202, this 
case was classified as one between a citizen and 
the government. 
49. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) 
Provision : INA $8 349(a)(2), 349(c) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Citizen 
Overridden: No 
Note: The government obtained reversal on the issue 
of the proper burden of proof in establishing loss 
of citizenship but the Court held for the citizen 
on an element necessary to lose citizenship. By 
successfully obtaining reversal and remand of an 
adverse court of appeals decision, the govern- 
ment was the primary beneficiary. 
50. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) 
Provision : INA 5 340(a) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Citizen 
Overridden: No 
51. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per curiam) 
Provision : INA 5 244(a)(l) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
Note: The decision in part focused on the discretion of 
Attorney General under the regulation pertain- 
ing to a motion to reopen deportation proceed- 
ings so that the noncitizen could apply for relief 
under INA. 
52. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) 
Provision : INA 9 lOl(a)(15)(g)(iv), Scope of INA for Purpos- 
es of Federal Preemption 
Winner: Noncitizens 
Loser: State University 
Overridden: No 
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Note: The Court earlier decided related issues in 
Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978). To avoid 
overcounting, Elkins is not included as a sepa- 
rate decision interpreting or applying the INA. 
53. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) 
Provision : INA $5 235(a), 235(b) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
Note: This decision posed a difficult classification 
problem because the Court held that a lawful 
permanent resident in exclusion proceedings 
was entitled to due process, an important gain 
for certain noncitizens as  a group. However, the 
Court reversed the court of appeals holding in 
favor of the noncitizen that the INS lacked the 
authority to proceed in exclusion, rather than 
deportation, proceedings. Consequently, al- 
though the individual noncitizen party to the 
case lost, noncitizens as  a group to some extent 
gained. 
54. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) 
Provision: INA $ 244(c)(2) 
Winners: Noncitizen and executive branch 
Loser: Congress 
Overridden: No 
Note: Provision repealed. See Pub. L. No. 100-525, 
§ 2(q)(l), 102 Stat. 2609, 2613 (1988). Reason for 
Repeal: The Court found that the provision was 
unconstitutional. 
55. INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984) 
Provision: INA $244(a)(l) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: Yes. Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. 
L. No. 99-603, $ 315(b), 100 Stat. 3359, 3439 
(1986). Reason Offered for Override: To "relax" 
interpretation of Phinpathya. See H.R. REP. NO. 
682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 110, reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5714. 
Ultimate 
Winner: Noncitizen 
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INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984) 
Provision : INA 9 243b) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985) 
Provision : INA $ 244(a)(l) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
Note: The decision in part focused on the discretion of 
the Attorney General under the regulation per- 
taining to a motion to reopen deportation pro- 
ceedings so that the noncitizen could apply for 
relief under INA. 
Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) 
Provision: INA $ 212(d)(5)(A) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizens 
Overridden: No 
INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986) (per curiam) 
Provision: INA $ 244(a)(l) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) 
Provision : INA $§ 243(h), 208(a), 101(a)(42)(A) 
Winner: Noncitizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
Note: Senator Kennedy, a few days after the Supreme 
Court decided the case, praised the decision on 
the floor of the Senate as consistent with the 
"intent of Congress" in enacting the Refugee Act 
of 1980. See 133 CONG. REC. S3038 (daily ed. 
Mar. 11, 1987). 
INS v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) 
Provision: INA § 276 
Winner: Noncitizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
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62. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988) 
Provision : INA $5 243(h), 1101(a)(42), 208 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
Note: The decision in part focused on the discretion of 
the Attorney General under the regulation per- 
taining to a motion to reopen deportation pro- 
ceedings so that the noncitizen could apply for 
relief under INA. 
63. Kungys v. INS, 485 U.S. 759 (1988) 
Provision : INA $9 340(a), 316(a), 101(f)(6) 
Winner: Citizen 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
64. INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875 (1988) 
Provision: INA 5 310 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen s 
Overridden: No 
Note: The case focused primarily on noncitizen entitle- 
ment to relief under the Nationality Act of 1940. 
In authorizing federal courts to order the Attor- 
ney General to accept new amnesty applications 
under the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 
Congress recognized that the lower courts had 
spilt on whether the reasoning of Pangilinan, 
which involved different statutory provisions, 
barred the federal courts from doing so. See H.R. 
REP. NO. 723(I) (1990), lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 50, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6730. 
Without apparent mention of Pangilinan, 
Congress amended the INA to allow Philippine 
veterans who performed honorably in World War 
I1 to become naturalized citizens, which the 
Court's interpretation of prior law had denied 
them. See Immigration Act of 1990, $ 407(b)(5) 
(amending 8 U.S.C. $ 329). 
65. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) 
Provision: INA 9 210(e) 
Winner: Noncitizens 
Loser: Government 
Overridden: No 
1256 BRIGHAM 'YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
66. INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 551 
(199 1) 
Provision : INA 8 242(a) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizens 
Overridden: No 
Note: The case in part focused on the validity of a 
regulation promulgated under INA 8 242(a). 
67. INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992) 
Provision : INA §§ 208(a), 243 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden: No 
Note: The case in part focused on the discretion of the 
Attorney General under the regulation pertain- 
ing to a motion to reopen deportation proceed- 
ings so that the noncitizen could apply for relief 
under INA. 
68. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) 
Provision: INA 8 101(a)(42) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen 
Overridden : No 
69. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993) 
Provision : INA 8 242(a)(1) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizens 
Overridden: No 
Note: The case in part focused on the validity of a 
regulation promulgated pursuant to INA 
8 242(a). 
70. Reno v. Catholic Social Sews., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2485 (1993) 
Provision : INA 8 245A 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen s 
Overridden: No 
71. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) 
Provision: INA 8 243(h)( 1) 
Winner: Government 
Loser: Noncitizen s 
Overridden: No 
